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Abstract
Machine Learning (ML) is a transformative technology at the forefront of
many modern research endeavours. The technology is generating a
tremendous amount of attention from researchers and practitioners,
providing new approaches to solving complex classification and regression
tasks. While concepts such as Deep Learning have existed for many years,
the computational power for realising the utility of these algorithms in
real-world applications has only recently become available. This
dissertation investigated the efficacy of a novel, general method for
deploying ML in a variety of complex tasks, where best feature selection,
data-set labelling, model definition and training processes were determined
automatically. Models were developed in an iterative fashion, evaluated
using both training and validation data sets. The proposed method was
evaluated using three distinct case studies, describing complex classification
tasks often requiring significant input from human experts.
The results achieved demonstrate that the proposed method compares
with, and often outperforms, less general, comparable methods designed
specifically for each task. Feature selection, data-set annotation, model
design and training processes were optimised by the method, where less
complex, comparatively accurate classifiers with lower dependency on
computational power and human expert intervention were produced. In
chapter 4, the proposed method demonstrated improved efficacy over
comparable systems, automatically identifying and classifying complex
application protocols traversing IP networks. In chapter 5, the proposed
method was able to discriminate between normal and anomalous traffic,
maintaining accuracy in excess of 99%, while reducing false alarms to a
mere 0.08%. Finally, in chapter 6, the proposed method discovered more
optimal classifiers than those implemented by comparable methods, with
ii
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classification scores rivalling those achieved by state-of-the-art systems.
The findings of this research concluded that developing a fully
automated, general method, exhibiting efficacy in a wide variety of complex
classification tasks with minimal expert intervention, was possible. The
method and various artefacts produced in each case study of this
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A field of computer science concerned with the development of
computer systems capable of mimicking tasks performed by a
human expert.
APIC Automated Pattern Identification and Classification
The method presented in this dissertation to address the
completeness and accuracy concerns of existing pattern
recognition systems.
Classifier A model for deriving an output vector from an input vector.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
A network attack with multiple attack vectors toward a single
target. The UDP protocol is most often used in conjunction with
spoofed source IP addresses.
DNS Domain Name Service
An application protocol used to translate a host name to an IP
address and vice-versa.
DoS Denial of Service
A network attack where an attacker attempts to deplete the
resources of a remote target, rending the target unavailable on
the network.
EA Evolutionary Algorithm
A generic optimisation algorithm inspired by biological evolution.
EAs are a component of Evolutionary Computing (EC).
EC Evolutionary Computing
A subfield of Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms for global
optimisation inspired by biological evolution
Flow A sequence of packet exchanges on a computer network sharing
the same five tuple of source and destination addresses, and source
and destination ports and protocol.
vii
Ground Truth A term referring to the accuracy of classification when parsing a
training set in supervised learning techniques.
Host A computer connected to a network.
IP Internet Protocol
A set of rules governing the format of data during communications
across computer networks.
IP Internet Protocol
The principal communications protocol in the Internet protocol
suite for relaying datagrams across network boundaries.
ISP Internet Service Provider
A network providing access last-mile Internet services to home
and business users.
Latency A synonym for delay, it represents the time taken for a segment
of data to arrive at the destination after transmission.
ML Machine Learning
A subfield of Computer Science (CS), providing computers the
ability to learn without being explicitly programmed.
Packet A formatted unit of data carried by packet-switched networks.
Port An application-specific construct serving as a communication
endpoint in a computer’s host operating system.
Signature A recipe for identifying a distinct application protocol on a
network.
Spoofing The act of imitating another host on a computer network,
manipulating traffic so that it appears to be sourced from a host
other than itself.
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
A stateful core protocol of the TCP/IP protocol suite.
UDP User Datagram Protocol
A stateless network communication protocol, often used for small,
latency-dependent communications such as DNS.
Zero-day Attack An attack which exploits a previously unknown vulnerability in a




k The number of clusters in a particular data set.
eps Epsilon: A parameter for clustering that specifies how close data points should
be to each other to be part of the same cluster.
minPTS Minimum Data Points: Specifies how many neighbours should be in close




Machine Learning (ML), a sub-field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) concerned
with learning from data or experience, has gained widespread adoption in
many data-driven tasks over the past decade. This can be attributed to two
main developments, namely, the abundance of data and the availability of
adequate computational power to explore it (Rogers and Girolami, 2016).
Significantly more data is collected and stored today by a variety of systems
than in previous years (Hendrickson, 2010). Owing to the size and
complexity of these data sets, useful content needs to be identified and
extracted effectively, avoiding information overload1. ML methods provide
the tools to model this high-dimensional, complex data, locating and
recommending the most relevant content. Larger data sets require more
complex models, inherently demanding significantly more computational
resources.
The amount of computational power, per dollar, has increased
exponentially over the past decade, at an estimated, average rate of around
55 percent per annum since 1940 (Nordhaus, 2001). These substantial gains
have had a profound affect on ML, allowing conventionally simple models,
such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), to expand in complexity and,
subsequently, their usefulness. Deep Learning (DL) networks are more
complex ANNs, consisting of multiple layers. Each of these layers provides
its own level of non-linearity, something that cannot be contained in a
single layer. Increasing model complexity for complex tasks produces more
generalised classifiers, avoiding conventional ANN pitfalls such as
1Information overload refers to overwhelming a user with too much data or information
1
over-fitting. These multiple layers subsequently allow the algorithm to more
accurately model high-level abstractions found in large, complex data sets.
The ability of ML to model high-dimensional, complex data sets makes
it attractive for a number of classification tasks. The application of this
technology in each task is, however, complicated by a number of factors -
the most prevalent being dependency on human experts for successful
implementation. Overcoming these obstacles will lead to a more pervasive
deployment of ML-based classification technologies across a broad range of
tasks in multiple domains.
1.1 Motivation
Technologies such as deep learning may allow more complex models to be
developed, however the design of these networks is still predominantly
performed by human experts, who optimise the design of each classifier
through an empirical process. The feature selection, data annotation and
classifier development tasks, for the majority of works studied in this
dissertation, are all heavily dependent on human expert contributions.
Subsequently, the classifiers produced may not be the best for a given
solution. Manual definitions often lead to overly complex classifiers, placing
unnecessary strain on computational resources or producing models that
exhibit high degrees of underfitting. Conversely, experts may develop less
complex models, where recall accuracy is high for their test data sets,
however perform poorly on previously unseen data (overfitting). In some
cases, no expert may be available to describe the problem well enough for
an ML algorithm to be useful and thus the results of the algorithm may be
inadequate.
Designing and developing models for solving complex classification tasks
is extremely difficult to accomplish manually and is often the most intensive
part of the ML integration process. Models for each classification task need
to be constructed efficiently, yet provide sufficient complexity for fair
generalisation (avoid overfitting). The number of options available during
classifier development is vast. The task of identifying the best combination
of feature vectors, neurons and hidden layers is often too large to discover
using a grid (sequential) search. Unsupervised ML algorithms that use
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stochastic techniques to imitate natural genetic inheritance and Darwin’s
theory of survival of the fittest (observed in nature) have demonstrated
significant efficiencies for problems like these. These Evolutionary
Algorithms (EA) provide search functions that generate solutions more
efficiently than grid searches. EAs are used by algorithms, such as the
Topology and Weight Evolving Artificial Neural Networks (TWEANN), to
develop the structure of a model, including the neuron connectivity and
weight allocations at each neuron. Using Neuroevolution (NE) approaches,
such as a TWEANN, complex models may be reduced by monitoring the
fitness and complexity of models described by each candidate solution.
Research has shown that the efficacy of ML technologies in complex
classification tasks is promising, however a significant amount of manual
intervention is still required to embed these algorithms in each task. The
selection of best features to describe each data set, the annotation of each
datum according to it’s class, and the development of the best classifier to
describe each class is often controlled by human experts who have
significant experience in each respective field. Domain knowledge is
therefore key when training ML classifiers for each task. The requirement
of intervention by a domain expert for each task inhibits the pervasiveness
of ML implementation across many general classification tasks.
1.2 Research Problem
Although ML methods have demonstrated impressive results in a variety of
classification tasks, a lack of automation in feature selection, pattern
identification, and classifier development is evident. In many cases, the
structure of classifiers is defined manually, using supervised learning
techniques, trained from data sets manually created and annotated by
human experts. Each classification problem is described using a distinct
feature set, specifically engineered for the task by these experts. This
manual intervention is costly, causing delays in classifier production and
increased risk due to human error. It is apparent that a general method
needs to be devised, incorporating automated, accurate classifier production
for a variety of tasks, reducing the dependency on human experts. Tasks
such as Internet Protocol (IP) traffic classification, anomaly detection, and
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handwritten digit identification provide good case studies for evaluating the
new method, as they are indicative of many difficult classification tasks.
These tasks, characterised by noisy, continuous data sets, are subsequently
used to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed method across a broad
range of domains. Both accuracy (achieved by development of optimal
classifiers) and completeness (the availability of a classifier for each pattern
tested, achieved through automating existing manual processes) are
paramount to the success of these systems. The research problem
considered by this dissertation can therefore be succinctly stated as follows:
Current ML-based classification approaches require a significant
amount of complex, manual intervention from domain experts
for embedding ML in each problem. Parameters guiding these
deployments are limited to the scope programmed by these
experts. Definition of best feature sets, identification of distinct
patterns in data (annotation), and the design of optimal,
accurate models that generalise well are tasks often undertaken
by human experts. This process is pessimal, especially for
real-time classification tasks, where the effectiveness of a system
is largely dependent on the accurate identification of new
patterns in data as soon as they are detected.
1.3 Research Objectives
The primary contribution of this research is the development of a new
general method - Automated Pattern Identification and Classification
(APIC) - which reduces the manual input required from human experts to
achieve high degrees of accuracy and completeness for a variety of
classification tasks. The primary case study in this work evaluates APIC’s
ability to improve the state-of-the-art technology for a current, complex
classification task, namely IP traffic classification. According to Szabo et al.
(2007), the success of IP traffic classification systems can be measured by
two key metrics: completeness and accuracy. Completeness refers to the
availability of a signature (classifier) for each application protocol present
on the network. Accuracy refers to the number of correct matches a
signature makes and the confidence level thereof.
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The primary research objective of this dissertation is, therefore, to
ascertain whether APIC can reduce the dependency on manual, expert
involvement currently associated with the development of classifiers for
complex classification tasks, increasing the overall completeness, accuracy
and efficiency of these classifiers compared to existing ML methods.
In support of this, the following sub-objectives were addressed:
• Determining whether APIC can automatically and accurately identify
new patterns in unlabelled, mixed, noisy data sets.
• Determining whether APIC can automatically produce customised
classifiers, where accuracy results are comparable with, or exceed,
those achieved by comparable ML methods designed by human
experts for a specific task.
• Determining whether APIC can serve as a general method, supporting
application across a broad range of problems compared to other ML
methods.
1.4 Methods
This research falls into the research field of computational learning theory
(Kearns and Vazirani, 1994), of which the use of ML to classify data is a sub-
field. In this research, the APIC method was investigated as an alternative
to human expert intervention for developing classifiers across a broad range
of classification tasks. The efficacy of the method was tested using three
distinct case studies: IP traffic classification (Chapter 4), anomaly detection
(Chapter 5) and handwritten digit recognition (Chapter 6).
The method proposed in this dissertation divided the task of classifying
data into three distinct parts. The first, an offline component, used a
Genetic Algorithm (GA) (Eiben and Smith, 2003) to automatically search
for more optimal feature sub-sets. Reducing the original feature set allowed
the method to lessen the complexity of the task, while retaining accuracy
during the classification process. The second part used clustering
algorithms (Harrington, 2012) to automatically detect distinct patterns
present in a data set described by each feature sub-set. The
hyper-parameter optimisation (Bergstra et al., 2011) of the clustering
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process was also performed using a GA, as the use of random search has
shown significant efficiencies when compared with searching for the same by
grid search (Bergstra and Bengio, 2012). Part 3 used the clusters discovered
in part 2 as labelled training sets for producing semi-supervised classifiers
(Russell and Norvig, 2009) to identify future instances of each pattern. A
GA defines the ANN (Gurney, 2003) topology of each classifier (neuron
configuration), with a second GA optimising the weights of each
connection, forming a Topology and Weight Evolving Artificial Neural
Network (TWEANN) (Sher, 2012) classifier. The backpropagation
algorithm (Rumelhart et al., 1988) was used to further optimise the weight
values of each classifier using a gradient descent function.
The set of newly-defined classifiers (signatures) were tested and, upon
reaching a pre-defined criteria, were declared suitable for the given task. If
the evaluation criteria were not met, another feature sub-set was produced
and tested, repeating the process. The APIC method uses an ensemble of
ML algorithms (pipeline) for producing classifiers capable of identifying
both known and previously unknown patterns in mixed, noisy data sets
automatically. As the method is a pipeline, algorithm substitutions may be
made without altering the general operation of the method. For example, a
GA may be replaced by a Bayesian Optimisation (Mockus, 2012) method
for a particular task, or the clustering algorithm altered from agglomerative
to divisive in another.
1.5 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation is the APIC method, a
principled, general method for automated feature set optimisation, pattern
discovery, and classifier production for a variety of tasks across multiple
domains. Several experiments demonstrated application of the method for
solving current problems, including those associated with the completeness
and accuracy of IP traffic classification systems (Chapter 4), identifying
anomalies in IP traces (Chapter 5) and identification of handwritten digits
in a publicly-available data set (Chapter 6). In these case studies, both
flexibility of application and protection against innovation were tested to
ensure that the method remained robust and future-proof.
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The experiments described in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the method
was capable of automatically producing TWEANN classifiers for identifying
IP traffic flows. Classifiers were automatically produced for each
application protocol, with no human involvement, producing a system
arguably more complete than comparable methods that rely on constant
human intervention. The accuracy achieved by these automatically
generated classifiers rivalled, and often exceeded, many comparable
systems, designed specifically for this task, for a number of tested
application protocols. Research into the application of TWEANN classifiers
for classifying IP traffic flows is also a novel contribution provided by this
work, as is automating the process of classifier development for previously
unseen application protocols. Interestingly, both completeness and accuracy
problems are not confined to the IP traffic classification domain. These
concerns are ubiquitous in many important areas, including biological
(Sakamoto et al., 2013), engineering (Darvishi et al., 2013) and earth
science (Foody, 2002) domains. The ability of APIC to act as a general
method, improving classification for a variety of tasks across multiple
disciplines is another important contribution, as most other ML-based
classification systems are designed for one specific purpose.
In Chapter 5, the efficacy of the APIC method was evaluated in the task of
Anomaly Intrusion Detection (AID), protecting computer networks against
malicious attack. The method was tested using a publicly available, pre-
labelled data set and private data sets recorded on a live enterprise network.
APIC, a general classification method, developed classifiers that resulted in
accuracies comparable with those of other ML-based systems, designed by
human experts specifically for this purpose.
Finally, in Chapter 6, the APIC method was applied to the task of
handwritten digit recognition, using a popular, publicly available data set of
handwritten digits. The APIC method was used to develop a more efficient
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model, where the convolutions,
kernels, pooling and classification models were determined automatically.
Results indicated that the method compared with the best systems
designed specifically for this purpose. The APIC classifiers were, however,
significantly more efficient (less complex) than these comparable methods.
The ability for APIC to form less complex models for tasks like this,
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without suffering from overfitting, is another contribution of this research.
All three case studies demonstrated that APIC could be applied in a
broad range of classification tasks, exhibiting results that rival systems
designed specifically for each task, often with less-complex classifiers. In
each case, the APIC method operated independently of human experts,
providing significantly more automation for these tasks than had currently
been tested. The APIC method is thus the first step toward fully
automating the production of classifiers for a variety of tasks, providing
exciting avenues for future research.
1.6 Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into four parts: foundations (Chapter 2), the
method (Chapter 3), case studies (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) and conclusions
(Chapters 7 and 8).
Chapter 2 reviews the current state of ML-based classification and
supporting algorithms. Foundational information for each of the three case
studies described in this dissertation is presented throughout as additional
motivation for this research.
Chapter 3 presents the APIC method for solving challenges associated
with general classification tasks. GA-driven unsupervised learning algorithms
provide clear distinction between patterns in mixed, noisy data sets. The
method protects against innovation by automatically creating new clusters
(groups) of datum for each previously unidentified pattern. These clusters
are subsequently used to train classifiers in identifying future instances of
each pattern automatically.
Chapter 4 focuses on the application of APIC for identifying the
underlying application protocol of IP traffic flows (IP traffic classification).
The accuracy achieved by automatically identifying and producing
classifiers for six applications is tested against results achieved for the same
by other methods. Here, APIC is shown to automatically produce accurate
classifiers for each of these protocols, where the accuracy attained by each
exceeds those achieved by comparable methods. APIC also exhibits
properties that ensure a more complete system is achieved when compared
to similar systems.
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Chapter 5 evaluates the APIC method in anomaly detection tasks.
Specifically, APIC is tested as a Network Based Anomaly Detection
(NBAD) system, evaluated using a publicly available static data set
comprised of completed, annotated IP flow records. A second test evaluates
the method for its ability to produce classifiers that profile a live,
production enterprise network, detecting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in
near real time.
Chapter 6 demonstrates the efficacy of APIC for addressing classification
tasks outside of the IP networking domain. In this chapter, a case study is
presented that tests the ability of APIC to produce less-complex, comparably
accurate classifiers for classifying handwritten digits, compared to existing
ML-based approaches.
Chapter 7 provides a discussion on the generality of the APIC method
and the efficacy it exhibits in the three case studies presented in this
dissertation. The chapter also provides recommendations for avenues of
future research.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation, providing a summary of the
contributions yielded by this research.
1.7 Assumptions and Delineations
In most cases, wherever feasible, results were rounded to four decimal places.
Acronyms are defined at least once per chapter and a summarised list of those
most popular can be found in the nomenclature section. In Evolutionary
Algorithms (EA), the terms genotype, genome and chromosome are used
interchangeably. This dissertation uses the term “genotype” as the standard




As a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML) is
concerned with the construction of systems that learn from data, adapting
to new circumstances and automatically improving with experience (Russell
and Norvig, 2009; Mitchell, 1997). These algorithms have been widely used
in a number of fields, including search engines, medical diagnoses and load
prediction (Hu and Shen, 2012). More recently, applications of ML in
Internet Protocol (IP) traffic classification, including the identification of
underlying applications and detection of anomalous traffic patterns, have
been proposed. Another area garnering widespread interest is computer
vision tasks, where ML is used to classify objects in two-dimensional
images. An ML algorithm learns using statistics, converting data into
information (Harrington, 2012). Today, time-critical information is vital to
a number of activities, where getting lost in raw data is no longer an option.
It is here that ML excels, by abstracting useful information from large data
stores (Harrington, 2012). The detection and extrapolation of patterns
within data sets is a core function of ML (Russell and Norvig, 2009).
Broadly, ML algorithms can be divided into three main types, according
to the feedback they provide. These types, described by Russell and Norvig
(2009), are supervised learning (classification), unsupervised learning
(clustering) and reinforcement learning. Supervised learning algorithms
learn from a set of pre-classified, or pre-labelled (annotated) data sets.
From these learnings models are formed describing the observations. These
models can be used to classify future, previously unseen, data samples. The
most common unsupervised learning task is clustering (Russell and Norvig,
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2009), where the algorithm gathers data in groups, or clusters, based on
similar features without any prior knowledge or guidance. A number of
hybrid types have also emerged over the years, combining elements of both
supervised and unsupervised learning. These approaches are often referred
to as semi-supervised learning algorithms (Russell and Norvig, 2009).
The focus of this dissertation is toward automating the development of
classifiers, creating more optimal solutions for solving complex classification
problems across a broad range of tasks with little assistance from human
experts. As such, both supervised and unsupervised algorithms - the ML
types used by the proposed solution (Chapter 3) - are discussed in more detail
in the following subsections. Past works implementing these algorithms are
surveyed, pertinent to the case studies tested by this dissertation in Chapters
4, 5 and 6. This chapter focuses on ML techniques and algorithms used by
the proposed method. Additional task information, including background
and comparable works, are included in each of the respective case study
chapters. The proposed method (Chapter 3) also makes extensive use of
Evolutionary Algorithms (EA), an optimisation method, to aid discovery
of more optimal feature subsets and hyper-parameters for each algorithm.
Given the significance of EAs, these algorithms are investigated separate to
unsupervised learning in section 2.3. This section describes the composition
of EA algorithms and their current applications for evolving Artificial Neural
Network (ANN) and Deep Learning (DL) models, by a process known as
Neuroevolution (NE).
2.1 Supervised Learning
In ML, supervised learning refers to the task of inferring a function from
labelled training data (Mohri et al., 2012). The algorithms are presented
with a set of input and output pairs (x, y), x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , for which a function
f : X → Y needs to be discovered. This function may be deterministic, or
stochastic (Russell and Norvig, 2009). Where the function is deterministic,
each output is given by y = f(x). Where a stochastic function is apparent,
a conditional probability distribution function P (Y |x) is required (Russell
and Norvig, 2009). The function may determine the output as one of a
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Figure 2.1: A diagram describing the development of most supervised learning classifiers,
adapted from Hu and Shen (2012).
output as a continuous value. Where a continuous value is returned, the
learning problem is called regression (Freedman, 2009). Here, the number
represents a conditional expectation (function approximation) rather than
an exact classification.
A cost function, which implicitly contains prior knowledge regarding the
problem domain, evaluates the inferred function and, subsequently, the
mappings produced when it parses a test data set. According to Mitchell
(1997), a commonly used cost function and the function used to ascertain
the fitness of supervised learning models in this dissertation is the







Where n is the number of pairs in the data set, Y the desired values
(outputs or targets) and A the actual value, or output of f(x), produced.
The goal of the training process is to minimise the average MSE value of the
network for all example pairs (x, y). There are a number of methods to reduce
the cost of, or train a network, one of which is gradient descent (Snyman,
2005). Gradient descent works by incrementally changing a single element
















Figure 2.2: A common ML supervised learning test (evaluation) process, adapted from
Hu and Shen (2012).
The accuracy of a supervised learning algorithm for a task is dependent
on the type of problem, the learning algorithm, the specific hyper-parameters
(Bergstra and Bengio, 2012) guiding the algorithm, and the supplied training
and test data sets. Supervised learning can typically be broken into two
phases: training and testing (Hu and Shen, 2012). The training phase (Figure
2.1) extracts features from a data set, applying labels to the resulting datum.
This data is sampled and supplied to a training process, which constructs
a model for describing the data. This model can subsequently be used to
classify previously unseen datum. The testing phase (Figure 2.2) extracts
the same features from previously unseen data before submitting them for
evaluation by the classification model. In some implementations, a parallel
process is used to adapt the model in real time, much like in the training
phase (Hu and Shen, 2012).
The following subsections provide an overview of supervised learning
applications related to the three case studies evaluated in this dissertation.
These are Internet Protocol (IP) traffic classification (Chapter 4), Network
Based Anomaly Detection (NBAD; Chapter 5) and handwritten digit
recognition (Chapter 6). Additional background for each task, and further
details regarding each of these related works, is provided in the respective
case study chapters.
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2.1.1 IP Traffic Classification
A number of supervised learning algorithms, including Naive Bayesian
(Mitchell, 1997), Decision Trees (Quinlan, 1987) and ANNs (Gurney, 2003)
have been applied to IP traffic classification tasks over the past few years
(Zhang et al., 2009a). Some of these applications include the work of
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood (2009), where AdaBoost (Freund and
Schapire, 1995), Support Vector Machines (SVM) (Cortes and Vapnik,
1995), Naive Bayesian, Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error
Reduction (RIPPER) (William et al., 1995) and C4.5 (Quinlan, 1993)
algorithms were compared for identifying Secure Shell (SSH) traffic flows
captured on the Dalhousie Campus network1. The results showed that the
C4.5 algorithm produced a superior model, with an overall accuracy of
between 83.7 percent and 97 percent. Their results also indicated that a
classifier trained on one network can be deployed on another with
reasonable success. It is noteworthy that the signature developed to
identify SSH was manually constructed and that the features and rules
employed were for detecting the SSH protocol only. According to
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood (2009), additional work would be required
to develop a robust signature suitable for classifying other applications,
such as Skype2, in a similar manner.
Li et al. (2007) describe a method for classifying applications using SVMs
into one of seven classes, a subset of those listed in table 4.2. Using specific
statistical features, including destination ports, receive packet size variances
and window size information, their optimised method yielded an accuracy
of 96.92 percent in unbiased training and testing. For regular training with
biased prior probability, the authors achieved an overall accuracy rate of
99.4 percent. While the overall accuracy achieved was very high, the method
lacked the ability to individually classify a particular application protocol,
instead, relying on grouping these protocols into one of seven categories.
Also, the dependency on port information raises doubts in applications where
dynamic port selection is in effect.
More recently, Goss and Botha (2012) proposed a fixed set of features,
which included packet directionality, packet size and Deep Packet Inspection
1Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. http://www.dal.ca/
2http://www.skype.com/
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(DPI) information to discriminate between application protocols on a
network in real time. Datum extracted using these feature sets were
manually grouped by their application protocol, and annotated by experts.
This labelled training set was used to train ANN classifiers in recognising
future instances of each protocol. Using the defined features and a fixed
ANN structure, or model, an overall accuracy in excess of 99 percent was
recorded.
In the works discussed, an individual classifier was developed for each
application protocol. In the case of Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood (2009),
the construction of these classifiers required additional, manual development
by experts. For Goss and Botha (2012), expert involvement was required for
annotating data sets compiled by extracting specific features from recorded
flow samples. Producing signatures in this fashion is not conducive to the
completeness of an IP traffic classification system, one of two metrics, namely
accuracy and completeness, used to evaluate these systems (Szabo et al.,
2007).
2.1.2 Anomaly Detection on IP networks
It is important to identify and control anomalous traffic flows, or malicious
content traversing IP networks. For example, a common, complex
classification problem plaguing IP network administrators is the ability to
accurately and efficiently classify unsolicited email messages entering and
exiting their network. According to Goodman and Heckerman (2004),
spammers are continually updating their tactics, making it increasingly
difficult to sustain a static programmed approach to spam email detection.
In these cases, learning algorithms work best at keeping spam at bay
(Goodman and Heckerman, 2004). Androutsopoulos et al. (2000) compared
Naive Bayesian and memory-based approaches for spam filtering, finding
both methods achieved very high classification accuracy, outperforming
anti-spam keyword patterns supplied by a widely used email reader. The
findings in this work showed that it was entirely feasible to construct
learning-based filters for spam detection purposes (Androutsopoulos et al.,
2000).
Although often only mildly annoying, unsolicited email, or spam, can also
act more maliciously, wasting resources and preventing legitimate access to
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both compute and network resources. These kinds of attacks are known as
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks - when only a single source host participates
using a single type of attack - or a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) -
when multiple hosts attack using many attack vectors.
Jalili et al. (2005) trained supervised ANNs for detecting DoS attacks,
where an attacker targeted a network with semi-normal packets.
Semi-normal packets are normal packets that occur either at an abnormal
rate, or contain abnormal payload content. According to (Jalili et al.,
2005), the statistical properties that a flow exhibits change under DoS or
DDoS attack, deviating from normal distribution. The method was
demonstrated capable of differentiating between normal and attack traffic
in 94.9 percent of cases.
2.1.3 Handwritten Digit Recognition
Computer vision classification tasks, such as image recognition and, more
specifically, handwritten digit recognition, deal with the extraction of high-
dimensional data from images to produce numerical or symbolic information,
representing each object for ML-based classification models. In most cases,
these methods divided the task into two main parts, namely the feature
extractor and trainable classifier. The feature extractor is rather specific
to each task and thus requires the most design effort (LeCun et al., 1998).
For the general classifier, LeCun et al. (1998) states that a large number of
commercial Optical Character Recognition (OCR) systems employ some form
of multi-layer ANN, trained using backpropagation (Rumelhart et al., 1988).
LeCun et al. (1998) tested a variety of supervised, gradient-based
methods for classifying the popular Mixed National Institute of Standards
and Technology (MNIST) data set of handwritten digits. The authors
manually configured ANN models using heuristic values for the number of
hidden layers and neurons, where the lowest classification error-rate was 1.6
percent. Using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), the authors
managed to reduce the error-rate to 1.1 percent. Finally, the authors tested
a boosting method that incorporates a fixed number of CNN classifiers and
uses the average classification to identify each digit. Here, the error-rate




Figure 2.3: Data clustering: one of the primary functions of unsupervised ML.
Ciregan et al. (2012) used CNN classifiers to redefine the state-of-the-
art technology for classifying images of the MNIST data set, achieving an
error-rate of 0.23 percent. The method, like that of LeCun et al. (1998),
uses multi-column Deep Neural Networks (MCDNN), with convolution and
pooling layers as pre-processors.
All of the supervised learning systems described used models that were
designed and developed manually by human experts. This process required
experts who were knowledgeable in each specific field. For example, an
expert on handwritten image recognition may not produce a model fit for
IP traffic classification as easily as an IP expert might. These methods also
used pre-labelled data sets, where the class of each datum was known as a
priori. Supervised learning algorithms were subsequently found to rely on
the presence of class labels (predefined outputs) for successful training.
Contrary to supervised learning algorithms, unsupervised learning can
identify similarities amongst data and produce groups, or clusters,
automatically. This clustered data could then be used as labelled training
sets for training supervised learning algorithms in cases where no experts
were available or no pre-labelled data set existed.
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2.2 Unsupervised Learning
In supervised learning the objective of the algorithm is to identify a function
that maps inputs to a specific output, where correct values are provided by
a human expert (Alpaydin, 2014). In contrast, for unsupervised learning
there is no human expert (supervisor) nor input to output mapping. The
objective of unsupervised learning is to find regularities and infer a function
to describe these hidden structures in unlabelled data sets. Some of these
structures, or patterns, occur more regularly in the data set and it is the job
of unsupervised learning algorithms to group, or cluster, these related datum
based on their similarities (Figure 2.3). Clustering processes tag each datum
with its associated cluster identifier, automatically providing a labelled data
set that can be used to train supervised classifiers.
The ability to automatically identify patterns in data sets is important
for real-time classification tasks, such as IP traffic classification and Network
Based Anomaly Detection (NBAD), where new patterns are introduced to
networks daily. One of the greatest contributions of ML to the networking
domain is the ability to identify advanced and previously unseen application
protocols and attack traffic. Most IP traffic classification systems require a
unique signature to classify each application protocol (Goss and Nitschke,
2013a). These signatures are provided by vendors of traffic management
systems in one or more signature packs on a regular basis. The process
of creating and deploying signatures in this manner is sub-optimal, as the
development of new application protocols far exceeds signature production
by vendors. Likewise, new attacks are launched daily on public networks,
thus NBAD systems cannot wait for vendors to release signature packs before
taking action. The lack of a suitable classifier for each application protocol or
attack profile, in these applications, results in a significant volume of network
traffic remaining unclassified, or inaccurately classified, until a classifier is
made available.
A number of works, including those of Hu and Shen (2012), have
successfully used unsupervised learning to produce annotated data sets for
training supervised, or semi-supervised classifiers automatically. Most of
these systems follow the basic framework depicted in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: ML unsupervised learning framework for automatically creating labelled
data sets and training supervised learning algorithms.
The offline training phase is responsible for extracting statistical
features from a data set. These feature vectors are clustered using an
unsupervised learning algorithm. Examples of these algorithms include
Expectation Maximization (EM) (Dempster et al., 1977), Autoclass
(Cheeseman et al., 1993), k-means (MacQueen et al., 1967b), the
Hierarchical Self-Organising Map (HSOM) (Kohonen, 1990) and
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN)
(Ester et al., 1996). Identified clusters are used to form training data sets
for developing supervised, or semi-supervised classifiers to recognise future
instances of each cluster (pattern) in the online classification phase. The
online classification phase extracts the same statistical features from an
input vector, evaluating the new feature vector using each of the trained
models.
Successful clustering of a particular task is heavily dependent on both
the feature set describing the problem space and the hyper-parameters used
to tune, or guide the clustering algorithm. Each classification problem
addressed by ML algorithms is very different. Each problem needs to be
described to the algorithm, a task often undertaken by human experts. The
requirement for optimised feature subsets and hyper-parameters in
classification tasks is prevalent for both supervised and unsupervised
learning methods. While these parameters are often set heuristically by
experts, EAs have been demonstrated as effective optimisation methods for
a broad range of tasks.
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2.3 Evolutionary Algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms are optimisation methods concerned with
incorporating the evolution and adaptation techniques observed in nature
into computer systems. These stochastic techniques attempt to imitate
natural genetic inheritance and Darwin’s theory of survival of the fittest
(Fogel, 1997; Schoenauer, 1997). Although they may yield very robust
solutions, evolutionary algorithms are, in reality, crude simplifications of
biology (Bäck and Schwefel, 1993) and are becoming commonplace in
solving complex real-world problems in industry, medicine and defence
(Fogel, 1997; Schoenauer, 1997). These algorithms are able to find the
global optimum of complex functions (Schoenauer, 1997), where heuristic
solutions are either not available or may lead to unsatisfactory results
(Fogel, 1997).
Optimised feature sets and hyper-parameters are essential to both the
accuracy and completeness of classification systems, especially those
operating on real-time data, where previously unseen patterns are regularly
observed. These optimisations are often performed manually by experts,
using empirical, sequential search processes until suitable results are noted.
Evolutionary algorithms are poised to improve this process, replacing
manual searches with automated feature set and hyper-parameter
optimisation processes (Bergstra et al., 2011). These hyper-parameters, or
meta-parameters, are the criterion that govern the operation of each ML
algorithm.
This section begins with a brief overview of EAs, their biological
inspiration, and a survey of their application to date in optimal feature
selection and hyper-parameter optimisation tasks.
2.3.1 Biological Inspiration
Although the terms employed in EA are synonymous with those in biology,
they are used in the spirit of analogy as the entities referred to in EA are far
more simple than their actual biological counterparts. All living organisms
consist of cells, which are comprised of one or more chromosomes, or strings
of DeoxyriboNucleic Acid (DNA) (Melanie, 1999). These chromosomes act
as a blueprint for the organism, described by a number of features, or genes.
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Most organisms have many chromosomes present in each cell. A collection
of chromosomes is referred to as a genome. In biology, there are subtle
differences between an organism’s genome and its genotype - a term used to
describe the collective set of all genes within a particular genome. In EA
literature, however, the term genotype is synonymous with genome. The
genotype of an organism is used to form its phenotype, or implementation of
physical and mental characteristics. Examples of these characteristics include
eye colour, height and so forth.
In biology, the reproduction (or crossover) process involves both parents
contributing to the formation of a new genotype, describing an offspring.
These offspring are subject to mutation, where the values of single genes
are forced to deviate from the blueprint. These changes are often results
of copying errors (Melanie, 1999). The fitness of the resultant offspring is
a measure of the probability that the organism will live to reproduce and
therefore describes its viability amongst the population.
In EA, the terms genotype, genome and chromosome are often used
interchangeably, referring to a candidate solution to a problem. These
candidate solutions are often stored as bit strings, where genes are either
single bits or short blocks of adjacent bits (Melanie, 1999). Other encoding
schemes include Permutation and Direct Value encoding. Permutation
encoding is typically used in ordering problems, such as the popular
Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), where each genotype is a string of
numbers, representing a sequence. Direct value encoding is typically used in
problems where real numbers (continuous values) need to be encoded. In
direct encoding, each genotype is comprised of a string of numbers
connected to the problem. While this type of encoding is good for special
problems, it often requires the development of customized mutation and
crossover operators specific to the problem. Although the method presented
in this dissertation is capable of supporting each of these encoding
methods, the bit string method was selected for demonstration purposes to
simplify crossover and mutation operations. A customized mutation
operator was developed in Chapter 6 to demonstrate the efficacy of the
proposed method in situations where special customizations are required.
The mapping from the phenotype space to the genotype space is known
as encoding, with the inverse mapping referred to as decoding (Schoenauer,
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Figure 2.5: An example EA candidate solution encoded as a bit string.
1997). In this dissertation, the term genotype is used for describing a
candidate solution encoded as a bit string. The term phenotype is used to
describe the implementation (solution) described by each candidate
solution. An example of such encoding is depicted in Figure 2.5. With this
terminology in mind, the following subsection provides insight into the
operations of a typical EA.
2.3.2 Overview of an Evolutionary Algorithm
Fogel (1997) describes an EA as a search for the extrema of a functional,
considering the value of alternatives as solutions to the problem at hand. In
section 2.1, supervised learning was defined as the task of inferring a
function from labelled training data. This process is usually performed as a
sequential search, where the solution will, over time, converge to a local
minima. In section 2.2, the parameters provided to clustering algorithms
played a significant role in the results these algorithms achieved. These
hyper-parameters are often selected by experts heuristically, chosen
sequentially and tested by experimentation. Evolutionary algorithms
provide the ability to optimise both of these searches, considering alternate
solutions in parallel. These algorithms are extremely robust, exhibiting the
ability to adapt in dynamic environments. This ability is of critical
importance in practical problem solving (Fogel, 1997), such as those
considered by the case studies in this dissertation (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
Evolutionary algorithms are also able to address problems for which there
are no human experts (Fogel, 1997). An example of a typical EA is
presented in algorithm 1.
The initial population of an EA is usually generated at random,
performed as uniformly as possible (Eiben and Schoenauer, 2002). The
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population comprises a number of individually encoded solutions
(genotypes), where the value of genes fall within the bounds of the search
space. These candidate solutions do not necessarily have to be unique to
the population. Each candidate solution is parsed by a fitness function,
which uses an objective function to evaluate the solution. The objective
function for each task is defined as D → O, where D is the search space
and O the objective. Each candidate solution (genotype) is therefore
measured as a direct relation to its objective function value. The resulting
value is set as the fitness of the genotype, where a higher fitness score
delineates a more suitable solution than a candidate with a lower score.
The fitness function represents the push toward quality improvements
within the population, supporting the selection operator (Eiben and
Schoenauer, 2002). The design and implementation of a suitable fitness
function for each problem is therefore of critical importance.
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/* Start with generation 0 */
set t = 0;
/* Initialise a random population of individuals */
initialisePopulation P(t);
/* Determine the fitness of the current population */
evaluatePopulation P(t);
/* Iterate until termination criterion is met */
while not terminate-condition do
/* Select sub-population for breeding */
P’(t) = selectParents P(t);
/* Breed parents using recombination (crossover) */
applyRecombination P’(t);
/* Apply genetic mutation stochastically */
applyMutation P’(t);
/* Evaluate fitness of resultant offspring */
evaluatePopulation P’(t);
/* Replace current generation with best from P’ */
P(t+1) = selectNextGeneration P’(t);
/* Increment generation count */
t += 1;
end
Algorithm 1: Example pseudo-code for an EA.
An EA executes a number of generations, evolving the population until
a termination condition is met (algorithm 1). This termination, or stopping
criteria can be a simple measure - such as the traversal of a fixed number of
generations (t) - or fitness of the best scoring solution breaching a
particular threshold. These termination conditions could also be complex -
such as a measure of the gradient gains over some number of generations -
or some measure of diversity amongst the population (Schoenauer, 1997).
At the end of each generation, a selection and replacement scheme is used
to produce a succeeding population. Here, a selection operator highlights
the best individuals within a population for the given problem.
Selection is one of the driving forces behind an EA to ensure increased
quality, while reducing genetic diversity (Eiben and Schoenauer, 2002).
Identifying the best candidates within a population ensures that resources
are concentrated on those that show the most potential. It is important to
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Figure 2.6: An example of roulette wheel selection probabilities for a generation
consisting of five genotypes.
note that no new solutions are found by this operator; it simply selects the
most suitable candidate solutions, discarding those found to be less
suitable. Isolating strong candidates from weaker ones is usually
accomplished by filtering them by their fitness scores, as those with a higher
fitness have a stronger chance of selection. The genotypes of the succeeding
generation’s population can be chosen from offspring only or, alternatively,
include one or more parents from the current population, through a process
called elitism (Eiben and Smith, 2003). In either case, this process can be
deterministic or stochastic, depending on the operator (Schoenauer, 1997;
Eiben and Schoenauer, 2002). Some of the most popular selection operators
employed today include: Fitness Proportionate Selection (Mitchell, 1997),
Rank Based Selection (Mitchell, 1997), Tournament Selection (Mitchell,
1997) and Elitist Selection (Eiben and Smith, 2003).
Fitness proportionate selection, also known as roulette wheel selection,
uses the assigned fitness scores of a population to calculate and assign a
probability of selection to each genotype. The probability of selecting an
individual, i, where Fi is the fitness of the individual in the current population






The result of calculating a probability of selection for each candidate with
respect to the total fitness of a population is illustrated in Figure 2.6. Here,
candidates with a higher probability occupy more space on the proverbial
“roulette wheel” and therefore have a higher chance of being selected.
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The Rank Based Selection operator differs from fitness proportionate
selection by assigning a probability to a candidate according to their rank,
rather than their fitness. All candidates of a population are ordered by
their fitness in descending order and assigned a probability based on their
position with respect to the rest of the population.
Basing selection strategies on global, shared information about the
whole population arguably makes both fitness proportionate selection and
rank-based selection unsuitable for parallel-based EAs. To overcome this,
Tournament Selection elicits a set of k candidates from the population with
uniform probability and has them engage in a tournament. The victor of
the tournament can be chosen either deterministically - as the individual
with the highest fitness - or probabilistically, where the probability of the
individual winning is proportional to its fitness (Miller and Goldberg,
1995).
Finally, Elitist Selection, or elitism is a process that links the lifetime of
an individual genotype proportionately to its attained fitness. The result is
that suitable solutions are retained over a number of generations, rather
than being discarded immediately. When elitism is implemented, the best
candidate will be copied (unmodified) into the succeeding generation.
Depending on the configuration, more than one candidate may be copied in
this fashion. Elitism is usually implemented with another selection
operator, such as fitness proportionate selection, rank-based selection or
tournament selection (Eiben and Smith, 2003).
During the breeding process (algorithm 1) those genotypes chosen by
selection methods other than elitism, are cloned. These clones are subjected
to genetic operators, which modify the genotype in order to maintain genetic
diversity in succeeding populations. This push toward genetic diversity is in
contrast to the selection operators and ensures novel solutions are developed
and tested by the algorithm (Eiben and Schoenauer, 2002).
Genetic operators are generally classified as one of two types: Mutation
and Crossover (Recombination). Mutation operators are stochastic (Eiben
and Schoenauer, 2002), mutating or altering specific elements within the
genotype to genetically modify the offspring. The purpose of mutation
operations is to simulate transcription errors found in nature. While there
is no standard method of implementing mutation, general trends are toward
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Figure 2.7: An example of bit string mutation (flip bit).
modifying genes of a cloned genotype by a very low probability (Eiben and
Schoenauer, 2002). Bit String Mutation is one of the more popular
mutation operators applied to genotypes encoded as bit strings. These
genotypes are described by {0, 1}n, where the genotype consists of n genes
with values of 0 or 1. One popular example of a bit string mutator is Flip
Bit. This operator considers each gene (bit) independently, flipping or
inverting the value based on a specified mutation rate (probability). Figure
2.7 illustrates the concept of bit string mutation on an example genotype,
where two genes were mutated using the flip bit mutation operator.
While there are many other mutation operators available, most of those
remaining are applicable to genes represented by continuous values, integer
or floating points. This type of encoding is not implemented by the method
proposed in this dissertation and are thus not discussed here. Bäck et al.
(2000) and Deep and Mebrahtu (2011) provide further insights into these
and other genetic operators.
The purpose of crossover operators is to take two or more fit parents
and exchange their genetic material to form novel solutions. The new
offspring offer solutions that incorporate inheritance information (genetics)
from multiple parents, describing new solutions. K-point crossover is one of
the most popular operators applicable in today’s EA implementations
(Jansen, 2013).
The k-point crossover technique is applied by selecting k randomly
assigned crossover positions in the parent genotype. Offspring are created
by taking segments of each parent, alternating between the two genotypes
at each crossover point. This process, illustrated in Figure 2.8, allows one
or more crossover points to be specified, permitting parents to contribute
toward offspring at a gene, rather than segment, level (Uniform Crossover).
It is important to note that the use of crossover to form offspring may
not be applicable where the ordering of variables is important (for example,
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Figure 2.8: An example demonstrating 2-Point Binary Crossover.
the case study described in Chapter 6). For this reason, a number of EA
paradigms forgo the use of crossover operators all together, while others
consider crossover an integral variation operator (Eiben and Schoenauer,
2002).
2.3.3 Feature Set and Hyper-Parameter Optimisation
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) (Eiben and Smith, 2003) are algorithms
belonging to the EA class, which generate solutions to optimisation
problems using natural evolutionary processes. These algorithms have been
used in classification methods as optimisation techniques for a number of
problems, such as feature selection. Park et al. (2006) proposed a feature
selection algorithm which produced three kinds of classifiers: Naive
Bayesian with Kernel Estimation (NBK), Decision Tree J48 and Reduced
Error Pruning Tree (REPTree). The results obtained through
experimentation showed that classifiers based on decision trees exhibited a
higher recall and thus higher overall accuracy than the Naive Bayesian
classifiers. This outcome was echoed by Chen et al. (2008) who, using the
tabu search algorithm (Glover, 1989, 1990), demonstrated that a decision
tree-based classifier outperforms a Bayes-based classifier.
In early works, Vafaie and De Jong (1992) tested GAs against a traditional
statistical method of feature selection. Through experimentation the authors
showed that a significant reduction in the number of features required for
classifying their targets was obtainable using a GA. These reduced feature
sets simultaneously yielded higher accuracy in classification when compared
to other methods.
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Huang and Wang (2006) proposed the use of a GA for selecting feature
subsets and parameters for use in SVMs. The de facto standard search for
hyper-parameter optimisation is an exhaustive one, often referred to as a
grid-search (Hsu et al., 2003). In this work, Huang and Wang (2006)
stressed that the kernel parameters and feature sets supplied to an
algorithm had a profound impact on classification accuracy. The objective
of this research was to simultaneously optimise both the kernel parameters
and the feature subset without decreasing the SVM classification accuracy.
Through this optimisation, the task of classification is reduced, while the
classification accuracy is retained, or possibly improved. Huang and Wang
(2006) demonstrated that, compared to a grid-search, their GA approach
was able to discover a more optimal (lower dimensional) feature set, which
resulted in improved classification accuracy and task efficiency.
An integral part of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is the ability
to classify IP traffic on a network. Li (2004) presents an interesting GA
approach, showcasing the use of GAs in problems within the IDS space.
Here, the author stresses that the parameters governing the operation of the
GA are crucial as they heavily influence the effectiveness of the algorithm.
Garcia-Teodoro et al. (2009) asserts the main advantage of using GAs in IDS
systems is their flexible and robust global search methods that converge to
a solution from a number of approaches without any prior knowledge of the
problem.
Goss and Nitschke (2013b) used GAs for automatically selecting
parameters for the k-means clustering algorithm in IP traffic classification
problems. In this work, the number of application protocols (or clusters, k)
present in a data set of IP flow traces was determined by a GA. Each value
of k was encoded in a bit string genotype, whereafter the clustering
algorithm was executed. Silhouette Cluster Analysis (Rousseeuw, 1987) was
used to determine the success of the clustering process and described the
fitness of each genotype. Goss and Nitschke (2013b) found that searching
for an optimal value of k was more efficient using a GA than searching for
the same using traditional, sequential (grid) searches.
The use of EAs for optimising feature sets and hyper-parameters for
complex classification tasks is still very much in its infancy. The
applications discussed in this section demonstrate the ability of GAs to find
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more optimal feature subsets and optimised hyper-parameters for both
supervised and unsupervised algorithms. Much of the research within the
field of parameter optimisation relates to SVM algorithms, however a
number of other algorithms could also benefit. SVMs are typically easier to
implement than an ANN and require fewer hyper-parameters be tuned
before reaching a global optimum (guaranteed). ANNs, although previously
very popular, have - until recently - been the second choice for many
systems, owing to complexity of topology design, the high number of
tunable parameters, and complexities related to result interpretation.
ANNs were used in a number of approaches studied in this chapter, often
using static topologies and gradient-based weight adaptation techniques.
Neuroevolution (NE) uses EAs to search for more optimal topologies and
weight configurations for ANN classifiers. While there are many NE
algorithms, two distinctions can be used to broadly group them. The first
type are those that evolve only the weights of an ANN. These algorithms
are often referred to as Conventional Neuroevolution (CNE) (Miikkulainen,
2010) algorithms. The second type are those that evolve both the topology
and the weights, commonly referred to as Topology and Weight Evolving
Artificial Neural Networks (TWEANNs) (Sher, 2012).
Common to all EAs, solutions for NE algorithms are encoded as
genotypes, representing the design of a particular classifier, or model. These
models can be encoded using a direct or indirect encoding scheme. In direct
encoding, every neuron and connection is specified in the genotype, while
indirect encoding simply specifies how the network should be generated
(Kassahun et al., 2007). Each model described by an NE algorithm is
evaluated on some task to ascertain its fitness. Unlike supervised ANNs,
which require a training set of input and corresponding output vectors, NE
algorithms require only the ability to measure a network’s performance at
some task. ANNs have already shown great promise in classifying IP traffic
(Goss and Botha, 2012; Goss and Nitschke, 2013a,b), however the topology
of the ANNs tested was fixed for each problem (based on heuristic
configurations). Goss and Nitschke (2014) demonstrated that, by adapting
the ANN topology (hidden neuron configuration) of an IP traffic classifier,
an increase in accuracy was possible. In this work, as in that of Goss and
Botha (2012), Goss and Nitschke (2013a) and Goss and Nitschke (2013b),
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the tuning of the topology’s weights was performed using only a
gradient-based search, which has many potential shortfalls and limited
guarantees for convergence.
Given the findings of the works discussed in this chapter, the use of GAs
for optimising feature sets and selecting parameters governing learning
algorithms show marked improvements in classification accuracy and task
efficiency. This, in theory, should improve the accuracy, completeness and
efficiency of complex classification tasks, such as IP traffic classification,
NBAD, and handwritten digit recognition. As far as could be ascertained,
the only research where EAs manipulate the structure and weights of IP
traffic classifiers was by Goss and Nitschke (2014). Here, the authors used
an EA to search for a suitable configuration of hidden layers and their
respective nodes. The results showed that an increase in accuracy was
achievable by adapting (customising) the topology of an ANN classifier for
each application protocol. A full TWEANN implementation in IP traffic
classification, where topology and weights of each classifier are determined
by an EA has, according to all literature reviewed, yet to be researched.
Furthermore, training TWEANNs for identifying anomalous network traffic
(Chapter 5) and developing more efficient (optimal), accurate CNN
classifiers for identifying handwritten digits have yet to be explored by
researchers. A general method capable of addressing each of these types of
complex classification problems, and providing increases in completeness,




ML techniques were identified as the current state-of-the-art technologies in
a broad range of classification tasks, however many implementations still
have a strong dependency on human expert intervention for feature set
extraction and optimisation, data set annotation, and model design
processes. Inefficiencies in these areas result in less complete systems,
where overly complex classifiers predisposed to human error are
commonplace. The ability to optimise feature sets, annotate data sets and
produce optimised classifiers is synonymous with most ML classification
tasks, including IP traffic classification, anomaly detection and image
recognition. The ability to automate these processes, reducing dependency
on human experts will lead to more complete, accurate and task-efficient
systems compared to current methods.
The following chapter outlines a novel method for addressing these
deficiencies, where optimised feature selection, pattern discovery, and
optimised classifier production processes are performed automatically. The
efficacy of this new method is tested using three distinct case studies: IP
Traffic Classification (Chapter 4), Anomaly Detection (Chapter 5) and






An efficient, flexible method for identifying optimised feature sets,
discovering patterns in data sets, and crafting more optimal classifiers is
required for a wide variety of classification tasks across multiple domains.
This process needs to be automated, adapting to a variety of pattern types
within a specific data set. The drive toward automation in Machine
Learning (ML) is fast becoming more prevalent in modern ML
implementations (Feurer et al., 2015), demonstrating a paradigm shift
poised to accelerate the task of data analysis in today’s modern big data
environments. Increased automation provides opportunities for non-experts
to implement ML in various applications using off the shelf software (Feurer
et al., 2015). To achieve high levels of automation, a candidate solution
should be capable of addressing each of the major components currently
associated with ML deployment, replacing human expert tasks with
methods to perform the same automatically. These major tasks have been
identified and are described in this research as Feature Selection, Pattern
Discovery (Data set Annotation) and Classifier Production (model
development). Various methods for automating each of these components
have been investigated in the publications listed in Appendix A. The
method proposed in this chapter incorporates the best solutions for each of
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Figure 3.1: A high-level view of the APIC method for automated pattern recognition
and classifier production.
classification tasks.
The goal of the Automated Pattern Identification and Classification
(APIC) general method is to identify distinct patterns in a variety of
mixed, noisy data sets, automatically producing efficient (low-complexity),
accurate classifiers for any given task. These tasks include, for example,
classifying application protocol flows traversing Internet Protocol (IP)
networks, images processed via visual sensors or voice recognition.
A method addressing these tasks should be complete, offering a classifier
for each possible pattern discovered in the data set. The accuracy of these
classifiers should be competitive, equal to, or surpassing, the accuracy
achieved by classifiers manually created by experts for the same task. A
fine balance needs to be reached when creating classifiers, ensuring the
overall completeness of the system is maintained, while ensuring a
sufficiently high degree of accuracy is achieved across these classifiers.
This chapter presents the APIC method (Figure 3.1), which improves
the completeness, accuracy and efficiency of existing classification systems.
APIC is an ML pipeline, comprised of feature selection, pattern discovery
and classifier production processes. These processes use unsupervised ML
algorithms, including Genetic Algorithms (GAs), Topology and Weight
Evolving Artificial Neural Networks (TWEANNs) and clustering
algorithms. In the sections that follow, the feature selection process
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(Section 3.1) searches for a more optimal (reduced) feature set to describe
each data set. New patterns are automatically identified and grouped
(clustered) in these new data sets (Section 3.2). The clustered data set acts
as training sets for the development of classifiers (Section 3.3), such as
TWEANNs. These classifiers are trained to identify future instances of
each pattern in a given data set. The ability to classify new datum in this
manner is important in a number of classification tasks, including IP traffic
classification. The APIC method presents a novel approach for the
formation of classifiers for a number of complex classification tasks. The
first step in this process is to accurately describe data sets for each
problem, using optimised feature sets. The following Section describes
APIC’s approach to identifying the best features for each data set.
3.1 Feature Selection
A feature vector is an n-dimensional vector of numerical features that
describe an object. These vectors are used to train ML algorithms in
identifying future instances of an object within a mixed data set. Feature
vectors with increased dimensionality are more task intensive and incur
extra computational overheads when training ML algorithms. For this
reason, it is best to discover a more optimised feature subset for each
problem. The classification accuracy achieved using this feature subset
must equal or surpass that of the original feature set. The APIC method
reduces the task of training classifiers by removing redundant or irrelevant
features through a process of feature selection. Using a similar approach to
that of Vafaie and De Jong (1992) and Huang and Wang (2006), a GA is
used to identify near-optimal feature subsets for describing patterns in each
data set.
The APIC method encodes each feature subset genotype as a bit string,
with the number of bits equal to the dimensionality of the full feature set.
Each gene represents a particular dimension, or feature, where “1” indicates
the inclusion and “0” the exclusion from the current feature subset. For
example, consider the input data set 3.1:
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
0.8 1.2 2.3 0.3 1.1 0.2 2.1 0.3
1.2 2.3 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.0 2.1 0.4
2.0 1.2 1.3 0.0 2.1 0.6 0.9 1.4
 (3.1)
This set is comprised of three vectors (rows), described by eight features
(columns). The bit string genotype describing this data set will subsequently
be eight bits long, where the genotype 00110011 describes a feature subset
including the third, fourth, seventh and eighth features; 11001010 the first,
second, fifth and seventh features; and 11110000 the first four features.
The APIC method searches for the lowest dimensional feature subset,
where classifiers trained using the feature subset achieve performance results
that equal or exceed those of classifiers trained using the full feature set. In
this method, a low dimensional feature subset is encouraged by applying a
penalty to each genotype’s fitness, proportional to its dimensionality. This
ensures that genotypes with lower dimensionality are more favourable than
others, promoting the reduction of unnecessary features within the data.
The initial genotype population describing feature subsets is generated
with bits toggled between “1” and “0” randomly. Using these feature subsets,
the supplied data set can be partitioned, or divided, into a distinct number of
groups. Each of these groups describes a unique pattern (type of object) in
the data. A clustering process is used to group (cluster) the data, annotating
each datum with its associated cluster identifier. More information on this
process is provided in the following section.
3.2 Pattern Discovery
In certain classification tasks, labelled data sets are not readily available. In
these cases, human experts are often used to annotate each datum with its
associated class label. This process is inefficient as this manual annotation
takes a significant amount of time and is prone to error. Worse, a human
expert may not be available for annotating data sets for a particular task. In









Figure 3.2: A GA-controlled clustering of data extracted using a feature subset.
The APIC method is capable of grouping feature vectors of a particular
type (pattern) using unsupervised learning algorithms, illustrated in Figure
3.1 (2). Each group, or cluster, is automatically annotated with its cluster id,
producing training sets for the production of supervised or semi-supervised
classifiers. The method allows the number of groups to be set explicitly, or to
be inferred automatically, through a discovery process. Where the number
of patterns, or targets, are not specified, the method uses algorithms such
as Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN)
(Ester et al., 1996) to discover these automatically. Where the number of
targets, k, are known a priori, algorithms such as k-means are used to group
datum into k clusters.
Using these algorithms, the input data described by the current feature
subset is clustered, grouping related datum. The hyper-parameters
controlling this clustering process are unique to each problem.
Accommodating for this, the APIC method uses a GA to search for
optimised values for these parameters, ensuring tighter (more optimal)
cluster formation. Figure 3.2 provides an outline of the APIC pattern
discovery process, where the hyper-parameters controlling the clustering
process are optimised automatically using a GA.
The parameters guiding the clustering process of each problem are
encoded as bit string genotypes. Where k-means partitive clustering is
used, the location of each centroid is encoded in the bit string. At this
point, each value of the feature subset is assumed to have been normalised
to a value between 0 and 1. The position of each centroid is represented as
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(b) Final Generation
Figure 3.3: A GA encodes the location of two centroids on a two dimensional lattice for
a k-means clustering problem. By tuning the locations of each centroid, the GA is able to
optimise the search process for centroid positioning. In (a), two centroids (denoted by x)
are positioned randomly on the lattice. In (b), the centroids have positioned themselves
in the centre of the two distinct patterns present in the data (the diamonds and the stars)
allows for up to 16 distinct positions in the feature space. This granularity
is sufficient for the k-means algorithm, as the centroid positions in the
feature space are fine-tuned by the k-means algorithm. Figure 3.3
illustrates the encoding of two centroids in an example two dimensional
problem. Figure 3.3a illustrates an example of a genotype from the initial
population, while Figure 3.3b demonstrates the evolution of centroids in the
final generation.
For problems where the number of clusters is unknown, algorithms such
as DBSCAN are used to infer these automatically. The DBSCAN algorithm
requires values for two hyper-parameters, namely the neighbourhood radius
size Epsilon (ε) and the minimum number of points (minPTS) per cluster.
These two parameters are each encoded as eight bit integers, concatenated
to form a complete genotype.
For all clustering algorithms, the initial population of genotypes of
hyper-parameters is generated randomly. Each genotype is evaluated by a
fitness function, which executes an instance of the clustering algorithm
configured with the decoded parameters. Each algorithm is permitted to
run until the stopping criteria is met. For the k-means algorithm, a stop
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Figure 3.4: An example of roulette wheel selection probabilities for a generation
consisting of five genotypes.
will occur when no changes are made to centroid locations during a single
pass. Algorithms such as DBSCAN, for example, stop once all datum have
been passed and evaluated by the algorithm. After clustering is complete,
the resulting clustered data set is evaluated using the Silhouette Cluster
Analysis (Rousseeuw, 1987) method. The average silhouette for a clustered





Where a(i) is the average measure of dissimilarity between datum i and
another datum within the same cluster, b(i) is the lowest average measure
of dissimilarity between datum i and any other cluster. The s(i) for the
clustered data set is therefore a measure of how successful the clustering
process is. These values are represented as values between -1 and 1, with a
value toward the latter signifying more appropriate (tight) clustering. Each
genotype is assigned a fitness value equal to the silhouette score achieved
post-clustering. Once all genotypes have been scored, a succeeding
population is generated for the next generation. Evolution of the successive
population is ensured by application of EA operators and processes after
each generation. First, elitism (Eiben and Smith, 2003) is applied, so that
the highest scoring genotypes are transferred directly to the next
generation’s population. Next, pairs of “parent” genotypes are selected
from the current population using roulette wheel selection (Al Jadaan et al.,
2008). This process ensures a high degree of probability for selecting fitter
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Figure 3.5: Application of EA operators on a pair of parent genotypes
parent genotypes. Where Fi is the fitness of genotype i in the current





Where N is the number of genotypes within the current population. The
probability of selecting a genotype based on fitness is illustrated in Figure
3.4
The pairs of parents are recombined using single-point crossover to
produce two child genotypes (Eiben and Smith, 2003). For each of these
genotypes, bit string mutation is applied to flip one bit, resulting in a
slightly altered resultant genotype. Both of these new genotypes are
subsequently added to the next generation’s population. These selection
and recombination processes, illustrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively,
continue until the maximum number of allowed genotypes have been added
to the successive generation’s population.
Once a sufficient silhouette score has been attained for a clustered data
set, the GA is said to have converged and the best scoring solution is
forwarded to the classifier production process. A fixed number of
generations is specified as a stop condition where, if breached, the best
solution at that point is used. The following section describes the third and
final process of APIC, the development of customised classifiers.
3.3 Classifier Production
The literature studied in Chapter 2 revealed that a number of works used
















Figure 3.6: APIC’s GA-controlled classifier production process.
These classifiers were often not general, requiring a significant amount of
customisation for each specific task. In most cases, a manually annotated
training set was required for training each classifier. Both the manual
labelling of training sets and the manual development of classifiers hinder
the scalability of these systems for complex classification tasks. The APIC
method addresses these issues, firstly by automatically distinguishing and
labelling distinct patterns in unlabelled data sets (Section 3.2) and
secondly, by automatically developing customised classifiers to identify
future instances of these patterns efficiently and accurately, illustrated in
Figure 3.1 (3). Figure 3.6 illustrates the APIC process for developing
customised classifiers for any complex classification problem.
Each classifier is customised, providing increased accuracy by adjusting
the topology of the classifier to fit each pattern. This customisation is
controlled by two GAs - the first evolves the topology and the second
determines near-optimal weights for each connection. Topology evolution
discovers the best configuration of hidden layers, neurons and node
connectivity. While the GA’s ability to provide a global search technique
often results in near-optimal solutions, it is rather inefficient in a fine-tuned
local search (Yao, 1999).
For this reason, a hybrid training approach is adopted, where the
weight-evolving GA is used to globally optimise the Artificial Neural
Network (ANN) weights, while the backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart
et al., 1988) adapts these weights over a number of iterations in search of
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Input Input Input Input
Output 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 3.7: Network topology and its associated connectivity matrix.
the best settings. The topology of the network is encoded using direct
encoding (Kassahun et al., 2007), with each genotype represented using bit
string notation. A connectivity matrix can be drawn for each genotype,
showing connections between respective nodes of the ANN (Figure 3.7).
In Figure 3.7, each row of the connectivity matrix represents a node and
its connectivity to other nodes in the network. The first row describes the
input at the bottom left of the ANN topology, which connects directly to the
output neuron (indicated by setting the eighth bit to “1”). The next row
describes input two, which connects to both node five and seven, indicated
by a “1” in columns five and seven. It is important to note that inputs do
not connect directly to one another.
Using this encoding scheme, APIC randomly generates genotypes for
the initial generation’s population, where each genotype specifies a
proposed topology for a TWEANN classifier. A second, weight-evolving GA
allocates the initial weights to each connection described by the topology
evolving GA (Figure 3.6). The weights for the network are encoded using
direct encoding, formatted in bit string notation, where each connection
weight is represented by eight bits.
Using the example in Figure 3.7, a total of eight connections are present,
therefore the genotypes of the weight-evolving GA will consist of 64 bits. The
initial population of the weight-evolving GA is generated randomly, where
each genotype specifies the weight values of each respective connection.























Figure 3.8: An illustration of the backward propagation of error (backpropagation)
algorithm, where errors between target and actual outputs are used to fine-tune the weights
of an ANN.
the training set is fed through the network in random order over a number of
iterations (epochs). This process is repeated until the average Mean Squared
Error (MSE) of a particular training cycle (epoch) is sufficiently small, or
the maximum number of permissible epochs has been reached. Equation 3.4







Where n is the number of patterns (datum) in the training set, O the
desired value (target) and A, the actual value (output) obtained.
The backpropagation algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.8, where outputs
generated for each datum are compared against the input’s target to establish
the error (Figure 3.8 (1)). The error for each datum is given Equation 3.5.
ErrorG = OutputG(1−OutputG)(Targeti −OutputG) (3.5)
OutputG is the output of neuron G for an input vector with target value
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Targeti. Using this value, the algorithm adjusts the weights of each neuron
connecting to the output, depicted in Figure 3.8 (2), using Equation 3.6.
W+FG = WFG + (ErrorG ∗OutputF ) (3.6)
Where W+FG is the new weight applied to the connection between F and
G. Equation 3.6 is used to adjust all weights connected directly to an output
neuron. The weights of neurons indirectly connected (hidden layers) also
need to be adjusted, however, as there is no target for these they cannot be
calculated directly. The targets for these neurons are “backpropagated” by
the algorithm from the output neurons. The first part of this process is to
calculate the error of the connecting neuron. This error value, for neuron F
(as an example), is given by Equation 3.7.
ErrorF = OutputF (1−OutputF )(ErrorGWFG) (3.7)
Once the error is known, the value of each hidden neuron, WCF shown
in Figure 3.8 (3), is calculated using Equation 3.6. By altering weights in
this manner, the average MSE of the network is reduced over a number
of generations. This process continues until either the average MSE of the
network is lower than a minimum set value for a complete epoch, or the
maximum number of epochs is reached. If either of these conditions is met,
the network is said to have converged.
At this point, the weight-evolving GA will ascertain the fitness of the
network (and thus the current genotype) by passing the clustered data set
through the network and recording the average MSE attained. A stop
condition is triggered if the MSE of the current network is less than a set
minimum, or the GA has executed more than a maximum number of
epochs.
Upon receiving a stop condition from the weight-evolving GA, control is
handed back to the topology-evolving GA to evaluate the best solution
provided by the weight-evolving GA. If the MSE of the best scoring
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Figure 3.9: An example of a topology-evolving GA, where ANNs are encoded as bit
strings. These genotypes are adapted using bit string mutation.
have been exceeded, the GA triggers a stop condition and the best scoring
network at that point is retained. This network is subsequently pushed to
the classifier staging database, where all new classifiers are collected
awaiting final evaluation.
If no stop condition is called, the topology-evolving GA (Figure 3.6)
executes variation operators to produce the next generation’s population.
Elitism is used to ensure the most fit genotypes are transferred directly to
the next generation. Unlike the feature selection GA (Section 3.1), no
cross-over operators are applied. This is because EAs, which use direct
encoding, relying on crossover operators do not perform well in searching
for near-optimal ANN architectures (Yao, 1999). Another reason is that, in
certain cases, the ANN topology encoded is complex and inverting a single
bit may render the entire topology invalid. Parent genotypes are selected
from the current generation and mutated at a set rate, adding and
removing connections between neurons (Figure 3.9).
Once all classifiers have been produced and deployed to the staging
database, the feature-selection GA’s fitness function is called to calculate
the MSE (Equation 3.4) of the collective set of new classifiers. If the
resulting threshold is below the minimum acceptable value, a stop condition
is called and the classifiers are deemed suitable for describing patterns in
the supplied data set. If no stop condition is called, the feature-selection
GA tests the next feature subset and the process repeats until the average
MSE (formula 3.4) of the staging classifiers is acceptable, or the maximum
number of feature-selection GA generations has been reached.
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3.4 Conclusion
The task of identifying and classifying future instances of interesting
patterns in complex, mixed data sets is common to a number of scientific
domains. In most cases, a significant amount of manual effort is required by
domain experts to develop systems for each specific task. This chapter
presented APIC, a general method that reduces human involvement in the
development of classifiers for a variety of classification tasks. The method is
capable of automatically selecting and testing the best features for each
task, discovering arrangements in data sets automatically and training
customised classifiers to identify future instances of each pattern. The
method is an ML pipeline, where principle algorithms can be substituted
with alternatives that better fit each particular problem. The APIC method
is a novel contribution to automated identification and future classification
of distinct patterns within mixed, noisy data sets. The following three
chapters present case studies, where the efficacy of APIC is evaluated for




Computer networks have grown substantially in recent years due, in part,
to the increasing global reach of the Internet, network access speeds and
content availability. The Internet - the world’s largest public-access network
- has emerged as a key enabler for business and personal communication.
The proliferation of computer users consuming Internet resources spurs the
development of numerous applications, using both client-server and
peer-to-peer (P2P) communication architectures. In most cases, these
applications are not well understood and are subsequently difficult to
control (Zhang et al., 2009a). Each application communicates using a
distinct application protocol, generating conversations that compete for
limited network resources. This competition needs to be managed to ensure
correct priority assignment of resources to each application, based on their
designated importance. Organisations, especially Internet Service Providers
(ISP), need to be aware of traffic flowing across their networks promptly,
allowing them to react quickly, thus maintaining their business goals
(Nguyen and Armitage, 2008). The classification and management of
network traffic is therefore an essential tool for network and system security
management (Zhang et al., 2013). Machine Learning (ML) (Russell and
Norvig, 2009) algorithms have been identified as the current state-of-the-art
technology for classifying Internet Protocol (IP) traffic, where supervised
and unsupervised learning methods and Evolutionary Algorithms (EA)
(Eiben and Schoenauer, 2002) have been tested for improving the
effectiveness of IP traffic classification systems.
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This chapter evaluates the Automated Pattern Identification and
Classification (APIC) general method for improving the task of IP traffic
classification, using Topology and Weight Evolving Artificial Neural Network
(TWEANN) classifiers. During this evaluation, comparisons against
existing systems are drawn, and the results assessed. This case study
demonstrates how the task of manual feature selection, application protocol
distinction and best classifier (signature) design and production processes,
commonly executed manually by human experts, can be automated using
the APIC method. This automation expedites the development of
classifiers, leading to increased completeness compared to similar methods.
Furthermore, APIC’s ability to discover more optimal models for each
classifier produces results that rival and, in certain cases, exceed those of
comparable methods for the majority of application protocols tested.
4.1 IP Traffic Classification
Zhang et al. (2009a) states that the goal of an IP traffic classification system
is to understand the type of traffic traversing networks as it evolves in both
scope and complexity. These classification systems play an important role in
modern network and security architectures, providing an essential component
in Quality of Service (QoS), Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Lawful
Interception (LI) services (Zhang et al., 2013; Nguyen and Armitage, 2008).
Szabo et al. (2007) asserts that the performance of an IP traffic classification
system can be measured by two metrics, namely accuracy and completeness.
The completeness of the system refers to the availability of a trained
classifier for identifying a particular application protocol. Accuracy refers to
the ability of such a classifier to precisely identify an application protocol
using the trained classifier. According to Kim et al. (2008), two common
metrics for measuring the performance accuracy of IP traffic classification
systems are overall accuracy and F-Measure.
Overall accuracy (Equation 4.1) is expressed as a ratio of the sum of






F-Measure, often used in the field of information retrieval, is given by
Equation 4.2. Here, precision is the ratio of correctly identified application
protocols over all those predicted within a class and recall the ratio of
correctly identified application protocols over the ground truth of the class.
FMeasure =
2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision+ recall
(4.2)
It can therefore be stated that the performance accuracy of an IP traffic
classification system is directly proportionate to the number of correctly
identified application flows traversing a network. A flow is defined by a
number of successive IP packets sharing a common five-tuple of source and
destination IP addresses, source and destination ports and protocol within
a specific interval (Goss and Nitschke, 2013a; Zhang et al., 2013). These
packet exchanges can be viewed in two directions: from the source to the
destination, or from the destination to the source (Alshammari et al.,
2009b).
A unique signature is required to identify the underlying application
protocol of a flow. The term “signature” is generally used to describe a
recipe for uniquely identifying a particular application protocol or category.
These signatures are often provided by vendors of traffic management
devices in one or more signature packs; these packs need to be updated
regularly, catering to advances in application protocol development (Goss
and Nitschke, 2013a). Each vendor is responsible for the creation of their
own proprietary signature packs, compatible with their systems. As the
recipe for each signature is often a closely-guarded secret, accuracy and
performance variances between vendor equipment is not uncommon (Goss
and Nitschke, 2013a). Over the years, a number of techniques have been
proposed for the development of these signatures. The following subsections
describe these approaches, highlighting their benefits and limitations.
4.1.1 Classic Port Matching
Traditionally, signatures were reliant on information inferred from passing IP
packet headers to classify a flow. These IP headers, depicted in Figure 4.1,
were traditionally 160 bits (20 bytes) long and included routing information,
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Figure 4.1: Structure of an IPv4 Packet Header.
such as the sender (source) and recipient (destination) host addresses and
the IP protocol. Of these IP protocols, Transport Control Protocol (TCP)
and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are the most popular for transporting
data across networks. Each of these protocols has a specific header format,
encapsulated within the packet’s data part. These headers contain additional
information about the flow, including the source and destination ports on
which the application is communicating.
Using a combination of the host addresses, IP protocol and ports,
network administrators build signatures to accurately identify and classify
flows as they traverse their networks. This method of traffic classification is
both effective and efficient, assuming hosts use consistent, “well-known”
TCP or UDP ports (Nguyen and Armitage, 2008). These well-known ports1
are assigned and managed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA). As port and IP protocol information is configured by the two
communicating hosts, alternatives can be negotiated by either side. The
effects of dynamic port and IP protocol selection impairs the abilities of
port-based filters and restrictions (Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood, 2008).
This limitation is of increasing importance as both legitimate and devious
application developers seek to evade classification using dynamic selection
strategies (Goss and Botha, 2011). This problem is exacerbated by P2P
application protocols, which operate in a decentralised manner,
dynamically selecting the ports and protocols on which they communicate
(Auld et al., 2007). Well-known port numbers can therefore no longer be
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Figure 4.2: HTTP protocol match analysis.
The inefficiencies associated with classic port-based classification dictated
that industry and researchers alike consider a number of alternatives. One
such alternative gaining widespread appeal is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).
4.1.2 Deep Packet Inspection
Deep packet inspection aims to address problems associated with
identifying an application protocol using classic port matching techniques,
by searching a packet’s payload (content) for string matches. This
inspection usually considers only the first few packets of a flow, as it is
within these initial packets that the application protocol is negotiated.
These searches are often performed using regular expressions in software, or
using specialised hardware such as a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) (Huang and Zhang, 2008). Each regular expression (signature) is
formulated for targeting a specific sequence of contextual characters or
numeric values, which are characteristic of a particular application protocol.
For example, Figure 4.2 illustrates a match analysis for the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
In Figure 4.2, the IP header contains packet routing information used to
transport the packet across the network. Some of these fields (Figure 4.1)
include the sender and recipient addresses and the IP protocol. The TCP
protocol is used by HTTP and thus a TCP segment is encapsulated within
the data part of the IP packet. The TCP header contains various fields,
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including the ports (source and destination) selected by the communicating
applications.
Dissimilar to classic port matching (Section 4.1.1), DPI is not concerned
with information in either the IP header nor the protocol header, as this
information is subject to manipulation by the communicating parties.
Instead, DPI concentrates on matching application protocol information
contained in the payload of the packet. In the HTTP example, this may be
achieved by constructing a simple regular expression, such as:
^[GET|POST] * http/[01]\.[019] [\x09-\x0d -~]
Note that the regular expression depicted here is overly simplified. In
reality, more precise patterns are required to accurately classify application
protocols. Examples of these regular expressions are available on the L7-
Filter project website2.
Network administrators perceive DPI as an essential tool since it
enables them to search payload information for predefined application
protocol signatures (Huang and Zhang, 2008). While P2P applications
elude classic port-matching techniques through dynamic port selection, Sen
et al. (2004) has shown that DPI solutions are capable of reducing false
positives and false negatives to 5 percent of the total bytes for most P2P
protocols investigated. Moore and Papagiannaki (2005) combine the use of
both classic port-matching techniques and DPI to classify network traffic.
In this work, application protocols operating on well known ports are
immediately classified. The remaining flows are passed through a DPI
engine, which examines the first kilobyte (KB) of payload data for a “well
known protocol”. Failing classification at this stage resulted in the entire
flow’s payload being inspected. The results of this work showed that up to
69 percent of the applications classified using classic port-matching
techniques were correctly identified. By examining the first KB of payload,
the accuracy increased to 79 percent. Upon inspecting the full payload, this
accuracy approached nearly 100 percent (Moore and Papagiannaki, 2005).
The tools that implement DPI have also been extensively evaluated as
of late. Bujlow et al. (2014), for example, offers an extended report on the
most popular DPI tools for traffic classification. In this work, Ipoque’s PACE
2http://l7-filter.sourceforge.net/protocols/
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software was shown to achieve the best results for the test data set, with
L7-Filter and Cisco NBAR performing poorly. No significant classification
differences were noted when using the full test data set, or where each flow
was truncated to include a maximum of ten packets (Bujlow et al., 2014).
While DPI has yielded a number of success stories, it is not without its
limitations. An increase in privacy concerns has labelled DPI as a
controversial topic due to it reading packet payloads (Zhang et al., 2009a;
Dorfinger, 2010). Another consideration is the high computational and
storage overhead associated with DPI (Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood,
2007). This overhead increases exponentially when interrogating every
packet traversing the network, a problem compounded as developments
toward higher-speed network connectivity continue.
To ensure completeness of an IP traffic classification system, the number
of signatures available should be at least equal to the number of application
protocols traversing the network. As the number of applications travelling
across networks increase, so the number of signatures required to classify
various protocols increases proportionately. The storage resources
consumed by these signatures will increase over time, placing increased load
on memory requirements for classification systems (Huang and Zhang,
2008). As network speeds increase, scaling problems associated with DPI
systems become apparent. For example, the Deterministic Finite Automata
(DFA) algorithm, used by many DPI systems, becomes overburdened at
high data rates (Huang and Zhang, 2008). This strain results in increased
latency due to packet queuing, degrading the overall performance of the
network (Goss and Botha, 2011). DPI systems will therefore be faced with
high-performance challenges as link rates and traffic volumes on networks
continue to increase (Huang and Zhang, 2008).
A final consideration, arguably the most significant, is that many
application protocols have begun encrypting their payload in transit
(Nascimento et al., 2013). In some cases, this encryption is imposed to
address privacy concerns associated with DPI, and in others to evade
classification by these systems. While DPI may yield excellent results for
identifying plain-text flows, encryption renders the content of packets
opaque and thus the use of DPI inept (Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood,
2008; Goss and Nitschke, 2013a). Although much early research in traffic
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classification did not take encrypted traffic into account, a number of recent
works focus primarily on that topic (Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood,
2008). As the number of encrypted flows increase, so the dependency on
DPI wanes. The drive of application development toward encryption
prompted both industry and research communities to investigate
alternatives to DPI. This investigation gave rise to IP traffic classification
by statistical analysis.
4.1.3 Statistical Analysis
Both classic port matching and DPI techniques are limited due to their
dependence on inferred semantics of information gathered from the contents
of a packet header or payload parts. By encrypting or otherwise altering
the state of the payload, the contents thereof become opaque and are thus
no longer manageable by these systems. Application protocols are therefore
difficult to detect if the underlying payload is encrypted (Gebski et al.,
2006). A number of application protocols, such as Secure Shell (SSH) and
various Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies make use of
encryption to secure data during transit. These opaque network flows are of
great concern to network administrators as it impairs their ability to
inspect and analyse the traffic. The problem of classifying encrypted flows
extends beyond the classification techniques already discussed and has
subsequently been the subject of much research as of late in the field of IP
traffic classification (Nguyen and Armitage, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009b;
Alshammari and Zincir-Heywood, 2008; Alshammari et al., 2009b;
Dorfinger, 2010; Goss and Nitschke, 2013a,b, 2014). In each case, the
opacity of data in transit presents as possibly the most challenging obstacle
to overcome when classifying IP traffic flows. Applications themselves do
not need to encrypt their data natively to render their data opaque in
transit. Instead, it is possible for applications to make use of VPNs, which
encapsulate their flows in an encrypted tunnel (Figure 4.3). In the case of
encrypted communications (natively or by VPN), the only remaining
discernible characteristics of the flow are statistical characteristics, or
features, such as the direction of packet flow, approximate size of packets
and the timing between packets (Gebski et al., 2006). These features are
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Figure 4.3: Two hosts communicating over an encrypted VPN.
exchanges of a flow (Alshammari et al., 2009b).
An assumption underlying IP traffic classification by statistical analysis
is that over a flow’s duration, certain statistical properties, such as
directionality of packet flows, size of packets and the duration of a flow, will
remain intact through encryption. These properties can therefore be used
to infer the category or, in some cases, the application protocol of
encrypted flows (Nguyen and Armitage, 2008). The accuracy of these
classifications is therefore dependent on the features selected to describe
each application protocol. A variety of feature combinations have been
proposed by researchers over the years, with a unique combination
constructed for identifying a specific application protocol. Nguyen and
Armitage (2008) provide an extensive analysis of works in IP traffic
classification through statistical analysis, with specific reference to the
features they incorporate. Some of the more popular features identified by
this work are listed in Table 4.1.
The selection of statistical features is also important in order to support
early identification, a high degree of accuracy and flexibility of application
in IP traffic classification systems. As such, certain features proposed by
researchers are not considered suitable for practical operational applications.
For example, network administrators require the ability to efficiently identify
a flow by its application protocol early in its establishment (Goss and Botha,
2011). The features selected for most operational implementations are thus
those which support real-time classification (Nguyen and Armitage, 2008).
For this reason, features such as flow duration and flow size are often
removed due to the requirement for observing the entire flow before a
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Feature Description
Packet Direction The direction of packets within a flow (source to destination and
destination to source)
Packet Length Packet length statistics (min, max, quartiles, standard deviation)
Packet IAT Packet inter-arrival time (min, max, quartiles, standard deviation)
Flow Duration The duration of a particular flow on a network, from its start to
termination
Number of Packets The total number of packets observed for a particular flow
Table 4.1: A summary of the most popular statistical features used in IP traffic
classification, according to Nguyen and Armitage (2008).
classification is made. Latency-dependent features, such as packet
inter-arrival time (IAT), are often studied by researchers (Mcgregor et al.,
2004; Zander et al., 2005), however these features are difficult to implement
in reality. Features which rely on timing are not always feasible in
real-world operational environments as these metrics are often skewed by
QoS policies and network congestion (Goss and Botha, 2012). The features
selected by each system play a significant role in the accuracy achieved by
that system. Too few features may allow an application protocol to be
broadly classified by a specific group (Table 4.2), while too many may
impose inefficient, undue computational cycles on the classification process.
The success of a feature set for IP traffic classification is therefore a
measure of how well the set delineates a number of application protocols
while maintaining operational efficiency.
As many applications move toward encryption, the ability to identify
flows “in the dark” is especially helpful and of tremendous value to network
administrators (Wright et al., 2006). Many statistical analysis-based IP
traffic classification systems allow flows to be classified in a broad context
(Table 4.2), with few providing an in-depth, turn-key solution for individual
application identification (Wright et al., 2006).
The use of ML has been investigated recently for providing additional
granularity and increased accuracy in classifying IP traffic, using features
identified through statistical analysis.
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MALICIOUS Virus Attacks, DDoS
GAMES Call of Duty, World of Warcraft Online
MULTIMEDIA Flash Media, Internet TV, Radio Streaming
Table 4.2: Broad categories for application protocol classification, adapted from Moore
and Papagiannaki (2005).
4.1.4 Machine Learning
Although ML has offered promising results when classifying IP traffic,
certain limitations are still apparent. These limitations hamper both the
completeness and accuracy of IP traffic classification systems. For example,
most modern classification systems are reliant on the manual definition of
signatures for each application protocol (Section 2.1.1). These signatures
require substantial customisation by experts to accurately distinguish a
particular application protocol in a data set of recorded network traces.
Delays caused by this manual intervention directly affect the completeness
of the system. Manual definition of signatures (classifiers) and formulation
of their training sets also has an impact on the accuracy these systems
achieve. Like any classification task, human error and insufficient
knowledge of a particular problem may result in less than optimal
signatures being produced.
Unsupervised learning, with the ability to find regularities and infer a
function to describe these hidden structures in unlabelled data sets has been
tested to address these deficiencies. Mcgregor et al. (2004) published one
of the earliest works where unsupervised learning was applied in IP traffic
classification. In this work, the Expectation-Maximization (EM) (Dempster
et al., 1977) algorithm was used to group flows with similar behavioural
patterns in the same cluster. The results of this work were the grouping of
57
applications by class (Table 4.2), rather than by application protocol.
Erman et al. (2006) tested the K-means, DBSCAN and AutoClass
algorithms for clustering empirical traces from both a publicly available
data set and one recorded by the authors at the University of Calgary3.
Each data set was searched for instances of application protocols from a
predefined list. The listed application protocols included HTTP, P2P,
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and Post Office Protocol version 3
(POP3). The results revealed that while AutoClass produced the highest
overall accuracy, DBSCAN showed great potential as it placed the majority
of connections in a small subset of the clusters, with an overall accuracy of
97.6 percent (Erman et al., 2006). This was likely attributed to DBSCAN’s
ability to distinguish noise within a data set, a feature lacking in both
K-means and AutoClass. Also noteworthy was an evaluation of the time
each algorithm took to complete the clustering task, concluding clusters. In
the tests conducted by Erman et al. (2006), DBSCAN clustering completed
in one minute, K-means in three minutes and finally, AutoClass in four and
a half hours. The inefficiencies experienced by the AutoClass algorithm
make it unsuitable for classifying IP traffic, as these have a direct affect on
the completeness of the classification system.
Goss and Nitschke (2013a) tested the Hierarchical Self-Organising Map
(HSOM) algorithm for differentiating between application protocols, rather
than classes, on a network. In this work, the clusters discovered were used
to form training sets for Artificial Neural Network (ANN) classifiers,
trained to identify future instances of each respective cluster. Each of the
ANNs produced scored an overall accuracy in excess of 99.35 percent, with
the exception of the HTTP classifier. Further investigation revealed that
the HTTP protocol exhibited varying packet directionality properties
during initial packet exchanges, which skewed the results. This issue speaks
to the features selected and the normalisation of each feature, rather than
the clustering algorithm. Goss and Nitschke (2013b) extended the work of
Goss and Nitschke (2013a), substituting the K-means algorithm in place of
the HSOM. Here, the K-means algorithm was found more accommodating
to the directional properties of HTTP, as the classifier achieved 99.88
percent overall accuracy.










Figure 4.4: A network tap copies flow information to a server, which records specific
trace information for each communication observed. In this experiment, the network tap
was configured to copy all packets switching through a subscriber network segment at a
large South African ISP.
The APIC method, with its ability to automate feature selection,
pattern discovery and classifier production processes is poised to address
the deficiencies apparent in modern IP traffic classification systems,
improving both the completeness and accuracy achieved by current
systems. The following section details a case study, where the APIC
method is evaluated for improving the task of IP traffic classification.
4.2 Task Description
The task of identifying an underlying application protocol in IP traffic flows is
not new. In Section 4.1, a number of works were detailed where solutions for
addressing both completeness4 and accuracy5 were investigated. In this case
study, an experiment is devised where APIC is compared to existing state-of-
the-art IP traffic classification systems. The test data set was recorded on an
Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) edge router at one of South
4Completeness refers to the availability of signatures for each application protocol
5Accuracy is a measure of how correctly an underlying application protocol is identified
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Protocol Description
SSH Secure Shell Protocol
SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
POP3 Post Office Protocol
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
Bittorrent Bittorrent Peer-to-Peer Protocol
Table 4.3: A list of commonly tested application protocols in IP traffic classification
research. This list also describes the application protocol signatures produced by APIC
which are analysed in detail in the discussion part of this case study.
Africa’s premier ISP networks (Figure 4.4). All network packets switching
through this segment were copied and recorded using custom packet trace
sampling software6, where certain statistical information about each flow was
sampled and stored. The statistical properties considered in this task include
those listed in Table 4.1. These flow properties were identified in Section 4.1.3
as those considered most popular in modern IP traffic classification systems.
Table 4.3 lists a set of commonly tested application protocols, where a
number of IP traffic classification system results have been published.
These results indicate how well the classifiers of each system perform when
tested on a recorded data set. In this case study, flows are recorded and
analysed in real-time using APIC. The results achieved by the classifiers
produced in this case study using the recorded data set are comparable to
those published by similar systems for the same protocol. This comparison
establishes the effectiveness of APIC in terms of accuracy and, at the same
time, demonstrates the gains in completeness realised through the method,
confirmed by the presence of a classifier for each test protocol.
The recording process was started at midday on a normal week day,
where the presence of each protocol listed in Table 4.3 was most likely to
occur. The process was set to run for a period of one hour, the maximum
time allowed by the ISP, sampling all IP traffic flows. In total, 1,462,038
packets were observed, describing 47,607 TCP and 4070 UDP flows
respectively. Each of the application protocols listed in Table 4.3 operate




0 0-9 Discriminators indicating the direction of flow for the first
ten payload-bearing packets
1 10 In vs Out byte ratio
2 11-14 Log IAT (min, mean, max, stddev)
3 15-18 Payload size (min, mean, max, stddev)
4 19-24 Payload bytes
Table 4.4: Feature group breakdown, depicting the dimensions included within each
group. The feature group genotype is comprised of five bits, which are toggled to include
or exclude certain attributes.
delivery of application data. A stateful (state-based) protocol describes a
transport level protocol, where each communicating host retains the state
of the connection (a virtual circuit) for the duration of the communication,
even when no data packets are being transferred. Either of the
communicating hosts may tear down the connection, dropping the
connection at both ends. Data transactions over a stateful protocol, in
contrast to a stateless protocol, are easily tracked by IP traffic classification
systems, allowing greater control over data exchanges between hosts. As
each of the application protocols considered in this case study operate over
the stateful TCP protocol, only data exchanges operating over this protocol
were sampled and recorded for this experiment.
APIC’s suitability for the task of IP traffic classification is measured by
two distinct objectives - accuracy and completeness. To demonstrate
increased completeness, most manual processes should be removed from the
task of classifier creation. For APIC to succeed in this, it must demonstrate
a process to automate both feature selection and application protocol
discovery tasks, ones commonly performed manually in existing systems by
human experts.
The following section details the feature selection process APIC employs
to automatically determine the most suitable features for describing
application protocols within a recorded flow data set.
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{
    "Dir": 1,
    "Dir2": 0,
    "Dir3": 1,
    "Dir4": 0,
    "Dir5": 0,
    "Dir6": 0,
    "Dir7": 1,
    "Dir8": 0,
    "Dir9": 1,
    "Dir10": 0,
    "ByteRatio": 0.594988344988,
    "LogIATMin": -3.16787857096,
    "LogIATMean":-0.141905890926,
    "LogIATMax":0.899455358536,
    "LogIATStdDev": 1.21841093522,
    "PayloadMin": 16,
    "PayloadMean": 273.7,
    "PayloadMax": 840,
    "PayloadStdDev":326.250839079,
    "Byte1": 83,
    "Byte2": 83,
    "Byte3": 72,
    "Byte4": 83,
    "Byte5": 83,
    "Byte6": 72
}
Figure 4.5: A JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) representation of a vector describing
a flow observed during recording.
4.3 Feature Selection
The features incorporated in the experiments that follow were, according to
Nguyen and Armitage (2008), those commonly used in modern IP traffic
classification research. These features, identified in Section 4.1.3, include the
directionality of flow for the first ten payload-bearing packets, the inbound
versus outbound payload size (byte) ratio, log outputs for various packet inter-
arrival times, payload size statistics and, finally, the first three bytes of data
inferred from the first payload-bearing packet in each direction. In total,
25 features were recorded for every TCP flow observed during the recording
process.
A vector with a length of 25 was subsequently created in memory to
store the metrics of each flow trace. Each dimension represents the value of
a particular feature recorded for the flow. An example of one such recorded
flow described by its statistical features is represented as JSON in Figure 4.5.
A bit string feature genotype with 25 genes was created to represent
each feature subset, where 1 denoted the inclusion of a particular feature
and 0 an exclusion. To ensure these features were toggled on and off as
a group, and not individually, a five-dimension feature group genotype was
created. Each bit of this genotype represented one of the five discriminator




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 111101 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
Feature Genotype
Figure 4.6: The APIC GA toggles bits in a feature group binary string, which in turn
expands to form a feature subset genotype. In this example, feature group options 1 and
5 marked as included, whilst options 2,3 and 4 are not. All features are expanded, where
those marked for inclusion are set to “1”, whilst those excluded are marked with a “0”.
dimensions, and a brief description are listed in Table 4.4. Using a feature
group allowed APIC to toggle between discriminators for inclusion (as a








Table 4.5: Heuristic values of Emin and Emax for each dimension. These values were
derived by observing the minimum and maximum values of each dimension within the
recorded data set for a particular feature group.
APIC uses a bit string to determine inclusion of each group in a feature
subset (Section 3.1). A “1” at position 0 in the feature group expands to
include the first ten discriminators in the feature genotype. A “0” at position
0 of the feature group genotype will mark the first ten features as excluded.
An example of this expansion is illustrated in Figure 4.6, where the feature
subset includes the directions of the first ten payload-bearing packets and the
first three bytes of payload in each direction of flow. By simply modifying
the bit string of the feature group genotype, the APIC method was able
to manipulate discriminators that were included for determining application
protocols in the recorded data set.
The objective of APIC in this task was to produce optimised TWEANN
classifiers, each trained to identify a specific application protocol. The APIC
feature selection process itself does not prepare the recorded data for training
these models. The clustering algorithms used by APIC rely on Euclidean
distance to determine cluster association. To ensure each feature contributed
fairly toward this calculation, each was normalised to values between 0 and





Where Emin is the minimum value of the dimension, Emax the maximum
value and i the value to be normalised. The heuristic values applied to
each feature group in respect of Emin and Emax for the task of IP traffic
classification are listed in Table 4.5.
64
4.4 Distinguishing Application Protocols
Using the normalised data set, the APIC method searched for distinct
application protocols, using feature subsets determined by a GA (Figure
4.7). In this case study, five basic feature groups were considered, consisting
of the most common features studied in today’s IP traffic classification
systems. A sequential search for an optimal feature subset within these
groups would require a mere 32 tests to consider every possible combination
of a five-bit binary feature group (25 = 32). For the sake of homogeneity, a
GA was used in this experiment to identify the most optimal feature set as
in a real world context, the number of feature groups may scale far beyond
this. For example, VISA’s latest fraud detection system, Visa Advanced
Authorization (VAA)7, considers more than 500 features per transaction. In
these cases, sequential search for best feature sets is not efficient. The
APIC method, as a general method, needs to support feature selection
across many tasks, where many features may be available for consideration.
A GA was identified as a sound choice, using a stochastic search technique
instead of sequential one to more efficiently identify suitable feature subsets
for a variety of problems.
The APIC feature search GA was configured to traverse a maximum of
64 generations - twice the number of iterations required to find the best
feature subset by grid-search. This value was set high for the purposes of
monitoring successful convergence during the experiment. According to Ferri
et al. (2000), a GA is an ideal choice for locating optimal features in high-
dimensional search space, compared to an enumerative search for the same.
A GA-controlled hyper-parameter search was used to select more optimal
hyper-parameters for guiding each clustering process. This process (Section
3.2) was required to distinguish between unique application protocols present
in the recorded data set. It is paramount to ensure that optimised clustering
occurs, as the clustered data sets are used to train TWEANN classifiers to
identify future instances of each identified application protocol.
As the number of application protocols (clusters) present within the
recorded data set was unknown, the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of
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Figure 4.7: The feature selection GA builds a population of feature group genotypes.
Each of these genotypes is expanded to include all features represented for each of the
groups. These genotypes ultimately determine which features are included in the hyper-
parameter search and data clustering process. The resultant clustered data set is used
to create TWEANN classifiers, where the average classifier test score is fed back to the
feature selection GA as a fitness score. The highest scoring classifier group is returned as
a result of this process.
determine this automatically. The algorithm was controlled by two
hyper-parameters, namely eps and minPTS. To ensure most optimal
clustering occurs, these hyper-parameters should be carefully chosen.
The selection of eps and minPTS parameters is often a manual,
heuristic task. An expert will often test a number of combinations until a
satisfactory result is achieved. Such manual parameter tuning is not
conducive to ensuring a complete classification system, which can only be
achieved through full automation. For this reason, a second GA was
configured to search for the most optimal set of eps and minPTS values for
each feature subset tested.
Each candidate solution was encoded as a bit string for consideration by





















Figure 4.8: A k-nearest neighbour (k-NN or KNN) histogram with the distance between
each flow describing vector and its nearest neighbour recorded on the x-axis. The y access
tallies the total number of flow vectors whose distance to their nearest neighbour was
within the specific range on the x axis. According to Goss and Nitschke (2014), a suitable
value for eps can be determined by noting the value on the x access at the knee of the
graph. In this example, the knee is observed at a x axis value of approximately 0.15.
range of values for each parameter. Goss and Nitschke (2014) implemented
the DBSCAN algorithm for the purpose of clustering application protocol
flow vectors. In this work, the value of eps was determined by plotting the
distance from each vector to its nearest neighbour on a k-nearest neighbour
(k-NN) histogram and setting eps to the value at the knee of the graph.
Goss and Nitschke (2014) assert that the value at the knee of the graph is
the most likely location for optimum eps; the point at which the distance
between neighbours increases exponentially, due to the presence of outliers
(noise).
The k-NN histogram depicting the proximity of nearest neighbours for
the normalised, recorded data set of this case study is shown in Figure 4.8.
The knee of the graph (Figure 4.8) is visible at approximately 0.15 on the x
axis. The maximum k-nn value noted was 1.6, with only a few flow vectors
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eps = 15/(13*46)  
=  0.02508361204 
Figure 4.9: An example of eps encoded as a bit string. The first six bits represent the
division factor (46), with the remaining bits representing the current real number value
(13) and the maximum possible real number value (15). By applying Equation 4.4, the
decoded value of eps is 0.0251.
contributing to this count. The range for consideration in determining eps
was subsequently set to 0.0158<= eps <= 15, covering the full range of k-NN
values. This scope was considered to demonstrate that the most optimum
eps could be found at the knee of a graph. A custom encoding scheme
was devised to represent this range within a ten-bit string. The last four
bits of the string represent a real number in binary form. This number is
multiplied by a factor, determined by the value of the first six bits. The
result is divided into the maximum value of the four bits representing the
real number (1111 = 24− 1, or 15). The value of eps was decoded from each





Where Rmax is the maximum value attainable using the last four bits of
the genotype, Rcur is the current value for the same bits and D the decimal
value of the first six bits. An example of eps in both its encoded and decoded
form is shown in Figure 4.9. According to Goss and Nitschke (2014), the
search space for minPTS can be determined by Equation 4.5:






where the lower range of minPTS is greater than or equal to the number of
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dimensions of the flow vector, D, plus one. The upper-most value of minPTS
is set to half the magnitude of the recorded flow vector recorded data set, db.
It is difficult to determine the lower and upper limits of minPTS definitively,
without prior insight into the source data set. For this reason, the upper and
lower bounds of minPTS in this case study were set using these rule-of-
thumb methods. By selecting a range of minPTS values using Equation
4.5, the majority of cases will be adequately covered, avoiding pitfalls such
as convergence to a single cluster, or the total number of clusters produced
being equal to the number of input vectors supplied.
Although 47,607 TCP flows were recorded, only 31,102 were observed
from their start, a requirement for accurately determining the directionality
of a flow (Goss and Botha, 2011). A genotype encoding the full range of
minPTS for a complete feature set is represented in Figure 4.10. Where the
result of minPTS is less than D+1, a value of D+1 was used as a substitute.
This ensures the lower bounds of minPTS is fixed at D + 1. An example
complete genotype used to find the best value for minPTS in a twenty-five
dimensional data set is illustrated in Figure 4.11.
69
1 10 1 0 1Encoded 1 10 1




minPTS =  58*237
=  13,746 
1 01 1
Figure 4.10: An example of minPTS encoded as a bit string for a full feature set. The
first six bits represent the multiplication factor (58), with the remaining bits representing
the current real number value (237). The value of minPTS encoded on this genotype is the
product of the multiplication factor and real number. In this example, minPTS = 13, 746.
1 10 1 0 11 10 1
Multiplication Factor Real Number
M = 58
R = 237
minPTS =  58*237
=  13,746 
1 01 11 10 1 0 1Encoded 1 10 1





eps = 15/(13*46)  
=  0.02508361204 
eps minPTS
Figure 4.11: A genotype showing an encoded solution for eps and minPTS values for a
full feature set, comprising twenty-five dimensions and 32,000 records.
For each new feature subset considered by the hyper-parameter GA, the
bits allocated for representing both eps and minPTS values were derived
automatically by APIC, using the encoding process described in Section 4.4,
Equations 4.4 and 4.5. The initial population of hyper-parameter genotypes
was created with bits set at random. The GA parameters governing both
feature subset and hyper-parameter searches are outlined in Table 4.6.
The selection of good parameters to govern a GA improve both
computation time and solution accuracy, for example, the population size
significantly effects the quality of solutions that a GA evolves (Roeva et al.,
2013). Roeva et al. (2013) found that, when identifying model parameters
using a GA, smaller populations result in lower accuracy and that by
increasing the population size, an increase in solution accuracy was
achievable. They also found that, beyond a certain point, a larger










Feature Subset Search 64 64 0.1 0.5
Hyper-parameter Search 100 100 0.1 0.5
Table 4.6: Parameter values configured for each GA.
A larger population did, however, increase the computational resource
requirements for completing the search. Roeva et al. (2013) found in their
research that an optimal population size of 100 achieved the most accurate
solutions. The hyper-parameter search method of APIC is very similar to
the model parameter identification methods described by Roeva et al.
(2013). Noting these observations, the population size for the APIC
hyper-parameter search was set to a value of 100.
Using the configured search parameters (Table 4.6), the APIC feature
discovery (Section 3.1) and pattern discovery (Section 3.2) processes were
started. For each genotype in the feature subset search population, a hyper-
parameter search process was executed to find optimal values for guiding
the clustering process. These hyper-parameters included both the eps and
minPTS parameters. Values for each of these parameters were decoded and
a DBSCAN clustering process run for each genotype of the current hyper-
parameter search population.
The resulting clustered data set was evaluated using the silhouette cluster
evaluation method (Equation 3.2), scored within a range −1 <= score <= 1,
where a score closest to 1 (indicative of most optimal clustering) is more
favourable. The scores for each genotype were converted to values between





Where e is the natural logarithm base and x the value being regressed to
a value between 0 and 1. A plot illustrating this conversion is illustrated in
Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.13: The best scoring feature group expanded to highlight the best feature subset
for the recorded data set.
All search processes were executed in parallel, where hyper-parameter
searches were chained as sub-tasks of feature subset searches. Parallel
execution of tasks ensured optimal use of available host resources8.
The APIC algorithm was executed and allowed to run all generations
for each search task. This was to provide evidence that the algorithm did
converge at a particular point. In a production deployment, where the APIC
method is processing real-world data, additional stopping conditions may be
included to conserve computational time and expense when distinguishing
application protocols. These stopping conditions may include the observation
of simple heuristic values, such as an acceptable fitness level achieved by a
particular feature subset.
8A single execution was assigned to each Central Processing Unit (CPU) core of the




Table 4.7: Hyper-parameters (from GA search), resulting in optimal clustering
After all generations had concluded, analysis of the results showed that
the best configuration was identified at generation four. The best scoring
feature subset genotype (Figure 4.13) was used to extract features from the
recorded data set for clustering by the DBSCAN algorithm. The highest
scoring hyper-parameter search revealed that the best values of eps and
minPTS were 0.1039 and 152 respectively, found at generation 23 (Table
4.7). The output of the hyper-parameter search process for the winning
feature subset genotype was recorded. Each of the hyper-parameter
genotypes considered were decoded and their eps and minPTS values
plotted on a three-dimensional scatter graph along with their associated
fitness (Figure 4.14).
Of the clusters formed by the DBSCAN algorithm, those that represent
the focus application protocols (Table 4.3) were deemed most important for
this experiment. A sample trace of each application protocol was identified by
a human expert9 and assigned cluster membership within the clustered data
set, using silhouette cluster comparison. By determining the best s(i) value
for each annotated trace, the best-fit cluster was identified and annotated
with the name of the application protocol assigned to the new member.
The following section provides additional evidence that the clusters
identified are accurate representations of each application protocol.


































Figure 4.14: A 3D scatter graph depicting the decoded genotypes considered when
searching for optimal hyper-parameters for the best scoring feature subset. The best
scoring feature subset where hyper-parameter values decoded from the genotype resulted
in the most optimal clustered data set. The chart density increased toward eps value 0.1
and minPTS value 152, which ultimately produced the best fitness score.
4.5 Verification by Visualising Application
Protocols
The potentially high multi-dimensionality of datum clustered by APIC make
identified clusters very difficult to express and verify statistically. Radar
charts, or star charts (Chambers et al., 1983), simplify the representation
of this multi-dimensional data, by expressing each as a spoke on a two-
dimensional radial map. These charts make it easier for human experts to
identify outliers by visual comparison of similar, clustered datum. The chart
plots values of each dimension along a separate axis (spoke) that starts in the
centre of the chart (minimum value) and ends on the outer ring (maximum
value). As each dimension of the data considered by APIC was normalised to
a value between 0 and 1, it follows that the minimum values for each spoke
of the radar charts drawn for this data will range between 0 and 1. As APIC
found 20 attributes sufficient for describing application protocols in this case
study, it follows that each radar chart is comprised of 20 spokes.
Radar charts were plotted for each focus application protocol, assisting
experts with the verification of dynamically discovered clusters (Section 4.4).
In this experiment, the chart included a value for each of the 20 features of
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the feature subset search genotype (Figure 4.13). Multiple colours indicate
diversity within each clustered data set. From the radar patterns of the POP3
(Figure 4.15), SMTP (Figure 4.16), HTTP (Figure 4.17), HTTPS (Figure
4.18), SSH (Figure 4.19) and Bittorrent (Figure 4.20) application protocols,
diversity between feature patterns and values are visible. Furthermore, the
close proximity and pattern conformance displayed by each of the colours
on the charts indicates tight (optimal) clustering was achieved. Optimal
clustering refers to the best possible grouping of datum, where the least
possible average distance between datum in a cluster and the highest average
distance between clusters is achieved.
Figures 4.15 through 4.20 represent each of the respective test
application protocols. The colours on each chart illustrate the effectiveness
of the clustering process which, when plotted on a radar chart, indicate
distinct patterns for each application protocol. While some patterns appear
similar, there are subtle (at times, significant) differences. These variations
were detected by the APIC pattern discovery process (Section 3.2), which
separated them into distinct clusters. For example, while the POP3 (Figure
4.15) and SMTP (Figure 4.16) application protocols appear similar,
attribute 14 is far more pronounced in SMTP than in POP3. Likewise,
although HTTP (Figure 4.17) and HTTPS (Figure 4.18) are similar
application protocols, there is a clear distinction between the statistical
properties of the two. The HTTP protocol exhibits high values for the
11th, 13th and 14th attributes, while HTTPS only the 14th. This contrast
is due to the presence of Transport Layer Security (TLS), which encrypts
the data exchanges of HTTPS. Although SSH (Figure 4.19) also uses TLS,
attributes 16 through 20 differ significantly from those of HTTPS. These
attributes act as a differentiator between the protocols.
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Figure 4.15: A radar chart plotting random datum samples of the cluster known to
describe the Post Office Protocol version 3 (POP3) application protocol. This protocol
is used by email clients to retrieve user email from a remote mail server. In this chart,
values represented on each spoke show subtle variations in dimensions 12 through 20.
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Figure 4.16: A radar chart plotting random datum samples of the cluster known to
describe the SMTP application protocol. This protocol is used by email clients to send
messages to a remote email server and for inter-mail server message exchange. The features
indicating directionality of packet flow, 1 through 10, show consistency amongst the
randomly selected flow samples. This is characteristic of SMTP, an application protocol
comprising very structured message exchanges.
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Figure 4.17: A radar chart plotting random datum samples of the cluster known to
describe the HTTP application protocol. This protocol is one of the most common
application protocols, used to retrieve and publish content on the World Wide Web
(WWW). Dissimilar to the POP3 (Figure 4.15) and SMTP (Figure 4.16) charts, the
diversity amongst random data samples within the HTTP clustered data set is more
apparent. This is because the HTTP protocol is less predictable in terms of data exchange
than both the POP3 and SMTP protocols.
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Figure 4.18: A radar chart plotting random datum samples of the cluster known to
describe the HTTPS application protocol. This protocol is used to perform the same
tasks as HTTP, but over a secure connection. Although the HTTPS application protocol
is effectively the HTTP protocol operating over an encrypted, TLS tunnel, there are
substantial differences in the values recorded for each feature. This is because the TLS
tunnel set-up occurs ahead of application protocol data exchange.
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Figure 4.19: A radar chart plotting random datum samples of the cluster known to
describe the SSH application protocol. This application protocol is most often used by
administrators to interact with remote systems, issuing commands and retrieving files.
The SSH application protocol, similar to HTTPS (Figure 4.18), uses TLS to secure its
communications. Although both use TLS, distinctions in the feature values extracted for
each application flow are apparent.
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Figure 4.20: A radar chart plotting random datum samples of the cluster known
to describe the unencrypted Bittorrent application protocol. This P2P communication
protocol, used for efficient file transfer amongst network hosts, does not rely on client-
server connectivity, nor static ports for data exchange. These attributes make it difficult to
detect and manage. The APIC algorithm was able to identify flow traces of the application
protocol, which uses distinct packet exchanges to establish each session.
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In addition to representing clusters using a radar chart, other methods
of confirming successful clustering of application protocol via visual aid
have been researched in recent years. Mcgregor et al. (2004) examined plots
of packet size against packet IAT for flows of particular application
protocols. In this work, the authors observed a number of characteristic
shapes, which were indicative of the underlying application protocol. Using
a similar methodology, the full trace for each cluster’s members were
analysed, with the payload size plotted against the value of log(IAT ) for
each. The advantage of plotting the log value of IAT is that it allows one to
readily identify features in the data that would not easily be seen if both
payload size and IAT had been plotted linearly.
A heat-map was created for each application protocol considered in this
chapter. Using the clustered datum associated with each of these
application protocols, the recorded payload size and log(IAT ) values for
each were plotted, illustrating packet size diversity in each direction over
time. This chart, according to Mcgregor et al. (2004), provides a visual
representation, which can be used to identify or verify the application
protocol. The sign bit of the packet size was used to indicate flow direction,
where a positive value indicates packet flow in the direction of the initial
synchronise (SYN) packet, a flag set by the host originating the flow.
Negative values were used to indicate packet flow in the reverse direction.
For each figure, the first heat-map represents the data clustered by APIC
for the protocol. Below each of these, a heat-map plotted using traces
manually annotated by experts10 of the same protocol is shown. The colour
of each pixel is indicative of packet density at the given size and time.
Brighter areas indicate a high concentration of packets, with darker colours
indicating very few packets observed. Heat-maps for SSH (Figure 4.21),
HTTP (Figure 4.22), HTTPS (Figure 4.23), POP3 (Figure 4.24), SMTP
(Figure 4.25) and Bittorrent (Figure 4.26) protocols are shown below for
visual analysis.
The heat-map describing APIC clustered data for the HTTP protocol
(Figure 4.22) shows the highest density of packets is toward the host that
initiated the flow. In this case, the majority of packet size observations are
10A qualified computer network expert with experience identifying application protocols
from raw traces
82
centred where payload sizes equal the standard ethernet Maximum Transfer
Unit (MTU) value of 1500. For HTTPs (Figure 4.23), the same observation
is apparent, where the majority of packet density is observed toward the
host that initiated the flow. Unlike HTTP, there is an apparent increase in
packet density spread in both directions. This is attributed to the additional
security exchanges HTTPS performs to secure the transit of data. The POP3
protocol (Figure 4.24) exhibits very small packet sizes toward the server, with
the majority of packet size density observed toward the host that initiated
the flow. This is expected, as POP3 is an inbound mail exchange protocol,
designed for consuming email messages from remote mail servers. The SMTP
protocol (Figure 4.25), on the other hand, exhibits the majority of packet size
density in the direction from the host initiating the flow to the remote host.
This is again expected, as SMTP is an outbound mail exchange protocol,
used by mail clients to transmit local email messages to a remote server.
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Figure 4.26: Heat-maps showing payload size against log(IAT ) values for the
unencrypted Bittorrent application protocol.
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Distinguishing application protocols automatically is the first step
toward a fully automated IP classification system. The ability to remove
manual tasks, including feature selection and data set annotation, is
important for promoting increased completeness compared to existing,
state-of-the-art systems. Another task highlighted in Chapter 2 where a
significant amount of manual intervention is required, is the development of
classifiers to identify future instances of each application protocol described
by the automatically-annotated data sets.
4.6 TWEANN Classifier Development
It has already been established that a significant amount of time is spent by
experts in developing accurate, customised classifiers for identifying specific
application protocols. The first step is to annotate the data sets (Section
4.4), followed by manually developing a classifier to uniquely identify each
protocol. These manual processes reduce the completeness of the system
and are prone to mistakes - mostly human error. Section 4.1 reviewed a
number of IP traffic classification methods, all of which relied on manual
intervention for classifier topology definition. These classifiers were
constructed using heuristics identified by experts as most optimal for
classifying each application protocol.
Unlike the classification systems studied in Section 4.1, APIC
automatically develops custom classifiers for each application protocol it
discovers (Section 3.3). For this case study, APIC uses TWEANN models,
fine-tuned with backpropagation. TWEANN parameters, including the
number of neurons, connections and weights, are determined automatically
using the TWEANN’s artificial evolution process. The average recall score
achieved by the classifiers for each feature subset defines the fitness score
for the genotypes tested, where genotypes encode the connection weights
and neuronal connectivity of the TWEANNs. If a classifier’s results surpass
a predetermined score, or if the maximum number of generations is reached
for the feature subset selection GA, the last set of classifiers produced is
deemed the most suitable for classifying the recorded data set.
90
In Goss and Botha (2012), where the same focus application protocols
were tested, the neuron count for each classifier trained was statically set to
twice the number of features considered. These neurons were split between
the input layer and a single hidden layer, which converged on a single
output neuron. Drawing inspiration from this configuration, the maximum
number of neurons permitted for each topology developed in this case study
was equal to twice the number of features included in the current feature
genotype. The search space for the number of neurons considered by the
topology evolving GA was therefore limited to fn + 1 ≤ neurons ≤ fn ∗ 2,
where fn denotes the number of features represented in the feature subset
genotype. For example, a feature subset genotype with a magnitude of ten
would generate topologies with 11 to 15 neurons. Goss and Botha (2012)
found that increasing the number of neurons beyond this value proved to
increase task load significantly, where more CPU time was required to train
the network due to increased computational complexity, while only a
marginal, disproportionate increase in accuracy was noted.
Operating within these parameters, a topology-evolving GA determined
the number of neurons and neuronal connectivity for each ANN classifier.
The weights for each connection were determined using a second,
weight-evolving GA. These weights were fine-tuned using the standard error
backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al., 1988), which affords APIC
additional efficiencies when searching for more optimal weight
configurations. Here, the GA prevents the backpropagation algorithm from
getting stuck in the local minima, a problem often associated with the
algorithm (Sher, 2010). As per Goss and Botha (2012), the total number of
training iterations (epochs) for the backpropagation algorithm was set to a
heuristic value of 1,000. A static value for the number of epochs allows each
topology to be tested fairly, providing a strong comparative base for
accurately reflecting and comparing the number of epochs required for
convergence.
The best scoring clustered data set from Section 4.4 was found using a
data set consisting of 20 features. A new TWEANN classifier was constructed
and trained for each identified cluster. The training set for each cluster was
automatically annotated, where datum that were members of the cluster
being identified were labelled with “1”, while datum external to the cluster
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were labelled with a “0”. In this case study, TWEANN classifiers were
developed to identify each of the six focus application protocols (Table 4.3).
The best classifier topology and it’s associated score was recorded for each
application protocol.
These scores are the average scores achieved when training a classifier
using five-fold cross-validation. For each fold, an 80/20 rule was applied
(Fan et al., 2008), where 80 percent of the data set was allocated to the
































































































Figure 4.27: The topology of the TWEANN best matching the SSH protocol. Using this
topology, an average recall score of 99.7928 percent was achieved. The topology includes
20 input (n0 to n19), and five hidden (n20 to n24), neurons plus one output neuron (n25).
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The cluster describing the SSH protocol was best recalled by the
topology illustrated in Figure 4.27. This topology scored an average of
99.7928 percent when parsing the training set. The topology consisted of
twenty input neurons (one for each feature) and five hidden neurons. These
hidden neurons were connected to both each other, the input neurons, and
the single output neuron. A number of the input neurons were also mapped
directly to the output neuron. The connectivity between each neuron was
determined as the best architecture by the topology-evolving GA.
The cluster describing the SMTP protocol was best matched using a
topology illustrated in Figure 4.28. Here, all 20 inputs are also connected
through five hidden neurons and directly to the output neuron. Through
this topology, an average recall score of 99.9413 percent was realised when
























































































Figure 4.28: The topology of the TWEANN best matching the SMTP protocol. Using
this topology, an average recall score of 99.9413 percent was achieved. The topology








































































Figure 4.29: The topology of the TWEANN best matching the POP3 protocol. Using
this topology, an average recall score of 99.8391 percent was achieved. The topology
includes 20 input neurons (n0 to n19), three hidden neurons (n20 to n22) and a single
output neuron (n23).
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The topology best matching the POP3 protocol is illustrated in Figure
4.29. This classifier, comprised of twenty input, three hidden and one output
neuron, achieved an average recall score of 99.8391 percent.
The HTTP protocol, the foundation of communication for the WWW is
a distributed, collaborative, hypermedia data transport protocol. The
clustered data describing the HTTP application protocol was best
described using the topology illustrated in Figure 4.30. The average recall






















































Figure 4.30: The topology of the TWEANN best matching the HTTP protocol. Using
this topology, an average recall score of 99.8383 percent was achieved. The topology
























































Figure 4.31: The topology of the TWEANN best matching the HTTPS protocol. Using
this topology, an average recall score of 99.9159 percent was achieved. The topology
includes 20 input neurons (n0 to n19), two hidden neurons (n20 and n21) and a single
output neuron (n22).
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The HTTPS protocol is not a protocol in its own right, but rather the
HTTP protocol operating on top of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or TLS
protocol. The best matching topology HTTPS is illustrated in 4.31, where
the average recall achieved was 99.9159 percent.
Finally, the topology of the TWEANN classifier best matching the
unencrypted Bittorrent protocol is illustrated in Figure 4.32. This classifier
achieved an average recall score of 99.5700 percent, using a single hidden
neuron. Twelve of the 20 input neurons were connected to the output
neuron through the hidden neuron, with the remainder connecting to the
output neuron directly. Seven of the inputs were connected to the output



















































Figure 4.32: The topology of the TWEANN best matching the Bittorrent protocol.
Using this topology, an average recall score of 99.5700 percent was achieved. The topology
includes 20 inputs (n0 to n19) plus a single hidden (n20), and a single output neuron (n21).
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4.7 Accuracy Comparison
It is important to quantify the results achieved in Section 4.6 by comparing
them with successes of similar systems. Table 4.8 outlines results achieved
by comparative systems over the past decade, where the same application
protocols as those investigated in this case study were tested. The table
highlights best scores achieved by each method for the focus application
protocols considered in this case study. This section discusses each of these
systems, providing insight into the techniques employed and the accuracy
achieved for each tested application protocol.
Bernaille et al. (2006) proposes a two-phase model for classifying IP
traffic. The first phase, the training phase, involves clustering recorded
TCP traces of target applications. The authors test three popular
clustering algorithms: K-means (MacQueen et al., 1967a), Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) (Lindsay, 1995) and spectral on Hidden Markov
Model (HMMs)(Baum and Petrie, 1966).
These algorithms are used to identify the number of distinct application
protocols present in a supplied data set. For successful clustering, the
authors stress that a number of requirements must be met. First, traces for
each of the target application protocols must be contained in the data set,
with a minimum number of samples present for each. The APIC method, in
contrast, does not require any manual intervention for ensuring successful
classifier creation (Section 4.6), a process that would otherwise hamper the
completeness of the system. The APIC method, instead, retains smaller
clustered datum for inclusion in future discovery processes, where these
clusters may grow over time to a sufficient size. Bernaille et al. (2006)
states that the number of samples for each application protocol should be
of similar magnitude, so as not to bias the clustering process. The authors
furthermore require manually annotated example traces of each application
protocol for calibrating the clustering process. For the purposes of their
research, the authors generated these examples using a commercial IP
traffic classification system. The APIC method has no such requirement,
relying on ML techniques to tune the clustering parameters adequately,
accurately segregating each distinct application protocol automatically.





























Bernaille et al. (2006) 99.70% 98.50% 99.00% 99.10% 93.80% N/A
Alshammari et al. (2009a) N/A N/A N/A N/A 99.50% N/A
Maiolini et al. (2009) 95.70% N/A 99.50% N/A 99.30% N/A
Gargiulo et al. (2009) 99.83% 99.54% 99.29% N/A N/A N/A
De Donato et al. (2014) 100.00% 96.00% 99.60% 99.10% N/A 98.90%
Bujlow et al. (2015) 100.00% 100.00% 99.80% N/A 94.19% 99.87%
APIC 99.84% 99.94% 99.84% 99.92% 99.80% 99.57%
Table 4.8: A list of comparable research into IP traffic classification over the past
decade. These works are those where classifiers identifying the same application protocols
considered by this case study were tested. The table includes the application protocol and
best score achieved.
using the aforementioned requirements are presented in Table 4.8. The
values represent the best noted classification scores across all tests for each
application protocol. In their results, the authors show the highest average,
combined score achieved was 98.7 percent, when considering all application
protocols. The authors failed to include testing of peer-to-peer application
protocols, including Bittorrent. The method proposed by Bernaille et al.
(2006) was not easily re-implemented for testing the Bittorrent application
protocol, as both the data sets and commercial classification software used
were not readily available. Alshammari et al. (2009a) used two data sets
to train an SSH classifier. The first data set was labelled using a
commercial classification tool, where a DPI system scanned for known
signatures. The SSH protocol is easily identified using DPI, as the first few
bytes of the application protocol are exchanged in plain-text. The second
data set was labelled using a port-based classification method. Alshammari
et al. (2009a) used balanced samples of SSH and non-SSH flows to
represent a subset of the original data sets. The authors argue that a
balanced subset of data improves the performance of the resulting models
when compared to those trained using the full data set. In total, 500,000
packets were considered, including TCP control traffic. As the APIC
method considers only payload-bearing packets, it requires less packets for
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processing the same flow traces, making it arguably more efficient.
Alshammari et al. (2009a) trained three classifiers, using C4.5, AdaBoost
and Team-based Genetic Programming algorithms, using the pre-labelled,
sampled data sets. These classifiers were trained to identify only the SSH
protocol using packet header statistics. Basing IP traffic classification on
header information was found in Section 4.1 to be unreliable as header
information is easily manipulated by the two communicating hosts (Moore
and Papagiannaki, 2005; Auld et al., 2007). For this reason, the APIC
method makes determinations without this data, focusing rather on
statistical information that describes application protocols independent of
the environment it traverses. Alshammari et al. (2009a) also states that
manual intervention and further research is required to evaluate the
proposed method for classifying application protocols, other than SSH. The
method proposed by Alshammari et al. (2009a) is therefore only suitable
for classifying the SSH application protocol, which greatly impairs its
effectiveness in the general field of IP traffic classification. Due to the
specific focus on SSH, the method proposed by Alshammari et al. (2009a)
was not re-implemented to determine its effectiveness in classifying the
other test application protocols listed in Table 4.8. Although the method
focused solely on the SSH protocol, the results achieved show that the
method has merit and provides noteworthy contributions. For example, the
authors found C4.5 as the best performer for classifying both in-class (SSH)
and out-of-class (non-SSH) samples. Using this method, a best score of 99.5
percent was observed when recalling training set data. In contrast, a 91.3
percent score was achieved when the classifier was tested against previously
unseen samples from the original data set. In this case study, APIC was
found to exhibit significantly higher success classifying unseen samples of
the SSH protocol, realising scores in excess of 99 percent accuracy, using a
method developed to identify a broad range of application protocols.
Maiolini et al. (2009) recorded network packet traces using a mirrored
port on their LAN switch. Unlike Alshammari et al. (2009a), TCP control
messages were removed through pre-processing methods which, according
to the authors, results in a higher degree of accuracy. Not dissimilar to
APIC, the method proposed by Maiolini et al. (2009) used min-max
normalisation to standardise each dimension of the recorded data set. The
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authors used heuristic values to calibrate each dimension of the input
vector, which included the directionality of packet flow, packet size values
and absolute times. The authors used a cross-validation method to
determine the number of clusters, k, within the recorded data set. Using
the described method, a best average score of 95.43 percent was realised
across all classifiers. Lacking access to the recorded data set, which the
authors state was artificially created on a university network and at a
private home, the method was unable to be re-implemented. As the authors
focus was on the identification of the SSH protocol from other protocols,
they failed to record the scores achieved by the classifier describing SMTP,
HTTPS and Bittorrent. It is unknown if these protocols were not
discovered during the testing, or if the artificial data set production process
simply did not cater to them. Artificial data sets remove many of the
variables introduced in real-world IP network traffic, such as latency
variances caused by congestion and QoS implementations on ISP networks.
It is therefore assumed that the results published are higher than the
results that would be achieved using data sets captured in a real-world
environment, such as those recorded for testing APIC.
Gargiulo et al. (2009) use attributes inferred from the first four
payload-bearing packet exchanges to classify each flow. The authors use the
destination port number of the flow, combined with the directionality and
size of these first four packets. The classification method described by
Gargiulo et al. (2009) consists of three stages. Stage one guesses the
application protocol using the destination port read from flow packet
headers. Stage two determines the pattern of bits showing directionality for
each flow over the first four packets, where a ”0” indicates the packet was
sent from server to the client and a ”1”, the reverse. The authors assert the
distribution of flow directionality patterns across the 16 available patterns
(24) provides sufficient evidence as to whether the application protocol is,
in fact, that which was determined using the port number. Finally, a third
stage uses a decision tree to parse packet size statistics from the first four
payload-bearing packets. Based on the scores generated by each of the
classifiers, a probability is provided as to which application protocol the
flow presents. While the average, combined score for all classifiers was not
provided, the individual scores presented in Table 4.8 provide sufficient
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evidence that high degrees of accuracy are achievable using the proposed
method. As part of the method is dependent on packet header information
(port), it is possible that the reliability of the method may be called into
question in real-world operation, where packet header information is
manipulated by end hosts. The APIC method does not suffer this risk, as
the attributes considered explicitly exclude those that may be manipulated
by the communicating hosts. De Donato et al. (2014) present an
open-source tool for traffic classification, the Traffic Identification Engine
(TIE). This engine uses a number of techniques to classify traffic, including:
J48 Decision Trees, K-nearest Neighbour, Random Tree, Ripper, Multilayer
Perceptron, Naive Bayes (Russell and Norvig, 2009), Portload (a custom
DPI engine) and, finally, classic port-based classification.
Table 4.8 highlights the best results achieved by this method, when each
technique (algorithm) was tested individually using network trace data
collected at the University of Napoli, Italy. Each classification technique is
loaded as a separate plug-in to the system, which supports a number of
methods for training classifiers. In each case, the training is provided
through a supervised learning approach, using pre-labelled training sets.
The authors cite results for all but one of the test application protocols
considered by this case study, namely SSH. The TIE engine was not
implemented for generating a result for SSH in this case study, owing to
tight time constraints.
Bujlow et al. (2015) reviews seven of the most popular DPI-based IP
traffic classification systems. These systems include PACE 11, OpenDPI 12,
nDPI 13, L7-filter 14, Libprotoident 15 and Cisco NBAR 16. The results in
Table 4.8 are the highest observed using any of these systems. The authors
emphasise that the signatures used in each of these systems must be well
defined (manually) and then kept up-to-date. This is contrary to operating
the APIC method, where classifiers are updated and replaced









accuracy as the application protocol itself also evolves. To test each of
these systems concurrently, Bujlow et al. (2015) designed their own
traffic-replay system. This system is said capable of reading and replaying
packet captures (network trace files) through each of the seven IP traffic
classification systems. Here the timing associated with each packet is also
maintained. The classification results of each replay event was logged, along
with the name of the application. The name of each application protocol
was inferred from the pre-labelled test data set. The authors assert, as is
apparent from the results in Table 4.8, that most traditional application
protocols are generally well detected. Due to the lack of access to the test
data set and the traffic replay agent, the experiment could not be
re-implemented in this case study to ascertain the effectiveness of DPI in
classifying the HTTPS application protocol.
Although the accuracy achieved by the classifiers listed in Table 4.8, for
the most part, exceed 95 percent, it is important to consider the effect
portability has on their accuracy. A classifier should be portable, retaining
a high degree of accuracy when deployed on networks other than where it
was trained. The scores presented in Table 4.8 are those achieved when
classifiers were tested against data sets recorded on the same network from
which their training sets were derived.
The following section argues for portability as a new metric for measuring
the success of IP traffic classification systems. The following section discusses
each of the methods listed in Table 4.8 based on this new metric.
4.8 Portability Comparison
It has already been explained that the completeness of an IP traffic
classification system relies heavily on the portability of classifiers. While it
is often possible to manually train models for each network, classifier
portability ensures consistency in recognising each application protocol
across multiple networks. Commercial system IP classification vendors, for
example, need to ensure that the classifiers they produce are effective on all
customer networks. It is impractical for these vendors to develop custom
application protocol classifiers for each of these networks. In Section 4.1, it






































Bernaille et al. (2006) M M
Alshammari et al. (2009a) M M M
Maiolini et al. (2009) M M
Gargiulo et al. (2009) M M M
De Donato et al. (2014) O O O O O
Bujlow et al. (2015) M
APIC O O O O O
Table 4.9: A high-level view of features used by each of the comparative systems
considered in this case study. Based on the investigations concluded in Section 4.1, many
of the feature groups listed in this table are not conducive to the production of portable
classifiers. In this table, an “M” denotes a mandatory feature while an “O”, one that is
optional. Finally, no character for a particular feature group indicates that the feature is
not considered or supported by the method.
promote portability, due to their dependence on network-specific metrics,
such as latency. This section compares these findings with the features and
methods selected by the focus systems listed in Table 4.8.
Table 4.9 lists each of these systems, broadly grouping the features each
considers into a high-level class. Here, an “M” denotes at least one feature of
the class that is mandatory (required by the system), while an “O” dictates
the features that are optional. Each of these feature classes, or categories,
are discussed below with specific reference to their support of portability.
Packet Inter-arrival Time (PKT IAT) is a metric inferred by classification
systems by calculating the time difference of arrival (TDoA) between packet
exchanges of a flow. Although expressing these metrics as a ratio may provide
similar results on a single network, the same application protocol may exhibit
a completely different pattern on another. Features that rely on timing are
not always feasible in real-world operational environments as this information
is often skewed by QoS policies and network congestion (Goss and Botha,
2012). Alshammari et al. (2009a) required the PKT IAT attribute for their
method, acknowledging that their proposed method was not portable.
The size of the first few packets of a flow (PKT Size) is used by a
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number of systems, including Bernaille et al. (2006), Alshammari et al.
(2009a), Gargiulo et al. (2009) and APIC. Section 4.1 affirms that the size
of the first few payload-bearing packets remains constant for each
application, as these packets are responsible for application protocol
establishment. After the application protocol has been established, data
exchange begins, where packet sizes will vary. For this reason, most systems
consider size metrics for only the first few packets of a flow. Features
describing the size of the first payload-bearing packets are therefore
considered portable and support the portability of classifiers that include
them.
Packet header (PKT Header) information, including TCP port and
protocol information, is easily manipulated by the communicating hosts.
While the IANA assign well-known ports to most applications, devious
application protocols are capable of communicating on any port. Classic
port-based application protocol identification has subsequently become
increasingly redundant in modern networks, as discussed in Section 4.1.
Alshammari et al. (2009a) and Gargiulo et al. (2009) both use packet
header information to infer application protocol type from flows. As this
information may have been manipulated by the communicating hosts, there
is no guarantee that the results they achieved in Table 4.8 would perform as
well in a less controlled environment. This, according to the published
results, remains largely untested (Alshammari et al., 2009a; Gargiulo et al.,
2009).
The directionality of packet flow (PKT Direction) is a feature
considered mandatory by Gargiulo et al. (2009). Not dissimilar to the PKT
Size attribute, the direction of the first few payload-bearing packets of a
flow remains constant during application protocol initialisation. This
attribute is therefore considered portable as it is fixed per protocol and is
not influenced by network variables such as latency and congestion.
Finally, payload inspection or DPI is an extremely accurate, portable
method of classifying plain-text application protocols. The classifier uses
predefined regular expressions to match specific byte strings exchanged
between communicating hosts during the initial application protocol
establishment. These methods have recently, however, been subjected to a
number of privacy concerns as the classifier requires access to sensitive user
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data. Furthermore, these classifiers are only capable of classifying
application protocols where the byte exchanges are exposed as plain text.
An encrypted, or otherwise opaque, application protocol string renders the
classifier inept.
Based on these findings, the only systems whose methods support
portability are those proposed by Bernaille et al. (2006), De Donato et al.
(2014), Bujlow et al. (2015) and APIC.
Both accuracy and completeness were identified as important metrics
for evaluating IP traffic classification systems. This chapter also introduced
a third metric - portability. Portability provides reuse of classifiers across
networks, ensuring consistent classification accuracy for each application
protocol. This increases the completeness of a system, as application
protocol classifiers developed on one system can be shared with other,
disparate systems. Achieving a high level of accuracy and completeness has
already been argued as heavily dependent on the level of automation the
method exhibits. The following section provides a comparison of the level
of automation offered by each method in Table 4.8.
4.9 Automation Comparison
The level of automation achieved by an IP traffic classification system has a
profound effect on the completeness of the system. Systems exhibiting higher
degrees of automation can efficiently produce classifiers for identifying new
application protocols as they present on a network. Table 4.10 presents a
number of categories in which automation could be achieved in this task,
providing a measure for each of the comparative systems discussed in this
case study.
Each of the comparative systems listed in Table 4.10 requires annotated
data sets for training, or otherwise tuning, their classifier creation processes.
This dependency on the supply of manually annotated data sets severely
reduces the completeness of these systems, as new classifiers may only be
defined once an expert has supplied the training data. The APIC method is
the only system in this list that did not require a manually annotated data
set for producing accurate classifiers.











































Bernaille et al. (2006) X
Alshammari et al. (2009a)
Maiolini et al. (2009) X
Gargiulo et al. (2009)
De Donato et al. (2014)
Bujlow et al. (2015)
APIC X X X
Table 4.10: A list of comparative systems and the degree to which each demonstrates
automation. An “X” indicates that the system achieves automation for the respective
category. In this table, only APIC achieves automation for each of the specified categories.
classification system to automatically aggregate and segregate application
protocol traces from mixed, noisy data sets of network flow traces.
Bernaille et al. (2006), like Maiolini et al. (2009), use clustering techniques
to identify and group related flow trace datum within a supplied data set.
While Bernaille et al. (2006) used clustering to group application protocol
traces, full automation was not achieved as annotated data sets were
required for tuning the clustering process. The method proposed by
Maiolini et al. (2009) also depended on the supply of manually labelled
data sets as input to their clustering process. The APIC method was the
only system that was able to discriminate between application protocol
traces automatically, without depending on manually annotated data sets.
Finally, the only method that concentrated on automatically creating a
distinct, custom classifier for identifying each application protocol identified,
was APIC. Bujlow et al. (2015) required that a unique classifier be manually
defined by experts using regular expressions for each plain-text application
protocol on the network. De Donato et al. (2014) provided an engine for
defining and training classifiers, however this process was executed manually.
The method provides a mechanism for supervised training, where the supply
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of manually annotated data sets for each application protocol was required.
4.10 Discussion
The case study described in this chapter highlighted the contribution of the
APIC method in that, although a general method, it automatically created
classifiers to identify previously unseen application protocols on an IP
network with a high degree of accuracy when compared to similar systems
designed manually, specifically for this task. While accuracy is an
important metric for IP traffic classification systems, completeness - or the
availability of classifiers - is equally important. The ability to automatically
create new, portable and accurate classifiers for identifying each application
protocol traversing a network is important for supporting both the
completeness and accuracy of an IP traffic classification system. In this
case study, APIC was demonstrated to excel in both of these areas. The
following subsections provide highlights of this success, supporting the first
two objectives of this dissertation (Section 1.3).
4.10.1 Completeness
The APIC method was shown capable of automatically selecting the best
feature subset (verified by a manual, exhaustive search of the feature space),
identifying distinct patterns in this data set and defining customised, highly
accurate classifiers to identify future instances of each pattern. Optimisation
of the feature set, by pruning irrelevant and redundant features, reduces the
complexity of classification tasks, drastically improving task efficiency (Dash
and Liu, 1997). In addition to feature pruning, APIC used GAs to find the
best hyper-parameters for clustering these feature subsets, grouping network
flows by their respective application protocol. Providing optimisation here
supported the clustering process by increasing diversity between clusters,
while ensuring that datum within the same cluster were more closely related.
This is unlike the clustering process described by Bernaille et al. (2006)
and Maiolini et al. (2009), where manually labelled data sets were required
for tuning the clustering process. In Section 4.9, APIC was found to be
the only method capable of producing its own labelled training data. After
the clustering process was complete, the APIC method labelled each of the
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clustered datum with their respective cluster identifier. This automatically-
labelled clustered data formed the training sets for the TWEANN semi-
supervised learning, hybrid development process. These TWEANN classifiers
were trained to identify future instances of each cluster (application protocol).
A unique TWEANN classifier was automatically produced by APIC for
each of the identified application protocols, using the labelled data set.
Unlike conventional ANNs, a TWEANN classifier allowed the topology of
each classifier to be modelled in a way that best described the application
protocol. This customisation produced highly accurate classifiers, capable
of identifying all tested application protocols with a confidence score17
exceeding 99 percent. In Section 4.8, the features selected by the APIC
method were found to support portability, therefore TWEANNs produced
using these features were also inherently portable.
Any unidentified flows were recorded and appended to a new data set,
which was periodically parsed by APIC in search of new application
protocols (Figure 4.33). TWEANN classifiers trained for each
newly-discovered application protocol were automatically fed back to the
classification engine (Figure 4.33) for identifying future instances of the
application protocol. The automatic creation of signatures in this way
ensured that the classification system was always up-to-date, with
classifiers readily available at the first sign of a new application protocol.
As application protocols evolved and evaded existing classifiers, new
classifiers were produced and fed back into the classification system.
The automated production of accurate, portable classifiers for
identifying application protocols across disparate network deployments is
one of the main contributions of the APIC method in the field of IP traffic
classification. The ML processes adopted by APIC for the production of
these classifiers required no human intervention, improving on the
state-of-the-art technique, where it was found - in Section 4.9 - that the
majority of classifier training and definition processes still require manual
interaction by human experts. The manual definition of classifiers limits
completeness, a problem APIC overcame by applying ML techniques. The
APIC method, with its automated classifier development and replacement
17A confidence score is the level of certainty, or probability, that the subject datum is














Figure 4.33: Any flow not identified by APIC classifiers was recorded. These recordings
were parsed by APIC periodically, while searching for new application protocols. Any
new TWEANN classifiers produced by APIC were fed back into the classification engine
to identify future instances of the same application protocol.
mechanisms, demonstrated a higher degree of completeness compared to
conventional IP traffic classification systems which depend on human
experts employed by the vendor to release new classifiers periodically
through software updates. Instead, APIC fostered a self-sustaining IP
traffic classification ecosystem, where new application protocols were
automatically discovered and new classifiers introduced on the network in
near real-time.
This supports the first objective of this dissertation (Section 1.3), in which
the hypothesis regarding whether the APIC method could automatically and
accurately identify new patterns in unlabelled, mixed, noisy data sets (such
as those describing IP traffic flows) was found to be true. The following
subsection focuses on the formation of, and the accuracy achieved by, the
TWEANN classifiers produced in this case study.
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4.10.2 Accuracy
The second metric most often associated with measuring the success of an
IP traffic classification is accuracy. While an IP traffic classification system
should be complete, the available classifiers should be capable of identifying
previously observed (learned) application protocols with a high degree of
accuracy. This subsection describes the formation of classifiers and the
accuracy each achieved for the focus application protocols considered in
this case study. To challenge the state-of-the-art method of IP traffic
classification, the classifiers produced by APIC should produce task
performance results that surpass, or are comparable to, existing systems.
The best scoring feature subset discovered by APIC in this case study
consisted of 20 features, where the remaining five were discarded as
insignificant or irrelevant. Of the 20 features, ten were payload-bearing
packet directionality indicators, six were initial payload bytes and the
remaining four were payload size statistics. These features are comparable
to those manually selected by Goss and Botha (2012) and all supported
portability, as described in Section 4.8. While Goss and Botha (2012) used
payload size information of the first four payload-bearing packets, APIC
used the mean, min, max and standard deviation values recorded for the
first ten payload-bearing packets. The APIC method ruled out the
inclusion of the inbound versus outbound byte ratio and packet IAT. The
packet IAT metric was also excluded by Goss and Botha (2012), due to
external skewing by QoS policies and network congestion. Removing the
dependency on network conditions affords classifiers portability to networks
other than where they were produced.
The application protocols tested in this case study included those that
transport their payload data in plain text, and those obfuscating their
payload data through encryption. In addition to payload obfuscation, the
application protocols tested included those that operate using client-server
connectivity architectures and those adopting the emergent peer-to-peer
connectivity model. This case study, therefore, focused specifically on six
popular application protocols, namely SMTP, POP3, HTTP, HTTPS, SSH
and Bittorrent. These application protocols were chosen due to their
diversity and the number of comparable works available where the same
application protocols were tested. Table 4.11 provides information about
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Table 4.11: A list of test protocols considered in this case study, along with their payload
obfuscation and connectivity model information.
each of these protocols, with specific reference to payload obfuscation and
connectivity models. It is important to note that certain protocols, such as
Bittorrent, operate using both plain text and encrypted communications.
In this case, each would be described by a distinct TWEANN classifier.
The application protocols chosen for accuracy comparison in this case study
were those of similar works with already-published results. These
application protocols, listed in Table 4.11, are common to many public
networks and are thus the focus of many IP classification system tests. The
specific works chosen for comparison in this case study (Table 4.8) were the
most commonly cited of these works, published over the last decade.
The APIC method created a TWEANN classifier for each of the six
considered application protocols listed in Table 4.11. The topology of the
network, including the number of neurons and their neuronal connectivity
was evolved to an optimal structure using a GA. A second GA was used to
evolve the weights of each network, providing increased efficiencies
compared to a local search for optimal weights from random weights
adjusted by the backpropagation algorithm. Instead, the GA calculated
near optimal initial weights, which the backpropagation algorithm
fine-tuned, achieving convergence on a satisfactory local maximum. While
1000 training iterations were afforded to the backpropagation algorithm, in
each case the algorithm achieved convergence almost immediately, as
illustrated in Figure 4.34. Here, a sharp decline in the output deltas during
training is observed almost immediately. This sharp decline is a testament
to the efficiencies gained through initial weight selection by a GA, prior to





















Figure 4.34: The convergence graph for the backpropagation algorithm executed on the
topology illustrated in Figure 4.28. The graph has been zoomed to include data for the
first 50 epochs only. The steep drop in delta over a short number of training epochs (less
than ten) is testament to the success of APICs weight-adjusting GA.
Section 4.7 compared six similar systems to the accuracy results
achieved by the APIC method. While many reported remarkably high
accuracy, there were a number of caveats accompanying the published
results. For example, the results published for the classifiers tested by
Bernaille et al. (2006) were only achievable using their cluster and
port-labelling heuristic, where an application’s “standard port” was
assigned to each cluster. The authors argued that this attribute greatly
improved the accuracy achieved by their system, which was evident in their
results. This finding is contrary to findings in Section 4.1.1, where the use
of standard ports to identify application protocols was found redundant
and prone to error. While Bernaille et al. (2006) stated that port numbers
were only used “when meaningful”, they agreed that the applicability of
port-based classification was becoming increasingly limited due to dynamic
port selection strategies.
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Alshammari et al. (2009a) assert that an assumption is made, whereby
all application protocols are adhering to IANA-assigned application ports.
Section 4.1.1 concluded that current trends show that an increasing number
of application protocols select port numbers at random, or elect to operate
on well-known ports to confuse and evade traffic shapers and firewalls. This,
along with latency-sensitive metrics considered by the method, brings into
question the ability of the classifiers to produce high degrees of accuracy when
ported to networks other than where the initial training set was recorded.
Alshammari et al. (2009a) also recognise this in their publication, stating
that tests showed that the classifiers performed poorly when deployed on
other networks.
The DPI-based classifiers produced by Bujlow et al. (2015) produced
exceptionally high accuracy scores for many application protocols, however
all of these classifiers were created manually using regular expressions to
match plain-text application protocols. This was demonstrated by Bujlow
et al. (2015) attempting to classify encrypted bittorrent, where only 78.68
percent accuracy was realised. This is in accordance with the findings of
Section 4.1.2, where DPI-based approaches were deemed extremely
successful for identifying plain-text flows, however are rendered inept when
packet payload is rendered opaque. This observation is of increasing
importance, especially as the trend for application protocol developers to
use encryption, prevails.
The best scoring topology for each of the six application protocols
produced by APIC tracked in this experiment was illustrated in Section 4.6.
Here, the best scoring classifiers all scored in excess of 99 percent. While
these results are comparable to those in Section 4.7 and Section 4.1, it is
important to remember that these results were achieved autonomously,
without the aid of a human expert. Where the comparable works used
manual processes to annotate data sets and create classifiers, APIC was
able to perform these tasks automatically using ML techniques.
Furthermore, the classifiers produced by APIC were found to be portable.
Both the automation of classifier creation and portability of these classifiers
increases the completeness of IP traffic classification systems. A more
complete system results in less “unknown” IP traffic flows, increasing the
control administrators have over their network. In addition to being
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complete, an IP traffic classification system should also be accurate. In this
case study, APIC was found capable of producing classifiers that rivalled
those of comparative systems, designed manually by experts over the past
decade. These results are summarised in Table 4.8.
4.11 Conclusion
This chapter presented a case study describing the efficacy of the APIC
general method for the task of IP traffic classification. In this case study,
APIC demonstrated the ability to automate feature selection, application
protocol identification and classifier production processes, increasing the
overall completeness of IP traffic classification systems. The ability to select
an optimal feature subset, identify patterns within a mixed, noisy data set
and automatically produce portable, accurate classifiers for IP traffic
classification tasks are each contributions to the field of IP traffic
classification. Furthermore, the use of TWEANN models to classify IP
traffic is also a novel approach and a further contribution of this
dissertation. The ability of APIC to automatically and accurately identify
new patterns in unlabelled, mixed, noisy data sets, producing classifiers for
identifying future instances of each pattern, supports the research
objectives defined in Section 1.3.
The following chapters explore the application of the APIC method in
a more general sense, across a variety of classification problems in a broad
range of tasks. Successfully demonstrating this property satisfies the third
and final objective of this dissertation - to demonstrate APIC’s value as a




Protecting a computer network against unlawful intrusion, or against
otherwise malicious attacks, is important. This is becoming more relevant,
especially as these networks expand their reach by connecting to public
networks, such as the Internet. The Internet was designed with minimal
processing and best-effort packet switching in mind, forwarding both safe
and malicious packets (Bhuyan et al., 2013). This seemingly unregulated
network provides a multitude of opportunities for cyber attackers,
motivated by a number of factors, including revenge1, prestige2, politics3
and money4.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are tools designed to thwart these
attacks, both pro-actively and reactively. These systems have become
fundamental components of computer security architecture (Juma et al.,
2014), identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating attacks against the
networks they protect. IDSs can be divided into two main categories:
Misuse Intrusion Detection (MID) and Anomaly Intrusion Detection
(AID). Misuse detection is based on prior knowledge of an attack signature
and the application of classifiers to identify instances of these attacks using
pattern recognition Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. This category of
IDS is akin to Internet Protocol (IP) traffic classification (Zhang et al.,
2009a) and anti-virus (Szor, 2005) systems. In contrast, anomaly detection






intrusion. While MID systems have shown favourable results, regrettably,
AID systems are often plagued by high rates of false alarms (Tsai and Lin,
2010).
Chapter 4 demonstrated the capabilities of the APIC method as an IP
traffic classification system, where it was found to exhibit properties for
increased completeness, accuracy and portability when compared to similar
systems. The method has, therefore, already been demonstrated as suitable
for application as a MID system. This chapter presents a case study that
evaluates the efficacy of the APIC general method as an AID system, first
using the pre-labelled Information Security Centre of Excellence (ISCX)
IDS 2012 public data set5 (Section 5.4), followed by an evaluation using a
private data set comprised of Cisco netflow traces, reported by the edge
router of an enterprise network (Section 5.5). The first test demonstrates
the efficacy of the APIC method compared to similar systems, while the
second test evaluates application of the method in a real-world setting. A
successful demonstration in both of these areas provides evidence that the
APIC method can be applied in a broad range of network classification
tasks, including MID and AID tasks, supporting the third and final
objective of this dissertation (Section 1.3).
The following sections provide a brief background on information security
and anomaly detection, with specific reference to the type of anomalous traffic
tested in the case study.
5.1 Information Security and Anomaly
Detection
It has already been established that a computer network should be
protected to ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of
an organisation’s data is maintained. Often referred to as the CIA triad
(Greene, 2006), these elements serve as a guideline for security policy
development within an organisation. An attack against any of these
elements, illustrated in Figure 5.1, is an attack on the information security
of the organisation. The protection of an organisation’s data is critical as it
5http://www.unb.ca/research/iscx/dataset/
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Figure 5.1: The confidentiality, integrity and availability elements comprising the CIA
triad. A breach of any element may compromise the security of the data of an information
security system. Adapted from Gregory (2014).
is often viewed as the organisation’s greatest asset (Redman, 2008).
Safeguarding the data by protecting the CIA elements is therefore akin to
protecting the tangible assets of the company.
Within a computer network context, an AID system is more commonly
referred to as a Network Behaviour Anomaly Detection (NBAD) system.
These systems are one approach to detecting attacks that threaten the
information security of an organisation. This approach is often viewed as
complimentary to systems that detect network threats using a
signature-based approach, such as those reviewed by Liao et al. (2013). The
NBAD system monitors the network for any event or trend that could
indicate the presence of a threat. For these systems to be effective, a
baseline of normal network or user behaviour must first be observed over a
sustained period. Once the initial network profile has been defined, any
deviation from normal operating parameters will result in an anomalous
traffic flag being raised. Anomaly detection is not limited to computer
networks, having already been applied in a number of domains including
intrusion detection (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009), fraud detection (Phua
et al., 2010), fault detection (Idé and Kashima, 2004), system health
monitoring (Niu et al., 2011) and event detection in sensor networks (Zhang
et al., 2010). Anomalies may be introduced in data sets for a variety of
















Figure 5.2: An illustration, adapted from Bhaya and Manaa (2014), depicting the typical
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack model. An attacker sends an attack command
to a number of handlers, who forward the command to zombie attackers. These in turn
send malicious packets to the victim, quickly overwhelming their resources, thus preventing
access for legitimate users.
cyber-intrusion, terrorist activity or the breakdown of a system (Chandola
et al., 2009). While this chapter demonstrates application of the APIC
method as an NBAD system, the methods discussed support
implementation in many of these other domains as well.
An attack commonly considered by NBAD systems, due to their
abounding presence on today’s public networks, is the Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack. The following section details this type of attack,
describing it’s many forms and effects on computer network infrastructure.
5.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attack
(DDoS)
In a DDoS attack (illustrated in Figure 5.2), an attacker commands a
number of handlers to orchestrate an attack directed at a specific victim.
These handlers are often compromised host machines, where the operator
(user) is often unaware that their machine is participating in these attacks.
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Figure 5.3: An example DDoS packet, showing a stateless packet (IP protocol) with a
payload consisting of repeated hexadecimal characters, representing the ASCII “A” letter
(0x41). The payload size is 1480 which, when added to the IP header, makes the packet -
at 1500 bytes in size - the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) for standard ethernet networks.
The handler machines forward the attack instructions, including the
victim’s information, to a number of zombies. These zombies are
compromised host machines, responsible for crafting and forwarding attack
messages. By using multiple attack sources (zombies), the power of the
DDoS attack is amplified, increasing solution complexity needed for defence
(Peng et al., 2007). A typical DDoS attack involves flooding a victim with
a large volume of stateless protocol messages, such as User Datagram
Protocol (UDP), IP or Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets.
These packets are often spoofed6, masking the true identity of the zombie.
The attack packet (Figure 5.3) contains meaningless, often repetitive
payload data, where the size of the packet is often the maximum allowed by
an ethernet frame. Sending large payloads reduces the number of packets
required to overwhelm the victim’s network and system resources in a short
amount of time. This type of attack prevents legitimate network
communications from reaching the victim, reducing the availability of data,
one of the critical elements described by the CIA triad. The attack operates
on the premise that it is easier for hosts to generate requests than it is for a
server to check the validity of these requests. This makes it difficult to
protect the server from malicious requests, designed to waste resources
(Peng et al., 2007).
The impact arising from DDoS attacks range from mild user annoyances
to substantial financial losses for companies who rely on network access to
operate (Peng et al., 2007). These companies include online retailers
(e-commerce), banking institutions and postal services. It is therefore
6IP spoofing is the creation of an IP packet using a forged source address in an effort
to conceal the true identity of the sending party.
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crucial that these attacks be deterred, or otherwise mitigated to avoid
associated damages. According to Belson (2015), the second quarter of
2015 saw a 132.43 percent increase in the number of DDoS attacks
compared to the same time in 2014, with the average lifespan of an attack
lasting 18.99 percent longer. More than half of the DDoS attacks noted
were multi-vector attacks, where two or more assaults were launched at the
victim simultaneously (Belson, 2015). These multi-vector attacks were used
to generate large-scale assaults, reaching peak traffic rates in excess of 100
gigabits per second. With the wide variety of systems now connected to the
Internet, such DDoS attacks may be extremely harmful, even
life-threatening. It is therefore crucial to discourage or mitigate the effects
these attacks have on computer networks (Peng et al., 2007).
5.2.1 Classes of DDoS Attack
DDoS attacks are realised in a number of forms, or types. These attack
types are commonly divided into four categories: TCP Connection Attacks,
Volumetric Attacks, Fragmentation Attacks and Application Attacks. This
section describes each of these attacks, their intent, and their possible effects
if the network is not adequately protected.
5.2.1.1 TCP Connection Attacks
A TCP connection-based attack focuses on occupying a significant number
of connections at the victim, consuming all available connection resources
on infrastructure equipment, such as traffic load-balancers (Bourke, 2001),
firewalls (Stewart, 2013) and application servers (Leander, 2000). Although
many of these devices are designed to handle scale, they are often no match
for a sizeable DDoS attack. A common attack in this category is the TCP
SYN flood attack, which exploits a weakness in the TCP protocol’s
three-way handshake (Figure 5.4). Normally, a client device will send a
synchronise (SYN) packet to a host device, initiating a TCP flow. The host
will respond with an acknowledge (ACK) for the original SYN packet and a
new SYN message. The host then waits until the client sends an ACK
message, after which the data channel is open and the hosts exchange data
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Figure 5.4: A normal TCP connection setup (three-way handshake) is depicted in (a),
where the three-way handshake is successfully completed, resulting in an open data channel
between the communicating hosts. Figure (b) shows a SYN flood, where SYN+ACK
responses from the host are ignored by the client device. The victim (host device) leaves
the connection open until an ACK is received from the client, an unlikely event as the
SYN packet is often spoofed.
number of SYN packets to a host (the victim), often using a spoofed source
address. The host will respond to these requests with a SYN+ACK
response and will wait for the client to respond. The zombie never responds
to the message from the host, but rather sends additional SYN messages,
resulting in further connection resources being consumed at the host. The
host will often continue to accept new connections, binding resources until
no new connections are possible, ultimately resulting in a loss of service.
5.2.1.2 Volumetric Attacks
Volumetric attacks focus on consuming all available bandwidth, causing
congestion either within the target or service, or between the target and the
rest of the network. Volumetric-based attacks are often easier to detect
than other DDoS attacks, due to their size and collateral damage
(downtime, lost contracts, data loss). In these attacks, the zombie hosts
craft packets using a number of protocols, loading the payload with random
data until the maximum packet size is reached. These packets do not need
to contain valid payload data, other than the target host’s IP address
information. The damage inflicted by this attack is caused by the transfer
of the large packets, which often overwhelm the limited network resources
of the target.
Examples of this attack include UDP Floods, where unsolicited packets
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are sent to a target using the UDP, session-less transport protocol. Unlike
the TCP protocol, UDP does not require a connection be established prior
to data transfer. The attack involves sending a number of UDP packets
to random ports on the victim, causing the host to repeatedly look up an
application binding to that port. When no matching application is found, the
host generates an ICMP “Destination Unreachable” message to the spoofed
IP. This attack consumes host resources and often leads to inaccessibility of
the victim. Another similar attack is the ICMP flood. This attack sends
ICMP echo requests (ping) to a host, as fast as possible without waiting
for a response. As hosts are often configured to respond to ping requests,
this attack often consumes both ingress and egress bandwidth on a victim’s
network, resulting in a significant slowdown of legitimate communications.
5.2.1.3 Fragmentation Attacks
The largest IP packet allowed on a network is 65,535 bytes (including the
IP header), however layer 2 protocols, such as ethernet, often impose a
MTU size of 1500 bytes. To send a single packet that exceeds this size, it is
necessary for the sending party to fragment the original message, breaking
it up into multiple messages. The recipient needs to receive each of these
fragmented messages to reassemble and process the complete message. In a
fragmentation attack, the zombie hosts send so many fragmented packets
that the host is quickly overwhelmed and is unable to reassemble the
streams. Other examples include the Ping of Death (PoD), where the
zombie constructs fragmented packets maliciously, such that the recipient
assembles a packet that exceeds 65,535 bytes. This often leads to buffer
overflow issues, causing a loss of service for legitimate traffic.
5.2.1.4 Application Attacks
Certain DDoS attacks operate more conspicuously than others. Application
attacks often involve very few packets, where the message contained in the
payload is specifically designed to overwhelm a target application. In this
type of attack, only the targeted application is affected, while the other
ports and network traffic remain available. Slowloris7 is an example of an
7https://www.incapsula.com/ddos/attack-glossary/slowloris.html
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application attack, enabling a single host to bring down a web server with
minimal bandwidth and nominal impact (if any) to other applications. The
attacking host opens a number of connections to a remote web server. A
partial request is sent to each of these connections periodically, ensuring
that the web server keeps them open. A complete request is never sent, thus
the web server continues to wait, holding these connections open. These
open connections fill the maximum concurrent connections pool, resulting in
service unavailability.
5.2.2 Identifying DDoS Attacks
A number of attacks, such as volumetric-based attacks, are fairly easy to
identify due to the high data or packet volumes they generate. Others that
operate more discreetly, such as application attacks, are more difficult to
detect. To identify these attacks, NBAD systems commonly use time series
data to learn normal operating values for a range of data points (attributes
or features) in specific windows (time frames). Data points that have a
low probability of being generated from the normal distribution are flagged
as potential anomalies (Chandola et al., 2009). An example of anomalies
(outliers) in a two dimensional data set is illustrated in Figure 5.5. In this
illustration, the data points A1 and A2, are sufficiently far from the normal
data sets (N1 and N2) to be flagged as anomalies.
5.2.3 Generic Architecture of DDoS Defence Systems
NBAD systems are deployed in a number of network locations, based on their
architecture. These include victim-end, source-end and intermediate network
locations (Mirković et al., 2003). Victim-end NBAD systems are deployed on
a network to protect and warn the operator of imminent, or current, inbound
attacks. The architecture of source-end NBAD systems is similar to victim-
end detection system architecture. In a source-end configuration, the network
operator deploys an NBAD system to detect hosts on their network who
participate in zombie-like activity, flooding the network with packets in an
outbound (egress) direction. Bhuyan et al. (2013) emphasises that stopping a
DDoS attack at the source is the best possible defence against a DDoS attack.






Figure 5.5: A two-dimensional representation of a data set where anomalies (Ax) and
normal data points (Nx) are clearly differentiable. Data sets considered by NBAD systems
are often multi-dimensional, extending beyond two dimensions.
as the Internet. Source-end detection would not only prevent the occurrence
of flooding at the victim side, but also across the intermediate networks
between the source and the victim. Intermediate defence systems balance the
trade-offs between detection accuracy and bandwidth consumption. These
systems monitor traffic profiles as packets transit the network, and compare
them to previously observed patterns. They consider information shared by a
number of routers on the network before deciding whether a particular traffic
flow is an attack. Similar to a source-end detection system, if an attack is
identified, a rate-limit is imposed to reduce the load imposed on the victim.
Due to the collaboration of neighbouring routers, tracing back the source of
an attack is simplified (Bhuyan et al., 2013).
ML paradigms, including supervised and unsupervised learning
algorithms, are increasingly used in DDoS attack detection due to their
ability to distinguish normal and attack traffic accurately and
automatically (Bhuyan et al., 2013). These learning algorithms are tolerant
to imprecision and uncertainty, factors for consideration when observing
real-world network traffic. Using features extracted from temporal data sets
describing network traffic, ML-based systems can learn to detect attacks
and, in certain cases, prevent them.
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The following section details a number of recent advances in statistical
and ML-based approaches to DDoS detection, the evaluation methodologies
employed to test these systems and the results achieved.
5.3 Statistical and Machine Learning-based
DDoS Detection
ML is poised as an effective DDoS detection and mitigation tool, due to its
ability to learn and make predictions on previously unseen data. Many ML-
based approaches have been tested, using both supervised and unsupervised
approaches. Supervised ML learning approaches are the most prevalent in
recent DDoS detection systems, leveraging statistical features of flows to
identify anomalous traffic on the network.
Chen (2009) investigated a statistical model, where the inbound
Synchronise Arrival Rate (SAR) was compared to the normal distribution
of traffic flows originating on the Internet toward their campus network.
The method identified an attack using a two-step process. First, the
current SAR was compared with the normal, expected SAR distribution. If
no significant difference was noted, the ratio of Synchronize (SYN) and
ACK packets was checked against the normal distribution. Chen (2009)
stated that the method incurred low computational overhead as it simply
counted the SYN and ACK packets received, without storing or tracking
the entire three-way handshake. The efficacy of the method was tested and
validated through experimental simulations, where results against a private
data set indicated that a low false positive and false negative rate was
achieved with short detection times. According to Chen (2009), the method
was capable of detecting even subtle attacks as the SAR and SYN-to-ACK
ratio deviate from the norm. While Chen (2009) failed to provide a
summary of accuracy achieved for their method, the results published
showed reduced computational complexity compared to two similar
methods. These methods are the SYN arrival method, where a heuristic
threshold is configured for SYN packet counts over set intervals and the
SYN-FIN method, where TCP flags for the entire flow are monitored. The
ability for the method to detect both high and low bandwidth DDoS
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Feature Description
NICMP Percentage of ICMP packets
NUDP Percentage of UDP packets
NTCP Percentage of TCP packets
NTCPSY N Percentage of SY N flags in TCP packets
NTCPSY NACK Percentage of SY N + ACK flags in TCP packets
NTCPACK Percentage of ACK flags in TCP packets
AAVGHEADER The average size of packet headers
AAVGDATASIZE The average size of data packets
Table 5.1: Features extracted from flows between time intervals, used to construct the
neural network input data in the method proposed by Jalili et al. (2005).
attacks make it suitable for identifying TCP Connection Attacks (Section
5.2.1.1), which is critical as TCP is the most important traffic on the
Internet, targeted by 90 percent of DDoS attacks (Moore et al., 2006).
Jalili et al. (2005) trained supervised Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
for detecting flooding attacks, where an attacker targets a network with
semi-normal packets. Semi-normal packets are correctly formed data
packets exchanged within a flow, occurring at an abnormal rate or
containing abnormal payload. The statistical features a flow exhibits
change under DDoS attack, deviating from the normal distribution of
features (Jalili et al., 2005). Jalili et al. (2005) also stated that these
features are time-based and may exhibit divergent profiles at different
times, such as day and night. For this reason, Jalili et al. (2005) divided the
provided normal and attack traffic samples into minor time intervals,
forming temporal data sets. These data sets included all packets and their
associated timestamps. The statistical features extracted from these traces
form the training data for a pre-processor neural network. The authors
implemented this ANN for DDoS detection in conjunction with their
Unsupervised Neural Network based Intrusion Detector (UNNID) method
(Amini and Jalili, 2004), a method that implements Adaptive Resonance
Theory (ART)(Grossberg, 2013). Combined, these methods form the the
Statistical Pre-Processor and Unsupervised Neural Network-based Intrusion
Detector (SPUNNID) method. The features used by Jalili et al. (2005) to
describe flows at each interval are listed in Table 5.1. To evaluate the
131
Feature Description
Time Time the connection was first observed (start time)
SrcIP Source IP address of the flow
DstIP Destination IP address of the flow
SrcPort Source port of the flow
DstPort Destination port of the flow
Protocol IP protocol of the flow
Table 5.2: Features extracted from the public, anomymous data sets used by the DDoS
detection method proposed by Bhaya and Manaa (2014).
method, the authors recorded real network traffic, which they replayed in a
simulated environment while DDoS traffic was introduced by a traffic
generator. Evaluation results revealed that with a time interval not
exceeding two minutes, the method was able to differentiate between
normal and attack traffic in 94.9 percent of the cases.
Bhaya and Manaa (2014) asserted that data mining techniques (Witten
and Frank, 2005) were capable of successfully distinguishing normal traffic
from attack traffic with good accuracy. The authors proposed a hybrid
approach for detecting and analysing DDoS attacks in real world traffic,
tested using the CAIDA UCSD “DDoS Attack 2007” data set8 for attack
traffic and traces from the CAIDA Anonymized Internet Traces 2008 data
set9 for normal traffic. The data sets contained anonymised flow traces,
where the payload of each packet had been removed. The method proposed
by Bhaya and Manaa (2014) used attributes inferred from IP packet
headers only. These attributes are described in Table 5.2. The authors
extracted 2,000,000 packets from each data set and, using Shannon’s
Entropy (Shannon, 2001) and min-max normalisation, transformed the data





















Table 5.3: A confusion matrix for DDoS detection, where True Positive denotes the
number of packets correctly identified as malicious, False Positive where normal traffic is
incorrectly identified as malicious (attack), False Negative when attack traffic is incorrectly
identified as normal traffic and True Negative when normal traffic is correctly identified.
Bhaya and Manaa (2014) evaluated the success of their method using a
confusion matrix (Stehman, 1997) (Table 5.3), where success was determined
by Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
accuracy =
TP + TN










The results published by Bhaya and Manaa (2014) show their
centroid-based rules method achieved better results than a simple
centroid-based method (Oh and Lee, 2003). Testing showed that an
accuracy of 99.77 percent was possible using the centroid-based rules
method on the CAIDA data set, whereas the comparable centroid-based
method achieved 97.67 percent.
Yassin et al. (2013) proposed a hybrid machine-learning approach to
anomaly detection on networks using K-means Clustering (KMC) and
Näıve Bayes Classifier (NBC), called “KMC+NBC”. The authors argued
that NBC alone produced a high percentage false alarm rate, whereas when
combined with KMC, the same accuracy and detection rates are noted,
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with a significantly reduced false alarm rate. The authors evaluated their
method using the ISCX 2012 benchmark data set, containing over 1,512,000
packets, describing network traffic for a seven-day period by 20 distinct
attributes (Table 5.4). More information about this data set is available in
Shiravi et al. (2012). Yassin et al. (2013) showed that, with the
KMC+NBC method, 99 percent accuracy and 98.8 percent detection rate
was achievable, compared to NBC alone, which scored 88.2 percent and
85.0 percent respectively.
Juma et al. (2014) extended the work of Yassin et al. (2013), replacing
the K-means and NBC algorithms with X-means clustering (Pelleg et al.,
2000) and Random Forest Classifier (Ho, 1995) respectively. Juma et al.
(2014) stated that the configuration was better suited to reducing false
alarms, compared to similar methods. The method also used the ISCX
2012 IDS data set during evaluation, where average accuracy scores reached
99.96 percent, with detection rates of 99.99 percent, whilst maintaining
false alarm rates of 0.02 percent. Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al.
(2014) demonstrated that instituting clustering algorithms such as K-means
and X-means, as first-phase classifiers, greatly enhanced accuracy and
detection rates of anomalous traffic in IP flow trace data sets, while
reducing the number of false positives.
The APIC method adopts a similar architecture, where an EA guides a
clustering algorithm using descriptive feature sets, prior to producing unique
classifiers to identify future instances of each cluster. The following section
describes experiments where the tests devised by Yassin et al. (2013) and
Juma et al. (2014) were implemented using the APIC method.
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Feature Description Data Type
appName The name of the application protocol String
totalSourceBytes Total bytes from the source Integer
totalDestinationBytes Total bytes from the destination Integer
totalSourcePackets Total packets from the source Integer
totalDestinationPackets Total packets from the destination Integer
sourcePayloadAsBase64 First source packet payload (Base64
Encoded)
String
sourcePayloadAsUTF First source packet payload (UTF
Encoded)
String
destinationPayloadAsBase64 First destination packet payload
(Base64 Encoded)
String
destinationPayloadAsUTF First destination packet payload (UTF
Encoded)
String
direction Direction of flow String
sourceTCPFlags TCP flags observed in source packets String
destinationTCPFlags TCP flags observed in destination
packets
String
source Source IP address String
protocolName Transport layer protocol String
sourcePort Source port of the flow Integer
destination Destination IP address String
destinationPort Destination port of the flow Integer
startDateT ime Start time of the flow Integer
endDateT ime End time of the flow Integer
tag Indicator of “normal” or “attack”
traffic
String
Table 5.4: Features included in the ISCX 2012 IDS labelled data set.
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5.4 ISCX 2012 IDS Experiment
This section details experiments where the APIC method was evaluated as
a victim-end NBAD system using the pre-labelled ISCX 2012 IDS data set.
The experiments follow the design set forth by Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma
et al. (2014), where a subset of the ISCX 2012 IDS data set was used to
evaluate their methods. These authors extracted IP flow information for a
specific target host, where normal and attack samples were evaluated using
their methods. Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014) divided samples
into training and testing data sets, where the former were used to train ML
algorithms to identify future instances of “normal” and “attack” flows. These
included combinations of K-means and X-means clustering, Näıve Bayes and
Random Forest (RF) classifiers. The trained systems were evaluated using
previously unseen IP flow samples from the testing data set, extracted from
the ISCX 2012 IDS data set.
Using the same target host as Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al.
(2014) provides a good basis for comparing the efficacy of the APIC
method against these methods. As many of the implementation details
were omitted by Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014), a number of
variations to the original experiments may be observed in those described
in this section. The following subsections detail the implementation of each
experiment using the APIC method. Each subsection highlights any
deviations from the experiments conducted by Yassin et al. (2013) and
Juma et al. (2014). The section ends with a discussion of the results, which
indicate that the APIC method is suitable for application as a victim-end
NBAD system, accurately identifying anomalous activity in data sets
containing complete flow information.
5.4.1 Experimental Data Sets
The experiments conducted by Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014)
used the ISCX 2012 IDS data set (Shiravi et al., 2012) as a benchmark
for testing their respective KMC+NBC and XM-RF methods. The data set
contains almost 1,512,000 packets, describing complete IP flows recorded over
a period of seven days. The data set contains labelled records, where each
flow is described by 20 features (Table 5.4), tagged as “normal” or “attack”.
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Training Data Testing Data
Normal Attack Normal Attack
Day 1 0 0 147 0
Day 2 22,612 0 0 0
Day 3 16,260 1,973 0 0
Day 4 0 0 19,115 37,159
Day 5 22,879 0 0 0
Day 6 13,621 181 0 0
Total 77,526 56,421
Table 5.5: The partitioning of complete IP flow traces into training and testing data sets
for the selected host. The six days encompass the entire ISCX data set. Flows for day
two, three, five and six are assigned to the training data set, while those recorded on the
first and fourth days are assigned to the testing data set. The days chosen and data set
split were performed in accordance with Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014)
Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014) reduced the complexity of the
task by testing flows destined for a single target host in the data set. The
daily traffic flows for the selected host were divided into training and testing
data sets. Table 5.5 outlines the composition of each of these data sets, where
the training data set comprised 77,526 flow samples and the testing data set
56,421 samples. These samples contain summary information describing web,
Electronic Mail (E-Mail), Domain Name Services (DNS) and Secure Shell
(SSH) flows - services running on the target host.
5.4.2 Feature Selection
Many details of the experiments conducted by Yassin et al. (2013) and
Juma et al. (2014) are absent in their publications. These details include
the features that were included as inputs to their clustering algorithms, how
these features were encoded, and the normalisation technique applied to
each feature. After an initial manual pruning of the ISCX 2012 IDS
features, the remaining, compatible features included in this experiment
were automatically determined by the APIC method, using the feature
selection process described in Section 3.1.
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Feature Encoding Example







direction L2L = 0, R2L = 1, L2R = 2, R2R = 3 1
sourceTCPFlags Boolean indicating inclusion of each
flag: S,F,R,P,A
1, 0, 0, 0, 1 for
SYN/ACK
destinationTCPFlags Boolean indicating inclusion of each
flag: S,F,R,P,A
1, 0, 0, 0, 0 for SYN





Table 5.6: Feature set considered by the APIC experiments. These features were chosen
from the original 20 features of the ISCX 2012 IDS data set.
The ISCX 2012 IDS data set describes complete flows using features listed
in Table 5.4. Of these features, only those offering statistical significance to
the problem were included for consideration by the APIC method. These
are features that enable the method to classify each flow as either normal,
or an attack. The final list of features, their encoding scheme and example
translations provided to the APIC method are described in Table 5.6.
A number of the original 20 features were excluded from the APIC data
sets. These included the sourcePayloadAsBase64, sourcePayloadAsUTF,
destinationPayloadAsBase64 and destinationPayloadAsUTF features.
These features were excluded as APIC relies on normalised input datum,
where a feature value range between zero and one is expected. It was
deemed unfeasible to encode each of these variable length strings as
features in the required format. The source and destination features were
also excluded, as directionality information was already provided through
the direction feature and IP address encoding presents a similar challenge
to variable length string encoding. The startDateTime and endDateTime
attributes were also stripped, as the data set provided to APIC was without
temporal knowledge.
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The remaining 11 features were those suitable for encoding in the
required format. The appName feature was encoded by substituting the
well-known port for the application. The totalSourceBytes,
totalDestinationBytes, totalSourcePackets, totalDestinationPackets,
sourcePort and destinationPort remained unchanged as integer values can
be reduced to a value between zero and one using a normalisation function.
The string value describing the direction feature was encoded by
substituting an integer value for each of the four known directions, using
values from zero to three. Both the sourceTCPFlags and
destinationTCPFlags features were represented by five bits, where
observation of a particular flag would set the value of the bit at that
location to “1”, whilst an absence of the flag was represented by “0”.
Finally, the protocolName feature was encoded by translating the string
name of the protocol to its protocol number. In total, 19 features were
provided to the APIC method for describing the training and testing data
sets.
Each of the 19 features considered by APIC were normalised using the
min-max normalisation function (Equation 4.3). This function requires a
bounded value range for calculating the normalised value. The low-end and
high-end values for each of the features were chosen heuristically, by noting
the lowest and highest values for each feature in the sample data sets. The
inputs to the min-max normalisation function for each feature are listed in
Table 5.7.
The normalised training data set comprising all 19 features was passed to
the APIC method, where feature selection genotypes were generated, each 19
bits long (Table 5.8). Each bit represented the inclusion of a specific feature
during the clustering process. The feature selection process implemented by
the APIC method is described in Section 3.1. The values used to configure






















Table 5.7: The bounded number ranges serving as inputs to the min-max normalisation













Feature 32 100 0.1 0.5 19
Hyper-param 100 100 0.1 0.5 16
Table 5.8: A table describing the algorithmic parameters configured for each of the two
GAs used by APIC: the first GA searches for an optimal feature subset (Section 3.1), the



















Figure 5.6: A histogram comparing the average distance between datum in each cluster,
calculated using the silhouette clustering method (Equation 3.2). Low average distances
provide evidence of successful, tight clustering by the GA-controlled DBSCAN algorithm.
The maximum value for the Y axis is determined by n∗1, where n is the number of features
considered during the clustering process and 1 the highest value possible for the normalised
feature. The chart includes the standard deviation of average distances between clusters.
5.4.3 Behavioural Profiling of IP Flow Summary Data
Each feature set genotype was tested by clustering the training data set,
described by the 19 normalised features (Table 5.7). The minPTS and eps
parameters for each Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with
Noise (DBSCAN) execution were tuned using a hyper-parameter search
GA (Section 3.2). These hyper-parameters are the tunable parameters
provided to learning algorithms to guide their execution (Bergstra and
Bengio, 2012). The parameters guiding this process are listed in Table 5.8.
The automated generation of optimal hyper-parameters for guiding the
APIC method’s clustering algorithms is described in Section 3.2.
After executing the APIC method, the best feature set was found to
include 18 features, where only the appName feature was excluded. The
tag label for each datum of the training set was excluded, preventing the
APIC clustering process (Section 3.2) from forming an unfair bias using
pre-labelled datum. The best scoring feature set genotype identified 15
clusters, with an average distance of 0.043 observed between datum of the
same cluster. Figure 5.6 depicts the average distance between datum in
each cluster. After an extensive search process - over 100 generations - the
hyper-parameter optimisation concluded with optimal parameters of
eps = 0.09 and minPTS = 205. An initial verification of the clustered data
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Cluster Average Distance Attack Tag Normal Tag
1 0.057 0% 100%
2 0.029 0% 100%
3 0.028 0% 100%
4 0.034 0% 100%
5 0.047 0% 100%
6 0.059 0% 100%
7 0.030 0% 100%
8 0.025 0% 100%
9 0.059 0% 100%
10 0.012 0% 100%
11 0.044 0% 100%
12 0.076 100% 0%
13 0.069 100% 0%
14 0.052 100% 0%
15 0.020 100% 0%
Average 0.043
Table 5.9: A list showing the average distance between datum and the distribution of
the ISCX “tag”, or label, for datum in the cluster. The tag distribution indicates how
many datum were tagged as “normal” and how many were “attack” in each cluster.
set was performed, comparing the distribution of tags of each datum within
the cluster. The average distance and tag distributions for each of the 15
clusters are listed in Table 5.9.
Although the “tag” flow label feature was excluded from the clustering
process, post-cluster verification of datum tags showed each cluster
distinctly described either an attack, or normal traffic. The APIC
clustering methods were therefore able to correctly distinguish normal from
attack flow behaviours using an unlabelled data set. The APIC clustering
method did, however, fail to associate 2.7 percent (2,093 flow samples) of
the training data set with a cluster. Manual verification of these
unclassified samples revealed that all were tagged as normal traffic flows in
the ISCX data set.
Each of the identified flow behaviour classes (clusters) were used to form
training sets for developing Topology and Weight Evolving Artificial Neural









Table 5.10: A list of parameters and their associated values supplied to the APIC
TWEANN creation process (Section 3.3).
The following subsection details the creation and composition of each of
these TWEANN classifiers.
5.4.4 IP Traffic Profile Classification
The best scoring clustered data set was used to create TWEANN classifiers
to identify future instances of each IP flow class. Using the method
described in Section 3.3, a custom TWEANN classifier was produced for
each identified cluster. The parameters guiding the TWEANN creation
process are summarised in Table 5.10.
These parameters were chosen heuristically, based on previous
experience working with similar data sets. The maximum number of
neurons for the TWEANN topology, including the inputs and output, was
limited to 30. The learning rate and momentum values were set to 1.0 and
0.5 respectively. The GA’s population size was set to 10, where a maximum
number of 100 generations was allowed. This rather small number of
generations is reasonable as, in previous tests, the best scoring TWEANN
topology was discovered at generations earlier than 25. Finally, the
backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al., 1988) was limited to a
maximum of 1,000 training iterations for fine-tuning the weights after the
GA had chosen the best neuron structure and weight values. The
backpropagation algorithm was used to fine-tune the weights found by the
GA since, although the GA’s ability to provide a global search technique
results in near-optimal solutions, it is rather inefficient at fine-tuned local
search (Yao, 1999). A hybrid training approach was therefore adopted,
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CID Topology TP FP TN FN Normal Attack Score
1 18 - 2 - 1 6,999 0 70,527 0 6,999 0 99.63%
2 18 - 6 - 1 7,054 0 70,469 3 7,054 0 99.28%
3 18 - 3 - 1 9,690 0 67,836 0 9,690 0 99.83%
4 18 - 4 - 1 3,153 0 74,373 0 3,153 0 99.26%
5 18 - 0 - 1 3,876 0 73,650 0 3,876 0 99.34%
6 18 - 1 - 1 3,643 0 73,800 83 3,643 0 99.01%
7 18 - 2 - 1 4,275 0 73,251 0 4,275 0 99.61%
8 18 - 2 - 1 3,078 0 74,448 0 3,078 0 99.24%
9 18 - 9 - 1 2,447 0 75,045 34 2,447 0 99.56%
10 18 - 0 - 1 3,599 0 73,967 0 3,599 0 99.26%
11 18 - 1 - 1 3,599 0 73,820 147 3,599 0 99.45%
12 18 - 6 - 1 1,173 0 76,353 0 0 1,173 99.93%
13 18 - 3 - 1 281 39 77,206 0 0 281 98.96%
14 18 - 2 - 1 322 0 77,204 0 0 322 99.73%
15 18 - 4 - 1 378 0 77,148 0 0 378 99.66%
Result 53,567 39 1,109,097 267 51,413 2,154 99.45%
Table 5.11: A list of the identified clusters along with the best scoring TWEANN
topology, the True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN) and False
Negative (FN) values achieved during recall of the training data set. The “Normal” and
“Attack” columns tally the number of normal and attack tags of the datum the TWEANN
was trained to identify. Finally, the average score achieved by recalling the training set
for each cluster is also listed.
using a weight-evolving GA to globally optimise the ANN weights, whose
weights were fine-tuned using the backpropagation algorithm.
Information regarding each of the best scoring TWEANN classifiers for
each cluster is listed in Table 5.11. The “normal” and “attack” columns
indicate that clusters one through 11 were trained to detect normal flows,
while clusters 12 through 15 detect attacks. The combined confusion matrix
for the recall tests, post training, are depicted in Table 5.12. The accuracy,
detection and false positive rates for the APIC method and comparable works






p′ 53,567 267 P′
n′ 39 1,109,097 N′
P N
Table 5.12: A confusion matrix for the APIC training set recall tests. The True Negative
count is substantially high due to the way the TWEANN training set is created, where any
datum external to the cluster being trained is marked with a “0”. The True Positive count
includes all datum that were part of a cluster (cluster membership is mutually exclusive).
Method Accuracy Detection False Alarms
NBC (Yassin et al., 2013) 82.800% 13.800% 17.600%
KMC+NBC (Yassin et al., 2013) 99.800% 95.400% 0.130%
RF (Juma et al., 2014) 99.990% 99.810% 0.010%
XM-RF (Juma et al., 2014) 99.990% 99.950% 0.000%
APIC 99.970% 99.920% 0.004%
Table 5.13: The results of training set recall tests by comparable NBAD systems. The
accuracy, detection and false positive rates are calculated using Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
After the TWEANN development process was concluded, an average
recall score of 99.45 percent was recorded for the classifiers (Table 5.11).
While the training set recall test demonstrated good results, it was
important to evaluate each of the classifiers using previously unseen data.
The following section tests the newly-trained TWEANN classifiers against






p′ 36,878 281 P′
n′ 15 19,247 N′
P N
Table 5.14: A confusion matrix for the testing set parsed through the trained TWEANN
classifiers. A total of 36,878 samples were correctly identified as attacks (TP), with 19,247
samples correctly identified as normal traffic (TN). A total of 281 attacks were incorrectly
marked as normal traffic (FN), with 15 normal samples erroneously marked as attacks.
5.4.5 Classifier Evaluation
A test data set was created using the 19,262 normal and 37,159 attack
traces extracted from the filtered data set (Table 5.5). The data set was
normalised using the same limits applied to the training data set (Table
5.7). Each datum of the testing set was passed through each of the 15
classifiers, where it was marked as either a normal or attack flow, based on
the best scoring classifier. A probability score in excess of 95 percent
describes a positive match, with anything below that value describing a
mismatch. Datum generating a positive match by TWEANNs trained to
identify clusters one through 11 were marked as normal, while those
positively matched by classifiers 12 through 15, an attack. As the purpose
of NBAD systems is to identify anomalous traffic, any datum not explicitly
marked as an attack by clusters 12 through 15, or normal flows by
classifiers one through eleven, were implicitly marked as normal.
The results of parsing each of the testing datum through the 15 classifiers
are described using the confusion matrix in Table 5.14. The True Positive
(TP) tally denotes all flows marked by clusters 12 through 15 as a positive
attack, corroborated by the tags read from the ISCX 2012 data set.
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Method Data set Accuracy Detection False
NBC (Yassin et al., 2013) ISCX2012 88.20% 85.00% 33.70%
KMC+NBC (Yassin et al., 2013) ISCX2012 99.00% 98.80% 2.2%
XM-1R (Juma et al., 2014) ISCX2012 93.68% 95.20% 9.26%
RF (Juma et al., 2014) ISCX2012 99.91% 99.94% 0.11%
XM-RF (Juma et al., 2014) ISCX2012 99.96% 99.99% 0.02%
APIC ISCX2012 99.48% 99.99% 0.08%
Table 5.15: The results of comparable NBAD systems, reporting their accuracy, detection
and false positive rates tested using the pre-labelled ISCX data set.
The True Negative (TN) count tallies all occurrences where an IP flow,
marked “normal” in the ISCX 2012 data set, was not positively identified as
an attack by the APIC method. The False Positive (FP) reading counts all
instances where ISCX 2012 “normal” tagged traffic was incorrectly marked
as an attack by the APIC method. Finally, the False Negative (FN) count
shows all ISCX 2012 “attack” flows that were marked “normal” by the APIC
method. Using Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, the accuracy, detection rate and
false alarm rate for the testing set was calculated. The results of these
calculations are shown alongside comparable NBAD systems in Table 5.15.
5.4.6 Discussion
The ISCX 2012 data set is comprised of complete flow traces, annotated
as “attack” or “normal” traffic by a commercial classification system. The
data set serves as a reference for many works, whose results are compared
against those achieved by the experiments of this chapter, in Table 5.15. In
these results, the APIC method is shown to exceed those of many works,
and remain comparable with the rest. The experiments described in this
section highlight the success APIC achieved as a victim-end NBAD system.
While accuracy and detection rates are important aspects of these systems,
many score well yet suffer a high number of false alarms (Tsai and Lin, 2010;
Muda et al., 2011). For APIC to succeed as a victim-end NBAD system,
it should exhibit high accuracy and detection rates, while maintaining a
low false alarm rate. The experiments in this section compare the results
APIC achieved using IP flow samples extracted from the ISCX 2012 IDS
pre-labelled data set with comparable research using the same data set. The
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results achieved by each of these methods are listed in Table 5.15. The APIC
experiments were modelled around those conducted by Yassin et al. (2013)
and Juma et al. (2014), using the ISCX 2012 IDS data set (Section 5.4).
The discussion that follows subsequently, focuses on the experimental results
achieved by these methods, using the ISCX 2012 IDS data set.
5.4.6.1 Data Sets
The ISCX 2012 IDS data set does not offer ready-made training and testing
data sets. To reduce the complexity of the classification task, Yassin et al.
(2013) and Juma et al. (2014) proposed extracting flows destined for a
particular target host to build their data sets. The extracted flow
information was then partitioned into training and testing data sets (Table
5.5). The experiment described in this section selected 75,372 normal and
2,154 attack flow vectors from day one, two, three, five and six of the
filtered data set. The testing data set was comprised of 19,262 normal
traces and 37,159 attack traces from day four of the same data set. The
purpose of reducing the size of the original ISCX data set was to lower the
complexity of the task and, subsequently, the computational resources
required for execution.
5.4.6.2 Feature Set
Little guidance was offered by Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014)
regarding which ISCX 2012 IDS features were included in their methods.
Furthermore, no information regarding the normalisation process or value
range for each dimension of these features were discussed. The features
considered and the encoding methods implemented to convert them to values
suitable for clustering are therefore expected to differ significantly between
APIC and these comparable methods.
The original 20 features from the ISCX 2012 IDS data set were pruned,
where the sourcePayloadAsBase64, sourcePayloadAsUTF,
destinationPayloadAsBase64, destinationPayloadAsUTF, source and
destination features were removed. This was due to complexities realised
when encoding variable length string features as inputs for unsupervised
learning algorithms, such as K-means and DBSCAN. The source and
destination flag features were converted from variable length string values
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to five separate features, each one bit in length. A “1” value at each
location signals the inclusion of a particular flag with a “0”, the exclusion
thereof. A summary list of the features considered by APIC and the ranges
supplied to the min-max normalisation function are shown in Table 5.7. An
interesting observation is that, of the 19 features presented to APIC, only
the appName feature was excluded from the best scoring feature subset. It
is surmised that the method found this attribute redundant, due the
presence of the dstPort feature, which contained values equal to appName.
5.4.6.3 Training Set Clustering
Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014) implemented a hybrid learning
approach, not dissimilar to APIC, to identify anomalous traffic in the ISCX
2012 IDS data set. The pre-classification module, described by Yassin et al.
(2013), used K-means clustering to partition the data set into three distinct
clusters. Juma et al. (2014) substituted an enhanced version of K-means
- X-means - as the pre-classification clustering algorithm. The X-means
algorithm initially started with three clusters, however the algorithm has
the ability to split clusters until more favourable results are achieved. The
APIC method uses the DBSCAN algorithm, where a GA evolves the hyper-
parameters governing the search. Using DBSCAN, the number of clusters,
K, is not required prior to execution of the algorithm.
The K-means clustering algorithm is known to form convex cluster shapes
and does not perform well where non-convex cluster shapes are required. This
clustering method also requires that all datum be joined to a cluster. The
clustered datum gather around a central point (centroid), which is prone
to being drawn toward outlier datum. This shifting of the centroid causes
the average distance between datum in the cluster to increase, resulting in
loose, less accurate clustering. The only input required for this algorithm is
a value for K - the number of clusters to form. Both Yassin et al. (2013) and
Juma et al. (2014) used a value of three (K = 3) as input to the clustering
algorithm.
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In contrast, the DBSCAN algorithm is capable of finding
arbitrary-shaped, non-convex clusters. The algorithm does not align cluster
datum around a centroid and is capable of discarding outliers. The APIC
method uses a GA to evolve hyper-parameters for the DBSCAN algorithm,
allowing it to automatically discern the number of clusters in the data set.
The algorithm discovered 15 clusters, where an average distance of 0.043
between datum (Table 5.9) was observed. Unfortunately, the average
distance within clusters produced by Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al.
(2014) were not reported. While the APIC DBSCAN implementation failed
to associate 2.7 percent (2,093 flows) with a cluster, each of these flows
were tagged as “normal” flows and thus did not affect the accuracy or
detection rates attained by APIC.
The resultant, best scoring clustered data set from APIC was evaluated
by restoring the original tags from the ISCX 2012 IDS data set on each
cluster member. It was observed that all members of each of the 15 clusters
shared the same tag, either “normal” or “attack”. This provides evidence
that the APIC clustering process correctly profiled and grouped (clustered)
the datum according to their behaviour. Not only did APIC correctly group
normal and attack datum, but unlike Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al.
(2014), it also provided enhanced visibility into the different types of attacks
destined for the target host. According to the clustered data set, a total of
four distinct attack profiles (clusters 12 through 15) were identified in the
training set. Each of the clusters discovered by APIC were used to train
TWEANN classifiers to identify future instances of each attack.
5.4.6.4 TWEANN Classifier Production
TWEANN classifiers were trained to identify each of the 15 clusters,
reconfiguring their topology to achieve best recall scores over each
successive epoch. The results of this training are depicted by the confusion
matrix in Table 5.12. As a result, 99.97 percent accuracy, 99.85 percent
detection and 0.01 percent false positive rates were achieved using the
training set. By comparison, the NBC method and enhanced KMC+NBC
methods, tested by Yassin et al. (2013) scored accuracy 82.8 percent,
detection 13.8 percent, false alarm 17.6 percent and accuracy 99.8 percent,
detection 95.4 percent, false alarm 0.13 percent rates respectively. Juma
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et al. (2014) reported that the training set scores of the XM-RF method
were accuracy rate 99.99 percent, detection rate 99.95 percent and false
positive rate 0.00 percent. Overall, the APIC method beat all but the
results reported by the XM-RF method in the training set recall tests. The
scores achieved by each of these methods are summarised in Table 5.13.
5.4.6.5 TWEANN Classifier Testing
Testing the classifiers produced by APIC using the testing data set, yielded
results represented in Table 5.15. Here, 99.48 percent accuracy, 99.99 percent
detection and 0.08 percent false positive rates were noted. By comparison,
the KMC+NBC testing data set recall by Yassin et al. (2013) resulted in an
accuracy score of 99.00 percent a detection rate of 98.80 percent and a false
alarm rate of 2.2 percent. When parsing the testing data set, the XM-RF
method, described by Juma et al. (2014), resulted in an accuracy score of
99.96 percent a detection rate of 99.99 percent, with a false alarm rate of
0.02 percent. These results are summarised in Table 5.15.
Once more, APIC scored higher than comparable systems, except the
XM-RF method described by Juma et al. (2014). The XM-RF method
scored 0.48 percent higher accuracy than APIC, with equal detection rates
and 0.06 percent lower false positives. These variances are not substantial,
especially when accounting for differences in experiment implementation for
each system. Furthermore, it is important to note that the XM-RF method
was designed specifically as an NBAD method, while APIC is a generic,
versatile method for pattern identification and classification for a broad
range of tasks.
In summary, the APIC method was tested against comparable methods,
using the same static, pre-recorded data set. The results showed that the
APIC method performed favourably, achieving outcomes similar to those
described by Yassin et al. (2013) and Juma et al. (2014). While this
experiment yielded truths regarding the performance of APIC classifiers
compared to similar works on static data sets, in reality, NBAD systems are
required to detect anomalous traffic in near real-time on live computer
networks. The following section describes an experiment that demonstrates
the efficacy of the method for identifying anomalous traffic on a live
network.
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5.5 Live Network Evaluation
This section describes experiments where the APIC method was evaluated
as both a victim-end and source-end NBAD system on an enterprise
network. The experiments conducted in Section 5.4 compared APIC
against methods using pre-labelled, public data sets. The APIC method
yielded comparable task performance to related methods in this area,
however this kind of analysis is not a true reflection of how well systems
perform as real-world NBAD systems. While network administrators may
require retrospective analysis of recorded data sets containing complete,
summarised flow records, more often their requirements are to identify and
mitigate the impact of attacks as they occur on live networks.
A number of methods exist for sampling and extracting live flow records
from a network router. Some of these include Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP), network taps (traffic mirroring) and Cisco’s Netflow
protocol. The former two methods incur significant computational overhead
on both the router and the collector and thus do not scale well on today’s
high-speed computer networks. The Netflow protocol (Hofstede et al.,
2014) offers a viable alternative to these methods, exporting summarised
flow statistics from the router to a Netflow data aggregation point. Due to
its low computational overhead, the protocol has gained wide-spread
adoption and is included by a number of high-end, carrier-grade router
manufacturers, such as Cisco10 and Juniper11 as well as less expensive,
small- to medium-size enterprise router manufacturers, like Mikrotik12.
The objective of this case study is to demonstrate that, using only
sampled Netflow records, the APIC method can profile normal host
communications, identifying anomalous traffic almost immediately as flow
information is reported by the edge router. A successful demonstration
provides further evidence that the APIC method is capable of addressing






Using an ML method to detect network anomalies using real-time data is
not new. A number of methods have been proposed specifically for this
task, some of which are described in Section 5.3. The purpose of the
experiments conducted in this section was to ascertain whether the efficacy
of the APIC general method extends to the identification and classification
of abnormal host communications on a live network. The results obtained
through these experiments were compared to those achieved by methods
designed specifically for this task. In this case study, the APIC method was
deployed as both a victim-end and source-end system, with the intention of
identifying attacks from the Internet toward internal hosts and also attacks
derived from internal hosts toward external (Internet) hosts.
An enterprise network with approximately 80 active user devices was
selected to produce a live, private data set of summarised network host
communications. According to Bhuyan et al. (2013), testing against a
private data set is the best approach for evaluating an NBAD system. The
private data set was used by APIC to profile “normal” host
communications on the network. According to Jalili et al. (2005), a single
network may exhibit various profiles over different periods of each day. For
this reason, it is important to factor the time, or time-slot, of the day when
profiling host communications. The APIC method used the heuristic value
of five minutes, dividing each day’s flow records into 720 distinct, five
minute time-slots.
The Netflow protocol was used to construct a private data set of live
flow data. The protocol exported all active flows traversing the router at a
particular time to one or more Netflow data collector services, or targets. A
custom Netflow collector13 was used to receive and store flow information. As
the Netflow protocol summarised flows at the IP layer, it did not include any
layer 2 (Ethernet) headers, nor payload (application layer) information. It
therefore follows that fragmentation attacks (Section 5.2.1.3) and application
attacks (Section 5.2.1.4) were excluded from this case study.
Using the recorded data, the APIC method was able to accurately detect
simulated instances of both TCP connection (Section 5.2.1.1) and volumetric
13Developed by Ryan Goss, available at: https://goo.gl/Ck0ZGk
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Parameter Description Value




Cache Entries Maximum number of flows tracked
simultaneously by the router
4,000
Active T/O Maximum lifetime of a flow 30 minutes
Inactive T/O Maximum idle time for an active flow 15 seconds
Target IP Address of the Netflow collector 192.168.10.5
Port UDP Port on which the Netflow collector
is bound
9992
Version Netflow protocol version to export 9
v9 Template Refresh Number of packets before the v9 template
is resent to the Netflow collector
20
v9 Template Timeout Maximum wait time before sending
template
1800
Table 5.16: Netflow parameters configured on the edge router of the chosen enterprise
network. The ether-wan interface records ingress flow information from the Internet, while
ether-lan tracks ingress flows from the LAN toward Internet-based hosts. Pairing these
flow records provides bi-directional flow information, from which features for the APIC
method are derived.
(Section 5.2.1.2) attacks on the network. The following sections provide
insight into the design and execution of the experiments used to determine
the efficacy of the APIC method as both a victim-end and source-end, NBAD
system for live IP networks.
5.5.2 Data Sets
The edge router of an enterprise network was configured to report IP flow
statistics, using version 9 of the Netflow protocol, to a server running the
Netflow collector software. The values assigned to each configuration
parameter on the router are outlined in Table 5.16.
The flow samples reported by the router included all attributes listed
in Table 5.17. The Netflow collector recorded flow samples for a period of
seven days during a normal work week, from Monday morning 00h00 to the
same time the following week. The flow records provided by the router were
unidirectional, where separate entries for requests (source host to destination
host) and responses (destination host to source host) are recorded.
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Feature Description
Timestamp An integer time value (epoch) reported by the router
Protocol An integer value representing the transport layer protocol of the flow
ToS The Type of Service (ToS) bits set in the flow
SY N An indication if a SYN flag was observed for the flow
ACK An indication if an ACK flag was set for the flow
Exporter The router’s IP address, encoded as a 32-bit integer
SRC The source IP address of the flow, encoded as a 32-bit integer
DST The destination IP address of the flow, encoded as a 32-bit integer
sPort The source port of the flow
dPort The destination port of the flow
Packets Total packets switched during the current reporting period
Octets Total bytes switched during the current reporting period
IfIn Inbound interface of the flow
IfOut Outbound interface of the flow
Table 5.17: Features included in each flow record reported by the router. Netflow version
9 is template based, meaning the features used to described each flow may be customised
on the router. The features listed in this table describe the default flow template defined
on the test router.
Related flow samples were combined and aggregated into a single entry
per host for each time-slot. Both internal and external hosts were aggregated,
as the objective of this case study was to evaluate the APIC method as both a
victim-end and source-end NBAD system. The aggregate features, calculated
for each active host per time-slot, are outlined in Table 5.18.
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Feature Description
timeslot The five-minute time-slot associated with this record
Example: 2016-01-01 00:05:00
host The IP address of the summarised host
Example: 192.168.10.245
outTotalF lows The total number of flows from this host toward others
inTotalF lows The total number of flows toward this host from others
outICMPFlows The total number of ICMP flows from this host toward others
inICMPFlows The total number of ICMP flows toward this host from others
outTCPFlows The total number of TCP flows from this host toward others
inTCPFlows The total number of TCP flows toward this host from others
outUDPFlows The total number of UDP flows from this host toward others
inUDPFlows The total number of UDP flows toward this host from others
outSY N The total number of flows with TCP SYN flag set from this host
toward others
inSY N The total number of flows with TCP SYN flag set from others
toward this host
outACK The total number of flows with TCP ACK flag set from this host
toward others
inACK The total number of flows with TCP ACK flag set from others
toward this host
outTotalPackets The total number of packets sent by this host to others
inTotalPackets The total number of packets sent by others toward this host
outICMPPackets The total number of ICMP packets sent by this host to others
inICMPPackets The total number of ICMP packets sent by others toward this
host
outTCPPackets The total number of TCP packets sent by this host to others
inTCPPackets The total number of TCP packets sent by others toward this host
outUDPPackets The total number of UDP packets sent by this host to others
inUDPPackets The total number of UDP packets sent by others toward this host
outBytes The total number of bytes (octets) sent by this host to others
inBytes The total number of bytes (octets) received by this host from
others
dstHosts The number of unique hosts this host sent packets toward
srcHosts The number of unique hosts sending packets toward this host
Table 5.18: Features used to describe the communications of each host on the network.
A unique record was created for each host at every time-slot it was observed.
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Figure 5.7: Total number of flows recorded per five-minute time-slot during the seven-day
observation period.
Feature Description
rOutTotalPkts The ratio of total outbound packets to total inbound packets
rInTotalPkts The ratio of total inbound packets to total outbound packets
rOutICMPPkts The ratio of ICMP outbound packets to ICMP inbound packets
rInICMPPkts The ratio of ICMP inbound packets to ICMP outbound packets
icmpOutPerc Outbound ICMP packets as a percentage of total outbound
packets
icmpInPerc Inbound ICMP packets as a percentage of total inbound packets
rOutTCPPkts The ratio of TCP outbound packets to TCP inbound packets
rInTCPPkts The ratio of TCP inbound packets to TCP outbound packets
tcpOutPerc Outbound TCP packets as a percentage of total outbound packets
tcpInPerc Inbound TCP packets as a percentage of total inbound packets
rOutUDPPkts The ratio of UDP outbound packets to UDP inbound packets
rInUDPPkts The ratio of UDP inbound packets to UDP outbound packets
udpOutPerc Outbound UDP packets as a percentage of total outbound packets
udpInPerc Inbound UDP packets as a percentage of total inbound packets
rOutBytes The ratio of total outbound bytes to inbound bytes
rInBytes The ratio of total inbound bytes to outbound bytes
rOutSY N The ratio of outbound flows with SYN TCP flag set to inbound
flows with ACK TCP flag set
rInSY N The ratio of inbound flows toward this host with SYN TCP flag
set to outbound flows with ACK TCP flag set
rDstHosts The ratio of unique hosts outbound flows were directed to against
the number of flows inbound from unique hosts
rSrcHosts The ratio of unique hosts inbound flows directed to the host
against the number of flows outbound from the host
Table 5.19: Statistical features derived from the aggregated flow records, used to describe
and profile host communications on the network. The features listed were included in the
full feature set provided to the APIC method.
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Table 5.20: Netflow experiment training and test data sets. Each count represents
normal, individual host communication profiles summarised per timeslot.
A plot of the total number of aggregate flows recorded per time-slot, for
the seven-day observation period, is shown in Figure 5.7. These aggregated
records were used to produce statistical features, describing the
communication profile of each host to the APIC method. These features
are catalogued in Table 5.19.
In total, 96 internal and 62,889 external hosts were observed
communicating through the router over the seven-day period. These
communications generated 4,578,500 flow entries, all of which were
aggregated, transformed and summarised per time-slot using the features
described in Table 5.19. A plot showing the average value for each of these
statistical features per time-slot is provided in Figure 5.8. A total of
770,649 host communication profiles were generated using the recorded flow
data set. These temporal host profiles were divided into both training and
testing data sets. For each time-slot, 80 percent of the recorded flows were
randomly selected and moved to the training set, with the remaining 20
percent assigned to the testing set. The distribution of training and testing
datum, per day, is listed in Table 5.20.
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Figure 5.8: A plot describing the distribution of the average value for each statistical
feature (Table 5.19) for each timeslot recorded over the seven-day period.
5.5.3 Feature Set Selection and Normalisation
The features chosen to represent each host communication profile per
time-slot (Table 5.19) were based on known attack profiles for both TCP
connection and Volumetric attacks (Section 5.2.1.2). Expressing data
exchanges between source and destination hosts as a ratio allowed a
distribution profile to be realised - one that is retained through varying
network load. A significant ratio skew in either direction (higher or lower)
was indicative of anomalous traffic, potentially an attack.
For example, the average rOutSY N ratio recorded for a single source
host communicating with a single destination host using the TCP protocol
was maintained, even as the source initiated similar, valid TCP connections
to other remote hosts concurrently. A higher than normal rOutSY N ratio
indicated that the source host was initiating a significant volume of
unanswered TCP connections, potentially acting as a DDoS zombie. A high
rInSY N ratio coupled with a high rSrcHosts ratio may indicate that the
host is the target of a TCP connection attack. These features are adapted
from those proposed by Chen (2009) to discern TCP connection attacks
using their statistical method.
A higher than normal value for rSrcHosts coupled with a higher than
normal rInBytes ratio may indicate that the host is the target of a volumetric
attack. It follows that a host with a low rDstHosts ratio, accompanied by
a high rOutBytes ratio may indicate that the host is participating in a
volumetric attack. Flooding attacks may be identified toward a host when a
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high rSrcHosts ratio is accompanied by a high udpInPerc or icmpInPerc
ratio. Similarly, a low rDstHosts ratio coupled with a high udpOutPerc or
icmpOutPerc ratio may indicate that the host is participating as a zombie
in a flooding attack.
The variety of combinations used to describe normal traffic and,
subsequently, to identify anomalous traffic is vast. An assumption of this
experiment was that no attacks were active during the seven-day recording
period. As attack traffic was not present on the network, it could not be
included in the initial training set. The APIC method’s clustering
algorithm was therefore used to distinguish and group a variety of normal
traffic profiles. Any future flow samples that fall outside of these groups
would be deemed anomalous. The full complement of features was
considered during this experiment, ensuring that a full profile for each host
communication was constructed. All features listed in Table 5.19 were
subsequently used to describe each flow for the training and testing
processes.
The mean average for each statistical feature (Figure 5.8) remained
constant throughout the seven-day recording process, with the highest
recorded standard score reaching a value of 1.7. A standard score, more
commonly referred to as a z-score (Rubin, 2012), is the number of standard
deviations a value is from the mean average for that distribution. It is
argued that any z-score value in excess of three is indicative of an
anomalous traffic flow. It is further argued that beyond a certain point,
specifically a z-score of five, the value may be transformed to a value
corresponding to a z-score of five without impacting the anomalous traffic
assessment. These arguments form the basis for the upper bounds of the
min-max normalization method (Equation 4.3), used to normalise each of
the feature dimensions in this case study. The minimum bound of each
feature was set to the minimum value observed during the recording period,
with the maximum bound set to the value corresponding to a z-score of five
for each dimension. Each of the features, along with their derived bounds



















rOutSY N 0 99
rInSY N 0 292
rDstHosts 0 40
rSrcHosts 0 16
Table 5.21: Each feature used to describe a host communication record was normalised
using the min-max normalisation function. The parameters guiding the Emin and Emax
bounds were determined by observing the lowest and highest values for each of the features
over the seven-day period. These bounds were recorded and are listed in this table.
5.5.4 Normal Communication Profile Determination
All 616,519 normal records from the training set were clustered using the
DBSCAN method, using the APIC pattern discovery process (Section 3.2).
The minPTS and eps parameters used to guide the clustering process were
controlled by a hyper-parameter search GA, which tuned the values until
the most optimal clustered data set was found. For the purposes of these
experiments, a more optimal clustered data set is one where the average
silhouette evaluation (Equation 3.2) approaches a value of “1”. The GA
parameters used to control this search process are listed in Table 5.22.
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Figure 5.9: A histogram comparing the average distances between datum of each of
the nine clusters discovered by the APIC clustering method. A low average distance
between datum in each cluster provides evidence of successful, tight clustering by the










Hyper-parameter Search 100 100 0.2 0.4
Table 5.22: Hyper-parameter search GA parameters. This GA was used to find the best
combination of minPTS and eps parameters, resulting in the most optimal clustering
process. The search process for determining the best hyper-parameters for guiding the
APIC method’s clustering algorithm is detailed in Section 3.2.
As the feature set was fixed, only a single GA was required for this
experiment. The GA found the best clustered data set at generation 14,
where silhouette evaluation revealed a best score of 0.89. The resultant
data set was comprised of nine clusters, where the distance between cluster
members ranged from 0.0001 to 0.006, with an average distance of 0.002.
The average distance between member datum of each cluster is represented
as a histogram in Figure 5.9. The histogram indicates that small average
distances are exhibited by datum of the same cluster, an indication that the
clustering process concluded successfully. The best clustered data set was
achieved using hyper-parameters minPTS = 1310 and eps = 0.04,
discovered by the GA. The DBSCAN clustering process did, however, fail
to associate 0.12 percent (740) host profile records with a cluster.
Each of the nine clusters, describing nine distinct normal communication









Table 5.23: The parameter values supplied to the APIC TWEANN creation process
(Section 3.3) for the Netflow live data experiment. The learningRate and momentum
parameters are used in the backpropagation algorithm.
of each normal traffic profile. The following subsection details the creation,
training and testing of these classifiers using the APIC classifier production
process (Section 3.3).
5.5.5 Developing Normal Traffic Profile Classifiers
The APIC method is capable of producing optimised models for classifying
various patterns in mixed, noisy data sets. In this case study, the APIC
classifier production process (Section 3.3) was used to train TWEANN
classifiers for identifying future instances of each cluster, each describing a
normal host communication profile. Contrary to anomalous or abnormal
communications, normal host communications are flows traversing the
network that exhibit expected patterns. The APIC method uses GAs to
optimise both the topology of the model and the weights for each neuron
connection, prior to using the backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al.,
1988) for fine-tuning the model.
The parameters guiding the TWEANN creation process in this
experiment were chosen heuristically, based on previous experience. A
maximum of 40 neurons were allowed per TWEANN, including the inputs
and output. This value is double the number of input features. A learning
rate of 1.0 was provided, along with a momentum value configured at 0.5.
A GA population size of ten was chosen, with a maximum of 100
generations permitted. A low population size is suitable in this
semi-supervised training process, as the weight values determined by the
GA are further fine-tuned by the backpropagation algorithm. Only the
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Cluster Topology TP FP TN FN Score
1 20 - 2 - 1 17,508 5 615,774 1 98.93%
2 20 - 4 - 1 124,709 2 615,777 1 99.62%
3 20 - 0 - 1 123,021 3 615,776 0 97.77%
4 20 - 3 - 1 115,241 1 615,778 0 99.84%
5 20 - 2 - 1 76,229 1 615,778 0 99.91%
6 20 - 4 - 1 69,127 6 615,771 0 98.71%
7 20 - 2 - 1 54,273 2 615,777 0 99.94%
8 20 - 1 - 1 19,226 3 615,776 6 98.49%
9 20 - 1 - 1 16,437 4 615,775 0 99.86%
Result 615,771 27 5,541,982 8 99.34%
Table 5.24: A list of the identified clusters along with the best scoring TWEANN
topology, the TP, FP, TN and FN values achieved during recall of the training data
set. The score field indicates the average probability achieved by each classifier during the
recall test.
topology and initial weight vectors are determined by each genotype. The
backpropagation algorithm was set to run for 1,000 iterations, fine-tuning
the weights of each network after initial GA weight selection concluded.
These parameters are summarised in Table 5.23.
The training data set for each cluster was comprised of the cluster’s
member datum, marked as “1”, and datum from all other clusters, marked
as “0”. With this annotation, the classifiers learnt to distinguish between
normal traffic profiles discovered during the clustering process. It is
important for the TWEANN classifier training process to include samples
of both matching (normal) and non-matching (anomalous) traffic flow
samples. Simulated anomalous flow samples were generated by selecting
random feature values, where values achieving z-scores in excess of 3 were
chosen. These flow samples undoubtedly describe anomalous traffic for the
profiled network, as the magnitude of their features exceed the mean
average value of normal traffic flows observed over the period of one week
by more than three standard deviations. These records provide the training
process with samples indicative of anomalous (attack) traffic profiles. The
total number of anomalous flow samples generated for each cluster was






p′ 615,771 8 P′
n′ 27 5,541,982 N′
P N
Table 5.25: A confusion matrix for the training set parsed through the trained
TWEANN classifiers. A total of 615,771 samples were correctly identified as normal
traffic profiles (TP), with 5,541,982 samples correctly identified as belonging to another
cluster (anomalous according to the classifier being tested) (TN). A total of 27 were
incorrectly marked as belonging to this cluster (FP), with eight normal traffic profile
samples erroneously marked as external to this classifier (FN).
A recall test was executed on each TWEANN classifier post its creation,
confirming its ability to correctly identify previously seen data. The topology
of each classifier, along with its recall scores for the previously seen training
set, are listed in Table 5.24. These values are represented as a confusion
matrix in Table 5.25. The accuracy, detection rate and false positive rates
for the training set recall tests were calculated using Equations 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3 respectively. The accuracy of the recall test was 99.99 percent, with a
detection rate of 99.99 percent and a false alarm rate of 4.87E-06 percent.
5.5.6 Classifier Evaluation
The training set recall test results in subsection 5.5.5 demonstrated that the
TWEANN classifiers were able to accurately identify instances of previously
seen, normal network traffic. In this subsection, the test data set (Section
5.5.2), containing previously unseen flow records derived from the seven-day
recordings was evaluated using the TWEANN classifiers. Following this, an
additional 24 hours of Netflow data was recorded, where all traffic flows were
assumed to be of a normal nature. It was anticipated that the TWEANN
classifiers would score normal traffic with high scores, in excess of 90 percent,






p′ 154,022 20 P′
n′ 108 1,387,150 N′
P N
Table 5.26: A confusion matrix depicting the evaluation results concluded by the nine
TWEANN classifiers on the previously unseen test data set.
The nine TWEANN classifiers were used to evaluate the 154,130 assumed
normal flow records of the test data set. The results achieved by the classifiers
are summarised in Table 5.26, where 99.99 percent accuracy, 99.93 percent
detection rate and 0.001 percent false positive rates were realised. While
these were previously unseen flow samples, they were recorded at the same
time as the training set.
Ensuring a greater diversity for evaluation purposes, the Netflow collector
was once more configured to record flow data for a period of 24 hours on a
normal week day, from midnight on Monday through to midnight of the
following day. Figure 5.10 plots the total aggregate flows recorded during
this period, for each time-slot, where a total of 100,085 flow samples were
recorded. The statistical features listed in Table 5.19 were extracted for each
aggregated flow, forming a new data set comprised of previously unseen data.
The features were normalised using the bounds described in Table 5.21 and
evaluated by each of the nine TWEANN classifiers. The testing once more
operated under the assumption that the recorded flow samples consisted of
only normal traffic flows. The results of this evaluation process revealed
that 100,053 of the flow samples were marked as normal traffic, where a
certainty score exceeding 90 percent triggered the flow sample to be marked
as “normal”. Only 32 of the flows considered were scored below 90 percent by

















Figure 5.10: A chart describing total aggregated flow records observed over a 24-hour
period during classifier evaluation. The aggregated flows are counted for each five-minute
time-slot - 286 in total.
A controlled DDoS test was devised to test the classifier’s ability to detect
anomalous traffic flows on the network. A secondary network interface on
the edge router was connected to a new Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)
on the corporate managed switch. A new private IP prefix was assigned to
the interface, with a default class C scope14. This design allows simulated
DDoS attacks to be sent to fictitious host addresses on the dedicated network
prefix without routing the attacks to the Internet or legitimate hosts on
the network. Directing the attack through the edge router ensures Netflow
records are generated and forwarded to the APIC classifiers.
Two distinct attack simulations were crafted toward a fictitious host on
the new VLAN from within the corporate Local Area Network (LAN). The
first initiated TCP connections toward the new VLAN at a rapid rate,
simulating a TCP connection attack. The attack targeted a single
destination host, using the TCP protocol across a number of destination
ports. The attack ran for a total of 15 minutes, after which the recorded
flows were added to the “normal” data set between time-slots 46 through
48. In total, 2,795 anomalous flows were introduced and reported by the
Netflow collector during this time, in addition to the 805 normal flows
already reported. The attack flows were easy to manually identify and
verify in the recorded data set using the destination host address as the key.
The APIC method was successfully able to classify all 805 flows as
14A class C IP prefix scope contains 256 IP addresses: 254 are usable for host addressing.
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Figure 5.11: A chart showing both the total number of flows recorded during the
evaluation window, and the simulated TCP connection attack traffic flows. Both normal
(solid line) and anomalous (long-dash line) traffic are shown, as detected by the classifiers.
“normal”, with an average probability score of 96.91 percent. The APIC
method also successfully scored 2,790 flows as anomalous, where the highest
probability score achieved for these flows, by any classifier, was 38.19
percent. A total of five anomalous flows were erroneously marked as normal
by the classifiers. These test results are displayed as a confusion matrix in
Table 5.27. The accuracy, detection rate and false positive rates were
calculated using Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 as 99.86 percent, with a
detection rate of 100 percent and false alarm rate of 0.18 percent.
The second attack simulation consisted of two attacks, designed to test
each classifier’s ability to detect volumetric attacks. In these tests, UDP
packets were crafted with a payload consisting of 1480 bytes of ASCII “A”
characters. These packets were sent at a high rate to a single destination
host on the attack VLAN, to 30 distinct destination ports. Unlike the TCP
connection attack, a significant number of new flows was not generated, as
only 30 flows were observed and reported by the router’s Netflow exporter
per time-slot. Although the average number of flows did not increase
significantly over each attack period, the udpOutPerc and rOutUDPPkts
features increased significantly during these times (Figure 5.12b). The
ICMP features (Figure 5.12a) during this time showed little change,
however a distinct drop in the tcpOutPerc feature is noted in Figure 5.12c.
Finally, the rOutTotalPkts feature (Figured 5.12d) shows a distinct







p′ 805 0 P′
n′ 5 2,790 N′
P N
Table 5.27: A confusion matrix for the live TCP connection attack test evaluated by the
trained TWEANN classifiers. A total of 805 samples were correctly identified as normal
traffic profiles (TP), with 2,790 samples correctly identified as anomalous (TN). A total
of five flow samples were incorrectly marked as normal traffic (FP), with no normal traffic
profile samples erroneously marked as anomalous (FN).
Each attack lasted no longer than 20 minutes, covering four time-slots.
For each time-slot, a total of 30 attack flows were maintained, ensuring a
consistent volumetric attack over the 20-minute period. The flows observed
for each time-slot, along with the average probability score provided by the
APIC classifiers, are outlined in Table 5.28.
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(a) Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Features
(b) User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Features
(c) Transport Control Protocol (TCP) Features
(d) General Features
Figure 5.12: Charts depicting the skewing of flow features observed during a simulated
volumetric attack toward a host on the attack VLAN.
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Timeslot Normal Normal Score Anomalous Normal Score
03:05 366 97.24% 29 25.04%
03:10 258 99.01% 30 12.20%
03:15 354 98.97% 30 6.10%
03:20 399 99.20% 30 7.89%
19:00 276 99.44% 30 8.03%
19:05 416 99.05% 30 11.23%
19:10 459 96.50% 28 21.40%
19:15 376 98.80% 30 11.21%
Table 5.28: Results of the live volumetric anomalous flow test. The results show a
high degree of probability (in excess of 95 percent) is achieved detecting normal traffic
flows, while anomalous flows scored far below the 90 percent certainty mark. These scores
indicate that the APIC classifiers were able to accurately discern normal traffic flows from





p′ 2,901 0 P′
n′ 3 237 N′
P N
Table 5.29: A confusion matrix for the volumetric attack test evaluated by the trained
TWEANN classifiers. A total of 2,901 samples were correctly identified as normal traffic
profiles (TP), with 237 samples correctly identified as anomalous (TN). A total of three
flow samples were incorrectly marked as normal traffic (FP), with no normal traffic profile
samples errantly marked as anomalous (FN).
The results of this test were used to produce a confusion matrix (Table
5.29), where accuracy, detection and false positive rates were calculated as
99.90 percent, 99.89 percent and 0.096 percent respectively.
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5.5.7 Discussion
The experiments conducted in this section demonstrate the efficacy of APIC
in identifying anomalous (attack) traffic flows on a live network, where the
normal network traffic has been profiled and learnt. The accuracy, detection
and false positive scores achieved in each of the experiments conducted in
this section indicate that the classifiers were able to accurately discriminate
between normal and anomalous traffic flows.
The clustering process described in Section 5.5.4 failed to associate 0.12
percent (740) host profile records with any of the nine discovered clusters.
It was later determined, through manual tracing, that this traffic was
anomalous. An IP-enabled network camera was found to be sending an
excessive number of unidirectional ICMP flows egress toward the Internet.
The assumption that all recorded flows were normal was based on the
commercial IDS and firewall on site not reporting any anomalous attack
traffic during the seven-day recording period. The misclassified flow entries
in Section 5.5.5 (highlighted in Table 5.25) were also manually traced,
where it was determined that the false positive (FP) datum were marked as
normal flow entries by another cluster. The close distance relationship
between cluster datum caused false positives at the clustering level, but did
not hamper detection of these flows as normal traffic by the system as a
whole.
Bhuyan et al. (2013) asserted that it was better to stop a network attack
at the source, rather than on the victim-end. This is because it prevents
wasting of resources across the intermediary networks it traverses en route to
the destination. Furthermore, once a flooding attack has entered the target’s
network, inhibiting the traffic at that point will not free the resources already
consumed on their external network connectivity. Stopping an attack at the
source, or close to the source, is not always possible, as it requires NBAD
systems at each network egress point. By receiving Netflow records from
multiple edge routers, the APIC method is ideally positioned to address
this problem, providing a normal traffic profiling service for these networks,
analysing and classifying all traffic flows traversing edge routers in an efficient
and effective manner.
According to Jalili et al. (2005), a single network may exhibit various
profiles over different periods of each day. The recommendation was that all
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APIC Private Test 99.90% 99.89% 0.096%
Chen (2009) Private 96.00% 99.99% 5-7%
Jalili et al. (2005) Private 94.90% 94.90% 2-5%
Bhaya and Manaa (2014) CBR Train 99.93% 99.92% 0.09%
Bhaya and Manaa (2014) CBR Test 99.77% 99.53% 0.46%
Bhaya and Manaa (2014) CB Train 99.93% 99.91% 0.09%
Bhaya and Manaa (2014) CB Test 97.67% 96.63% 3.23%
Table 5.30: A comparison of accuracy, detection and false alarm rates achieved by
comparable, specifically crafted methods against those achieved by the generic APIC
method during the testing process.
flow datum should be tested against baseline flows captured during the same
time-slot. The experiments conducted in this section found that the average
flow feature ratios remained consistent across various times of the day and
days of the week, as demonstrated in Figure 5.8. While it is important to
aggregate flows using fixed time-slots, these experiments provide evidence
that factoring the time-slot itself into the evaluation process (as a feature,
for example) when using the APIC method, was not required.
The simulated attacks executed in this section demonstrated the ability
of APIC to profile source-end traffic, as it originated from the LAN. It is
also argued, however, that the method will be equally effective classifying
attack traffic ingress on the Wide Area Network (WAN) interface, as all
communicating hosts ingress on this interface are also profiled in the same
manner as those originating on the LAN. The APIC method is thus capable
of acting as a victim-end and source-end NBAD system, identifying attack
flows in near real-time and, according to the summarised results in Table
5.30, at least as accurately as comparable systems designed specifically for
this purpose. The results highlight the possibilities for early detection of
anomalous traffic using Netflow records exported from edge routers in
real-time. The experiments demonstrate that the Netflow protocol provides
adequate statistical data from which flow profiles can be derived, while
placing near negligible additional load on the edge router.
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented a case study in which the efficacy of the APIC
method was evaluated in the task of Anomaly Intrusion Detection (AID).
Specifically, the method was tested as both a victim-end and source-end
NBAD system, using both publicly available, pre-labelled static data sets
and private data sets, recorded on a live enterprise network. The results
achieved by the experiments conducted in this chapter indicate that the
APIC general method achieves accuracy, detection and false positive rates
that are comparable with, and often exceed, results produced by methods
designed specifically for this purpose. The automated compilation of
feature sets describing host communication profiles and the use of
TWEANN classifiers to classify anomalous traffic on computer networks is





Machine learning (ML) has, in recent years, played a significant role in
computer vision tasks, including image recognition, video analysis and even
playing complex games - defeating human experts at games such as Go1.
According to LeCun et al. (1998), better pattern recognition systems can
be built by relying on automatic learning and removing hand-designed
heuristics. This ideal is shared with those of the APIC method, where
previous manual feature selection, model development and hyper-parameter
tuning processes are replaced by fully autonomous ML methods.
This chapter explores the efficacy of APIC in the task of handwritten
character recognition. Using the popular Mixed National Institute of
Standards and Technology (MNIST)2 data set, the method automatically
extracts features and produces an accurate classifier for a data set of
handwritten numbers provided by over 500 contributors. The current
state-of-the-art classifier for this data set is modelled manually by human
experts and achieves an error score of 0.23 percent (Ciregan et al., 2012).
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that APIC is capable of
designing less complex classifiers automatically, while maintaining test set
recall rates that are comparable with existing, manually-created systems.
The ability of APIC to achieve this objective provides evidence of its




The empirical test devised in this chapter demonstrates that, by including
additional distortions or scaled samples of the original MNIST training
data set, the APIC method is capable of producing models that classify
handwritten characters with competitive degrees of accuracy (Table 6.5).
The following sections provide background on image and, specifically,
handwritten character-recognition techniques. An experiment follows, in
which APIC is evaluated for its ability to construct less complex models for
handwritten character-recognition tasks.
6.1 Image Recognition
Many new methods have been proposed lately for enhancing computer
vision. In most cases, these methods divide the task into two main parts,
namely the feature extractor and the trainable classifier. The feature
extractor is rather specific to each task and thus requires the most design
effort (LeCun et al., 1998). This process is responsible for extracting and
encoding information about each problem as low-dimensional vectors,
suitable for an ML classifier. Feature vectors should be representative of
each pattern in the data set, providing a tolerance for transformation,
translation and distortion of patterns within the input space. While the
features extracted are specific to each task, the classifier is often more
general and trainable. According to LeCun et al. (1998), a large number of
commercial Optical Character Recognition (OCR) systems use some form of
multi-layer Artificial Neural Network (ANN) (Gurney, 2003) trained using
backpropagation (Rumelhart et al., 1988).
Over the years, a number of methods have been proposed and tested for
recognising images, or objects, in an image. These include linear classifiers,
K-nearest Neighbour (KNN), Boosted Stumps (Reyzin and Schapire, 2006),
Non-Linear Classifiers, Support Vector Machines (SVM), ANNs and
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). According to LeCun et al. (1998)
and demonstrated by Ciregan et al. (2012), CNNs designed specifically to
deal with the variability of 2D shapes outperform all other techniques for
identifying handwritten digits.
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Figure 6.1: An example CNN, where each image (32x32 pixels) is presented to the first
convolutional layer (layer 1), comprised of four 2-dimensional (26x26) feature vectors.
Each feature vector is sub-sampled, or pooled by the four feature maps (16x16), before
passing to a second layer of convolution feature maps (layer 3). The outputs of layer 3
are pooled by four additional feature maps, with a spacial neighbourhood of 6x6. The
results of this final pooling process are passed to a fully-connected, MLP network. The
outputs of the trained MLP network indicate the probability of the input image matching
a particular class. In this case, the classifier identifies the image as class one, with 94
percent probability.
6.1.1 Convolutional Neural Networks
CNNs are a special type of feed-forward ANN, inspired by the organisation of
the visual cortex in animals and are comprised of multiple layers of neurons
that have tunable weights and biases. Contrary to most other classifiers,
CNNs make an explicit assumption that the inputs to the network are images,
allowing them to encode certain properties, or features, into the model. CNNs
are comprised of three types of layers, namely Convolutional Layer, Pooling
Layer and Fully-Connected Layer (Figure 6.1). The convolution and pooling
layers may be repeated, where the output of the final pooling process is passed
as input to the fully-connected network. CNNs are particularly successful at
classifying images as they use special kernels designed to extract important
features from an image, known as convolutions. These features are resilient,
often impervious to transformations, translations or distortion. The ability
for CNNs to extract valuable features from images, instead of treating them
as a whole, allows CNNs to outperform conventional multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) models.
Feature maps for each convolutional layer are constructed by translating
specific kernels, or filters, over output from the previous layer. In the case of
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(b) An example of pooling, or down-sampling, used to reduce the values
of a feature map and improve generalisation of the model.
Figure 6.2: Examples of convolution and pooling processes, integral components of the
feature extraction process.
The kernel of each feature map is often chosen by an expert, based on
the data set, using a heuristic approach. The kernel is translated across the
input matrix, where the amount of overlap and the degree of translation is
determined by the kernel stride parameter. Feature map values are derived
by translating the associated kernel through the input (an image or feature
map from a previous layer), calculating the weighted sum (Evangelos, 2000)
at each location. This process is illustrated in Figure 6.2a. The number of
feature maps configured for each layer is another parameter often determined
by human experts through heuristic approaches.
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Each feature map is reduced using a form of down-sampling, mitigating
the effect of inadvertent translation and distortion of objects within images.
This down-sampling, or pooling (Graham, 2014), improves the generalisation
capabilities of the CNN, by averaging the results of specific regions within a
feature map. The pooling layer produces new feature maps by translating a
matrix, with a predefined spacial neighbourhood (receptive area) and stride,
through each feature map of the preceding layer. There are many functions
used to implement pooling, where the most common is max pooling (Graham,
2014). In max pooling, the value of each location is the largest value within
the spacial neighbourhood of the pool at that position (Figure 6.2b).
The final pooling layer of a CNN connects directly to an MLP, expressing
datum as single-dimensional input vectors. The number of hidden layers
and neurons for each MLP is configured by human experts, based on the
requirements for each classification task. The number of outputs present on
a CNN matches the number of categories in the labelled training set. Each
output neuron provides a value during recall, indicating the probability of
an image matching a specific class (Figure 6.1).
The challenge of producing successful CNN classifiers is finding the best
configuration for convolution and pooling layers, including the number of
feature maps, kernel design and translation stride for each convolution layer
and the spacial neighbourhood and stride for each pooling layer.
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the MLP topology design for each
task. Typically, these parameters are determined by human experts,
through empirical methods, for each task. This requires expert knowledge
of both the problem domain and optimal CNN architecture design. Human
designed models are often overly complex, requiring significant compute
power to process large data sets. The APIC method, already successful at
automatically producing efficient, accurate classifiers for Internet Protocol
(IP) traffic classification (Chapter 4) and Network Based Anomaly
Detection (NBAD) (Chapter 5) tasks, is a viable alternative to human
expert customisation of CNNs for image recognition applications. The
following sections provide an empirical evaluation of APIC as a suitable
candidate for this task.
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Figure 6.3: Example images retrieved from the MNIST training data set. Five samples
of each digit are provided, showing diversity amongst the digits of the same type, and of
others. The top four images of each column represent random, individual samples of the
digit, while the bottom image shows the mean average of all samples of each digit in the
MNIST training set.
6.2 Task Description
The current state-of-the-art method for classifying the MNIST data set was
recently proposed by Ciregan et al. (2012), who recorded an error-rate of 0.23
percent. This result is close to the 0.2 percent error-rate expected of humans
(LeCun et al., 1995). Some of the 23 misclassified samples were incorrectly
labelled in the data set, while others contained random strokes appearing
midway through images. To date, most works achieve error rates between
0.23 percent and 8 percent (Section 6.4). The objective of this case study
was to determine if, when using APIC, similar error-rates could be realised
when classifying the MNIST data set using a less complex CNN classifier,
developed automatically by the method.
To succeed at this task, the method should automate the feature selection
(feature extraction) and classifier development processes of a CNN, providing
a topology that accurately classifies a data set with an error rate comparable
with similar systems designed by human experts. The following subsections
provide details of an experiment where the efficacy of APIC is tested using
the MNIST data set.
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6.3 MNIST Data Set
The MNIST data set (LeCun et al., 1998) contains handwritten samples
of single-digit decimal numbers, ranging from nought to nine. The data
set is divided into a training and testing set comprising 60,000 and 10,000
samples respectively. Each sample has been normalised by scaling the width
and height to 20x20 pixels, while preserving the aspect ratio. The result
is centred on a 28x28 pixel canvas, where the centre of the handwritten
character image aligns with that of the larger 28x28 base image (Figure
6.3). Many image-recognition systems have used the MNIST data set for
evaluating their methods. Some of these are discussed in Section 6.4.
As a significant contributor to the field of image and, more specifically,
handwritten image classification, the APIC method should demonstrate
production of automated classifiers (CNN) that produce error rates rivalling
those of similar works, compiled empirically by human experts.
Demonstrating the ability for a classifier to achieve competitive results
without human intervention allows more efficient feature extraction process
definition when developing a CNN. This allows CNNs to be applied more
broadly across many image-recognition tasks, without first seeking the
input of a human expert.
The first step in this development is for APIC to automatically determine
the best features to extract from images for a particular classification task.
The following subsection details how the APIC feature selection (Section 3.1)
process was applied to achieve this.
6.3.1 Feature Selection
The accuracy achieved by image-recognition systems, much like any
classification system, is highly dependent on appropriate features that best
describe the problem space (LeCun et al., 1998). While CNNs are capable
of extracting valuable features from images (Figure 6.2a) and reducing
them through pooling operations (Figure 6.2b) to improve generalisation of
the model, the design of the classifier is often determined empirically for
each task by human experts. Choices concerning how many convolution
and pooling layers to include, the kernel sizes, values and strides, and the
MLP topology is ultimately decided this way. This is apparent in many
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Feature Bits Min Max
conv layers 3 1 7
fm count 3 1 7
fm stride 3 1 7
fm magnitude 3 2 7
fm matrix fm magnitude2 N/A N/A
pool size 3 2 7
pool stride 3 1 7
Table 6.1: Parameters for defining the configuration of the convolution and pooling layers
in an APIC-tuned CNN classifier. The value of each parameter is encoded as a bit string
and concatenated to form a variable-length genotype.
systems tested against the MNIST data set (Section 6.4).
The APIC feature selection process (Section 3.1) is well suited for
determining the best feature sets for a variety of classification problems.
The process can adapt to design and optimise the configuration of
convolution and pooling layers for a CNN classifier, as demonstrated in this
case study. First, the APIC method divides the CNN design process into
two related search problems: the search for an optimal convolution and
pooling configuration specific to the task (feature selection), and designing
the topology of a more general, fully-connected MLP model for classifying
them (classifier (MLP) development).
For this case study, the feature selection process used a Genetic
Algorithm (GA) with variable-length genotypes to describe configurations
of the convolution and pooling layers. The parameters governing the design
of each configuration (Table 6.1) were encoded as bit strings and joined to
form a complete genotype. The range for each parameter was determined
heuristically, based on estimated requirements for classifying MNIST
images and empirical testing of APIC on an MNIST training data subset.
Each genotype was formed, or compiled, using algorithm 2.
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Figure 6.4: A convolution and pooling configuration encoded as an APIC feature
selection genotype. The genotype describes a single convolution and pooling layer with a
single feature map. The feature map’s configuration is 3x3, with a stride of 2. The feature
map’s kernel is encoded in 9 bits (3x3). The kernel is followed by the size of the single
pool (7x7) with a stride value of 2.
genotype = as bits(layer count)
foreach layer in layers do
genotype += as bits(layer.fm count)
foreach feature map in layer.feature maps do
genotype += as bits(feature map.stride)
genotype += as bits(feature map.magnitude)
genotype += as bits(feature map.get as bitstring())
end
foreach pool in layer.pools do
genotype += as bits(pool.size)
genotype += as bits(pool.stride)
end
end
Algorithm 2: Pseudo-code outlining the compilation process for encoding
a CNN feature extraction configuration as a bit string for the APIC feature
selection process (Section 3.1).
An example genotype describing a configuration with a single layer of
convolution and pooling, with a single feature map and single pool is
illustrated in Figure 6.4. The variable number of layers, feature maps and
pools encoded makes it inefficient to encode each configuration as a
fixed-length genotype. Instead, the size of each genotype is determined
dynamically, where the number of genes is directly proportional to the size
of the configuration being encoded.
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Parameter Description Value
max population Maximum number of genotypes per generation 100
elitism Number of best genotypes transferred to next population 10
max generations Maximum number of generations to traverse 100
mutation rate Mutation rate applied when breeding next generation 0.1
crossover rate Crossover rate applied when breeding next generation N/A
Table 6.2: GA parameters used to control the feature selection (convolution and pooling
configuration) search process.
Genotypes with random values were generated for the initial population,
where the number of layers, feature maps per layer, kernel size, stride and
values were selected at random, within the bounds listed in Table 6.1. The
parameters guiding GA execution are listed in Table 6.2. All non-elite
genotypes were evaluated at each generation, where successful
configurations were used to train MLPs, where the best topology was found
by a second GA (Section 6.3.2). Configurations were marked as successful if
no errors were raised when extracting features from the MNIST training
data set, according to the convolution and pooling configuration described
by the genotype. Unsuccessful configurations, such as a multi-layer
configuration, where a particular pool’s spacial neighbourhood exceeds the
dimensions of the source feature map, are marked with a fitness score of -1.
Outputs derived from genotypes whose configuration successfully extracted
features from all images were used to train MLPs (Section 6.3.2), where the
recall score of the best scoring classifier was used as the fitness score for the
feature extraction genotype. The topology of the best scoring MLP was
recorded and stored with each genotype.
After scoring each genotype of the population, the highest achieving
(most elite) genotypes were identified and, together with their existing
MLP solution, transferred directly to the population of the succeeding
generation. Per generation, ten of fittest genotypes were transferred to the
subsequent population. This is an heuristic value, based on past experience
with populations up to 100 total genotypes. The remainder of the new
population was developed by selecting existing genotypes from the current
generation, using roulette wheel selection (Al Jadaan et al., 2008), altered
by application of a custom bit string mutation algorithm, using the
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configured mutation rate of 0.1. This heuristic, low value was chosen to
prevent the GA from converging too quickly, which may cause the
algorithm to converge on a local minima, ultimately representing an
inadequate solution to the problem. Simply inverting the value of a
particular bit, a common practice when applying bit string mutation, is not
suitable for the bit strings in this experiment, as it may render an invalid
configuration (corrupt genotype). Instead, a specialised mutation function
was developed specifically for this task (algorithm 3), allowing the mutation
operation to modify any of the encoded configuration parameters
independently.
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topology = get from bitstring(genotype)
/* Mutate the number of layers */
if rand float() > mutation rate then
/* Generate number of layers */
new layers = random int(low=min layers, high=max layers+1)
/* Generate new and remove old layers */
topology.reshape layers(new layers)
end
/* Manipulate each layer */
foreach layer in topology.layers do
/* Mutate the number of feature maps */
if rand float() > mutation rate then
new fms = random int(low=min fms, high=max fms+1)
/* Add or remove FMs to this layer as dictated by new fms */
layer.reshape fms()
end
/* Mutate the values of kernels */
foreach kernel in layer.kernels do
/* Mutate neighbourhood size */
if rand float() > mutation rate then
kernel.random resize()
end
/* Mutate kernel stride */
if rand float() > mutation rate then
kernel.random stride()
end
/* Mutate kernel values */
foreach bit in kernel do







/* Mutate the number of pools */
if rand float() > mutation rate then
new pools = random int(low=min pools, high=max pools+1)
/* Add or remove pools to this layer as dictated by new pools */
layer.reshape pools()
end
foreach pool in layer.pools do
/* Mutate spacial neighbourhood size */
if rand float() > mutation rate then
pool.random resize()
end
/* Mutate pool stride */





Algorithm 3: Pseudo-code demonstrating the mutation process,
developed specifically for this case study, executed on each new genotype
of the successive generation.
While it is possible to implement a custom crossover mutation function
in a similar fashion, the potential gain realised from this process was
deemed insignificant compared to the complexities related to ensuring the
encoded configuration remained valid after mutation. The search for the
best configuration continues until max generations is reached (Table 6.2),
or another predefined stop condition is triggered (algorithm 1). For this
experiment, the search process was permitted to continue until
max generations was reached.
6.3.2 Classifier (MLP) Development
The genotypes produced in Section 6.3.1 were used to extract features from
the MNIST training data set. Prior to any convolution or pooling
operations, each MNIST sample image was resized (normalised) to a 20x20
pixel size image in accordance with Ciregan et al. (2012). Each image was
duplicated four times, where the first copy was resized to 10x10 pixels. The
images of the second copy were resized to 14x14 pixels. Both of these












Figure 6.5: Each MNIST sample is down-scaled to a 20x20 image pixel. The original
MNIST training data set is duplicated twice, where samples of the first copy are resized to
14x14 images, whereafter they are up-scaled to 20x20 images. The second copy is reduced
to 10x10 size, before being up-scaled to 20x20. This process increases the distortion of
the data set, while preserving the label for each sample. Reducing images below 8x8 size
reduces the image quality to a state where the original handwritten digit is difficult even
for humans to identify.
designed to increase generality of the total training set, by distorting the
original images through sampling and up-scaling, while retaining the
original classification label. Early testing revealed that resizing sample
images below 10x10 pixels caused distortions that were too significant after
up-scaling the image to its original 20x20 pixels size (Figure 6.5). Each
image in the third and fourth data sets were rotated around the image
centre five degrees clockwise and five degrees anti-clockwise, respectively.
This rotation provided a final perspective for the classifier, improving
generalisation and providing better classification accuracy. The third and
fourth data sets were chosen for this process as a suitable level of distortion
was already applied. Five degrees was a heuristic value, used in order to
allow additional perspectives of the images to be presented to the classifier
during the training process.
A second GA was configured to search for the best fully-connected MLP
classifier topology for the CNN network. The 300,000 sample training data
set was used to train each candidate MLP classifier designed by this GA.
The focus of the MLP GA was on identifying the best scoring MLP topology
for each feature extraction genotype, using the APIC classifier production
process described in Section 3.3. The GA encodes the MLP topology and
training parameters (Table 6.3) as bit string genotypes.
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2Total Layers: Layer 2 Neurons: 2
(a)
Fully-connected MLP
Topology described by MLP
Genotype
Outputs
One per classification class,
dictated by problem
Inputs
Results of final pooling layer
(b)
Figure 6.6: An example showing how an MLP topology is encoded as a bit string
genotype using APIC. The variable-length encoded genotype (a) represents a fully-
connected MLP classifier (b).
These genotypes are variable in length, where magnitude is proportional
to the number of hidden layers present in the MLP topology. An example
MLP topology, encoded as a variable-length genotype, is illustrated in
Figure 6.6. The example genotype describes a two-layer fully-connected
MLP, where layer one contains three neurons and layer two contains two
neurons. The alpha value is derived by dividing the decimal representation
of the 14 bit alpha bit string into one. Figure 6.6 illustrates the
implementation of the encoded topology, where the magnitude of the input
vector is determined by the output produced by the convolution and
pooling configuration (Section 6.3.1) and the number of outputs by the
number of classes of the problem. The parameters used to control the GA
for training each MLP in this experiment are listed in Table 6.4.
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Feature Bits Min Max
alpha 14 1 16383
layers 4 1 15
neurons 5 1 31
Table 6.3: Parameters for defining the configuration of each MLP. The value of each
parameter is encoded as a bit string and concatenated to form a variable-length genotype.
Parameter Description Value
max population Maximum number of genotypes per generation 100
elitism Number of best genotypes transferred to next population 10
max generations Maximum number of generations to traverse 1000
mutation rate Mutation rate applied when breeding next generation 0.1
crossover rate Crossover rate applied when breeding next generation N/A
train iterations Training iterations for the backpropagation algorithm 10,000
Table 6.4: GA parameters used to control the feature selection (convolution and pooling
configuration) search process.
The weights of each MLP topology were randomly selected, prior to
tuning by the APIC classifier production process (Section 3.3). The
training process loaded all 300,000 MNIST training samples, including
distortions and rotations, extracting features for each genotype produced by
the feature selection process (Section 6.3.1). The backpropagation
algorithm was used to tune the weights of the classifier over a maximum of
10,000 iterations (train iterations, Table 6.4). This value was chosen
heuristically, based on observations noted when training MLPs within a
CNN on similar data sets. A recall test was performed on each trained
MLP classifier, where the full MNIST test data set, comprising 10,000
previously unseen, labelled samples, was subjected to the feature extraction
process and evaluated by the MLP. The best scoring MLP topology,
determined by the recall accuracy of the MNIST test data set, was returned
and used as the fitness score for each feature extraction genotype produced
in Section 6.3.1.
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Figure 6.7: Results of the APIC feature extraction search process. The chart includes
results for the first 20 generations as no improvements were observed after generation 13.
Outputs


















Figure 6.8: Best scoring CNN topology designed by APIC.
The best scoring feature extraction genotype and its associated
convolution and pooling architecture, along with the best scoring MLP
topology produced by this genotype, were combined to form the best
scoring CNN produced by the APIC method for the MNIST data set using
the parameters listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.3. The following subsection details
the results achieved by the APIC method after the experiment concluded.
6.3.3 Results
The APIC method produced a top scoring CNN topology, reaching an
accuracy rate of 98.86 percent (1.14 percent error rate). This was achieved
by extracting features from the 300,000 MNIST training set samples
(60,000 original, 120,000 resized and up-scaled samples, and 120,000 rotated



























(d) Layer 1: Kernel 4
Stride 2
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
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(g) Layer 2: Kernel 3
Stride 1
Figure 6.9: A depiction of the seven kernels chosen by APIC for the feature extraction
layer and their associated strides. The first four were assigned to the first convolution
layer, with the last three forming the second convolution layer.
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The best scoring feature extraction configuration was discovered at
generation 13. The scores achieved by the feature extraction search process
at each generation are shown in Figure 6.7. The best scoring feature
extraction configuration included two convolution and pooling layers,
illustrated in Figure 6.8. The best scoring MLP for this configuration
consisted of two hidden layers and 40 total hidden neurons (Figure 6.8).
The kernel matrices for each convolution layer are shown in Figure 6.9.
A pooling process was executed for each convolution layer of the
best-scoring CNN. Layer 1 used four pools, with spacial neighbourhood
(receptive area) and strides set to 3x3 stride 2, 3x3 stride 3, 3x3 stride 2
and 3x3 stride 2 respectively. Layer 2 included three pools, with
configuration 4x4 stride 1, 2x2 stride 1 and 2x2 stride 1 respectively. The
best-scoring MLP configuration was found with two hidden layers, with
layer 1 and layer 2 consisting of 17 and 23 neurons respectively. The alpha
value for the MLP was identified during the search process as 1/16026 or
6.2398e-5. The alpha value is used for regularisation, aiding to avoid
overfitting by penalising weights with large magnitudes.
6.4 Discussion
Many approaches for handwritten digit identification have been published
over recent years. The following section outlines a few approaches tested
using the MNIST data set. Some of these approaches perform poorly,
resulting in high error rates, while others define the state-of-the-art
technique for classifying the data set. One clear observation is that
methods achieving low error rates often exhibit complex models consisting
of hundreds of feature maps (for CNNs) and hundreds of neurons (for
ANN/MLPs). A summarised list of each method discussed, and their
respective error rates, is recorded in Table 6.5.
LeCun et al. (1998) tested a variety of gradient-based methods for
classifying the MNIST data set, including linear classifiers, K-nearest
neighbour, Principle Component Analysis (PCA), Radial Basis Function
(RBF), SVMs, ANNs and CNNs. For the purposes of this discussion, the
focus is on the approaches and results achieved by the authors for their
experiments on ANN and CNN classifiers. LeCun et al. (1998) produced
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Method Description Error-rate
LeCun et al. (1998) ANN Classifiers 1.6% - 4.7%
LeCun et al. (1998) CNN Classifiers 0.7% - 1.7%
Ciregan et al. (2012) CNN (Multi-column Deep Learning) 0.23%
Makhzani et al. (2015) Semi-supervised AAE 0.85%
Makhzani et al. (2015) Unsupervised AAE (16/30 Clusters) 9.55%/4.10%
Mohapatra et al. (2015) CDCST Approach 1.2%
APIC Automated CNN development 1.14%
Table 6.5: A list of recent competitive results for classifying the MNIST database of
handwritten digits, ordered by date of publication.
multi-layer ANN topologies, experimenting with the number of hidden
layers and neurons. The first test, on an ANN with a single hidden layer
and 300 hidden neurons, resulted in an error-rate of 4.7 percent. This
error-rate was improved to 4.5 percent, by increasing the number of hidden
neurons to 1,000. Growing the training set by including distortions of the
original images reduced the error rates of the 300 and 1,000 neuron
networks by 3.6 percent and 3.8 percent respectively. The most significant
impact on the error rate was achieved when slanted, or rotated, training
images were used. Including these samples, the error rate for the 300
neuron network was reduced to 1.6 percent. The authors also found that,
by expanding the network to two hidden layers and adding additional
neurons per layer (300 and 100 respectively), only marginal improvements
were observed, achieving 3.05 percent error-rate.
LeCun et al. (1998) expanded their ANN search to include defining CNN
classifiers for the same task. For the first test, samples from the MNIST
training data set were down-sampled to 16x16 pixels and centred in the
28x28 input layer. The authors did not go into detail on their design of
the convolution and pooling layers for this classifier, however they stated
that the classifier achieved an error-rate of 1.7 percent during test data set
recall. These results led the authors to experiment with larger convolutional
networks. The authors tested a network, LeNet-4, which contained four first-
level feature maps, connected to eight sub-sampling (pooling) maps, followed
by 16 feature maps and another 16 pooling maps. The results were passed
through a single-layer MLP with 120 neurons, which achieved an error-rate of
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1.1 percent. The authors next developed LeNet-5, by combining or boosting
(Drucker et al., 1993) three LeNet-4 networks, training and operating them
in an ensemble fashion. An error-rate of 0.7 percent was observed, the best
of all classifiers tested by the authors (LeCun et al., 1998).
The method proposed by Ciregan et al. (2012) represents the current
state-of-the-art technique for classifying images of the MNIST data set. The
authors achieved an error-rate of 0.23 percent, producing the best scoring
classifier for this data set to date. The method, like LeNet-5 (LeCun et al.,
1998), uses multi-column Deep Neural Networks (MCDNN), with convolution
and pooling layers as pre-processors. The authors normalised the MNIST
training data set to 20x20 pixel images, from which six additional data sets
were created with sizes 10x10, 12x12, 14x14, 16x16 and 18x18 pixels. The
authors asserted that reducing the size of the images was akin to observing
the same image from different angles and perspectives. The authors trained
five CNNs for each data set, resulting in 35 total columns for the classifier.
Samples from the data sets were distorted at each of the 800 epochs, where
a learning rate decay of 0.993 was applied. This reduced the learning rate
over the training process from 0.001 (initial) to 0.00003. The results of all
five CNNs were combined, producing the final classification result.
Makhzani et al. (2015) proposed the use of the Adversarial Autoencoder
(AAE), an Autoencoder (AE) (Bengio et al., 2009) that maps an AE output
distribution q(z|x) to an arbitrary prior distribution p(z) using adversarial
training, rather than traditional variational inference. Using this method, a
batch of inputs were encoded and decoded by the AE, which was updated
based on the standard reconstruction loss between input and expected
output. A second batch of inputs was transformed by the AE encoder, after
which they were joined with samples from the prior distribution p(z). The
discriminator was updated, based on its ability to separate samples
generated by the AE and those of p(z). Finally, a batch of inputs was
transformed by the AE encoder and passed to the discriminator for
evaluation. The discriminator predicted the source of the data, after which
the AE encoder was updated. The reconstruction loss of the AE continued
to decline, as did the adversarial loss, until such time as improvements in
the discriminator, and that of the generator, caused the network to
converge. The authors recorded an error-rate of 0.85 percent when
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executing an AAE in a semi-supervised learning configuration. In this test
generated, unlabelled samples were used to supplement labelled samples
when developing the classifier. Finally, the authors removed labels
altogether, testing an unsupervised model that resulted in error-rates of
9.55 percent and 4.10 percent for 16 and 30 clusters, respectively.
Mohapatra et al. (2015) proposed the Discrete Cosine S-Transform
(DCST) method for classifying the MNIST data set. The authors removed
the boundary pixels of each 28x28 pixel MNIST sample, by reducing each
to 20x20 pixels. The authors used DCST to perform the feature extraction
process for each image, resulting in a feature length of 400. These features
were used to train an MLP classifier with 400 input neurons, ten output
neurons and a single hidden layer. Unfortunately the authors failed to state
how many neurons were present in the hidden layer, only stating that they
were “appositely fixed”. The authors also considered only 10,000 of the
70,000 available samples from the MNIST data set in their experiment.
Using this data subset, they achieved an error-rate of 1.2 percent during
their recall tests.
Application of the APIC method for classifying the MNIST data set,
described in Section 6.3, automatically generated best scoring CNN designs
within the parameters listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.3. The most elite (highest
scoring) genotype from the feature extraction GA defined a CNN classifier
that achieved 98.86 percent recall rate (1.14 percent error rate) when
evaluated on the full MNIST data set. This value is comparable with the
ANN and CNN results of LeCun et al. (1998), where the authors achieved
error-rates between 0.7 percent and 4.7 percent, using complex topologies
consisting of many neurons and feature maps. The recall and error rate
achieved by the less-complex, APIC-generated CNN classifier rivalled those
achieved by semi-supervised and unsupervised AAE, tested by Makhzani
et al. (2015). The scores achieved by the APIC-generated CNN also
compare against those of Mohapatra et al. (2015), where 1.2 percent recall
rate was achieved when testing on the full MNIST data set.
While the results produced by the APIC classifier are competitive, the
most noteworthy contribution of APIC to this task is the ability to
generate less complex models for classifying data. These less complex
models were demonstrated to achieve results comparable with more
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complex, manually-defined classifiers. Complexity, in this case, is measured
by the number of hidden layers and hidden neurons required by the MLP to
achieve a model capable of generalising well, where models comprised of
less neurons and layers are considered of lower complexity (Kon and
Plaskota, 2006). For CNN classifiers, complexity extends to include the
composition of the feature extraction layers, where less convolutional layers
and feature maps of lower dimensions are considered less complex. The
complexity of the classifiers produced by APIC was controlled by strict
parameters (Tables 6.1 and 6.3), forcing the method to search for best
feature extraction configurations, including kernel designs, to improve
classification scores. An explanation for how the number of feature maps,
kernels (filters) and pooling operations were chosen was excluded from all of
the comparable CNN approaches discussed in this section. After reviewing
all available information, this section concludes that these configurations
were derived heuristically. There is no evidence to suggest significant effort
was invested in optimising these configurations to improve task
performance, an issue plaguing many systems evaluating MNIST and data
sets of similar size (Kumar et al., 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2015). The APIC
method demonstrated that competitive results could be achieved using far
less complex models. The model achieved competitive results using seven
feature maps and 40 neurons, while LeCun et al. (1998) used 20 feature
maps and 120 neurons for LeNet-4 and Ciregan et al. (2012) used 820
feature maps and 150 neurons for each DNN of MCDNN. Although the
accuracy results achieved by the best scoring APIC classifier failed to
challenge the current state-of-the-art design (Ciregan et al., 2012), they
provided evidence to suggest that simplified models could be developed to
achieve similar results to those of the 35 DNNs developed as part of the
MCDNN classifier.
The MCDNN developed by Ciregan et al. (2012) is effectively 35 DNN
classifiers working together to classify data samples. The same boosting
approach was tested by LeCun et al. (1998), where the results of three
classifiers were used to decide the classification result. LeCun et al. (1998)
observed the best results of all classifiers using this strategy. The APIC
method, as part of the feature extraction process, developed a population of
suitable CNN candidates, of which ten were the most elite (best-scoring). It
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is possible that by utilising a combination of these best-scoring CNN
classifiers, the recall and error rates achieved by APIC at this task could be
improved further. This evaluation, however, falls outside of the objectives
of this chapter and will subsequently be evaluated in future research.
6.5 Conclusion
The objective of this case study was to demonstrate that, by applying
methods like APIC, the complexity of image-recognition classifier models
could be reduced, while maintaining competitive recall and error rates.
This process was demonstrated using the full MNIST data set, where
previously unseen handwritten digits were identified with an accuracy rate
of 98.86 percent (1.14 percent error rate) using a single CNN classifier. This
chapter found that accurate, low-complexity CNN models can be produced
by paying attention to the optimisation of the feature extraction process.
Using the APIC automated feature selection (Section 3.1) and classifier
production (Section 3.3) processes, comparably accurate, less-complex CNN
classifiers could be produced, where recall and error rates rivalled those of
more complex, manually-defined classifiers.
Less complex models increase the reach of classification algorithms,
especially in situations where computational overhead is critical, such as in
embedded systems. As the increase in compute power continues to expand,
the range of APIC-operating parameters can also be expanded, allowing the
method to explore and test more complex classifiers. This, coupled with a
boosting strategy positions APIC as a method that can produce classifiers




Discussion and Future Work
Automated Pattern Identification and Classification (APIC) is a principled
Machine Learning (ML) pipeline method that aims to automate many of
the manual tasks currently associated with ML model development. During
this process, efficient model phenotypes are discovered, which generalise
well compared to topologies constructed manually by human experts. More
efficient models lead to significant performance gains and reduce the chance
of overfitting. Intuitively, overfitting occurs when the model fits the
problem too well, often due to an overly complex model definition.
Likewise, an underfitting situation occurs when the underlying trends of the
data are unable to be captured, often due to an overly simplified model
design. The APIC method prevents both of these situations by evolving
models over a number of generations, evaluating each phenotype using
previously unseen data. APIC is a general method, with efficacy extending
beyond a single domain into a broad range of complex classification tasks,
characterised by noisy, mixed data sets consisting of either static or
streaming data.
This chapter begins with a general discussion of APIC’s approach to
reducing dependency on human experts for implementing ML technologies
in a variety of complex classification tasks, improving accuracy, completeness,
efficiency (performance) and generalisation compared to similar systems. The
discussion focuses on implementation of the method in three complex tasks:
the first two describe related tasks in the network domain, with the third
a distinct task in the domain of computer vision. Successful application of
the method in each of these tasks demonstrates the efficacy of APIC as a
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general method for a broad range of classification tasks. The remainder of
the chapter provides areas of future work, where additional research can be
applied to further enhance the APIC method.
7.1 Automating Classifier Model Design
The APIC method provides several advances for implementing ML in many
complex classification tasks. Although algorithms, such as Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN), have proven effective in solving complex tasks, the design
of a suitable model architecture can be challenging, even for human
experts. Using a Neuroevolutionary (NE) approach, many of the human
design requirements associated with implementing ML technologies in these
areas are removed. This leads to a more pervasive deployment of ML
technologies, especially in instances where no human experts are available,
or where complexity of the task dictates that manual designs are not
feasible. This is especially true for evolving data, where new patterns are
frequently introduced, such as in real-time streaming data sets. In these
cases, it is neither feasible nor cost effective for human experts to monitor
and update classifiers manually.
Incorporating feature selection (Section 3.1), pattern discovery (Section
3.2) and classifier production (Section 3.3) tasks into a single pipeline
method allows all aspects of a classification task to be tracked and tuned
holistically by the APIC method. Rigorous self-evaluation of each model,
automatically designed to classify identified patterns using optimised
feature subsets discovered by the method and tested by cross-validation
using previously unseen sample data, promotes the development of efficient,
high-performance models that generalise well. The results achieved by these
models are automatically improved using Evolutionary Algorithms (EA),
which encode candidate solutions as bit strings. While candidate solutions,
in this dissertation, were provided by EAs, it is possible to substitute
alternative optimisation methods for each task. Likewise, alternative
algorithms may be implemented in each process of the pipeline method, as
the situation dictates. More detail on the topic of algorithm substitution is
provided in Section 7.3.
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In this dissertation, three complex classification tasks were chosen to
demonstrate efficacy of the APIC method. Successful application of the
method in these tasks demonstrates that it is broadly applicable, achieving
accuracy, detection and error rates comparable with methods designed
specifically for each task, with less human expert design input. The
advantages provided by APIC do not imply that these classifiers will always
outperform those manually developed for a particular task. Instead, the
high-level objective of each case study was to demonstrate that even today,
complex hand-designed classifiers could be replaced by high-performance
models that achieve at least comparable accuracy, automatically. The
following section provides a general discussion regarding the application
and benefits of APIC for each case study considered in this dissertation.
7.2 Case Study Analysis
Three current, complex classification tasks were chosen as case studies to
demonstrate the efficacy of the APIC method across a broad range of
classification problems. The first was Internet Protocol (IP) traffic
classification (Chapter 4), a task characterised by low degrees of
completeness, owing to manual design processes often associated with IP
traffic classification systems. APIC was also applied to a related task,
Network-Based Anomaly Detection (NBAD), in Chapter 5, where the
method was tested as a viable victim-end and source-end solution,
classifying anomalous traffic early and accurately. Finally, Chapter 6 tested
APIC for automatically developing more efficient (higher-performance)
models for classifying images as accurately as more complex models,
designed by human experts.
The following subsections discuss the benefits arising for each task
through application of the APIC method.
7.2.1 IP Traffic Classification
The goal of an IP traffic classification system is to understand the type of
traffic traversing networks as it evolves in both scope and complexity (Zhang
et al., 2009a). The evolution of application protocols traversing IP networks
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presents a significant problem for vendors, as unique signatures are required
to classify instances of each application protocol to maintain completeness
of the system. Completeness and accuracy are, according to Szabo et al.
(2007), two performance metrics often used to evaluate IP traffic classification
systems.
In Chapter 4, most classifiers for modern IP traffic classification systems
were found to be designed by human experts. This process introduced
delays and risk of error during signature development, reducing both the
completeness and accuracy of the system. The APIC method, in contrast,
demonstrated that higher degrees of completeness were achievable by
identifying new application protocols in streaming, mixed, noisy data sets,
producing efficient and accurate classifiers to identify future instances of
each automatically. The case study demonstrated that using APIC, a
self-sustaining classification framework that protects against innovation,
remaining up-to-date and relevant, was achievable. APIC’s ability to
automatically identify new application protocols in a constantly evolving
data set demonstrated that automatic, accurate identification of new
patterns in unlabelled, mixed, noisy data sets was possible using a general
ML pipeline method. Furthermore, APIC automatically produced and
evolved customised classifiers, where accuracy results were comparable
with, and often exceeded, those achieved by more complex classifiers,
manually designed by human experts. Both of these findings support the
objectives of this dissertation, set out in Section 1.3, providing evidence
that ML-based pipeline methods, such as APIC, are poised to challenge
state-of-the-art IP traffic classification systems in completeness and
accuracy.
7.2.2 Network-Based Anomaly Detection (NBAD)
NBAD is a task closely related to IP traffic classification, where anomalous
traffic flows on an IP network need to be identified and managed. APIC was
tested as a viable candidate for this task in Chapter 5, where the method
was found capable of discriminating between normal and attack (anomalous)
traffic in both static and live data sets.
According to Tsai and Lin (2010), IP-based anomaly detection systems
are often plagued with high rates of false alarms. The case study presented
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in Chapter 5 showed that using APIC, false alarm rates were reduced to
0.08 percent, while maintaining accuracy and detection rates of 99.48
percent and 99.99 percent on a publicly-available, static data set.
Comparably, the best scoring, manually-designed system constructed
specifically for this task achieved accuracy, detection and false alarm rates
of 99.96, 99.99 and 0.02 percent, respectively. These results showed that the
APIC method was capable of automatically evolving efficient classifiers
where accuracy, detection and false positive rates rivalled those of the best
scoring classifier, designed specifically for this task by human experts. The
remaining six comparable works achieved false alarms significantly greater
than APIC, between 2.2 percent and 33.70 percent. Most noteworthy, the
results achieved by APIC were achieved with very little human-design input
compared to the other systems. Furthermore, the APIC method was
designed as a broadly applicable, general method capable of exhibiting
efficacy in a wide range of classification tasks, while the comparable
methods were designed specifically for the purpose of discriminating
between normal and attack flows in a static data set.
The second part of Chapter 5 evaluated the efficacy of APIC in profiling
and detecting anomalies on a live enterprise network. Using statistics
inferred from Netflow data records, the method was found capable of
detecting anomalous (attack) traffic flows with accuracy, detection and false
alarm rates of 99.90 percent, 99.89 percent and 0.096 percent, respectively.
The accuracy and detection rates achieved by APIC exceeded those of
comparable systems (Table 5.30), while the false alarm rate matched those
of the best scoring methods.
The experiments performed in Chapter 5 provide further evidence to
support the research objectives of this dissertation (Section 1.3),
demonstrating the efficacy of APIC in a broad range of tasks. Interestingly,
anomaly detection is not limited to computer networks, having already
been applied in a number of domains, including intrusion detection
(Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009), fraud detection (Phua et al., 2010), fault
detection (Idé and Kashima, 2004), system health monitoring (Niu et al.,
2011) and event detection in sensor networks (Zhang et al., 2010). The
design of APIC allows it to extend beyond anomaly detection in IP
networks, where application in other domains is the subject of future work.
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7.2.3 Handwritten Digit Recognition
The final case study of this dissertation was chosen to demonstrate the broad
applicability of the APIC method. For this, the method was tested in the
domain of Computer Vision (CV), a discipline attempting to analyse and
understand scenes of the real world (Klette, 2014). Specifically, the task of
handwritten digit recognition was chosen, where the APIC method evolved
less-complex (higher-performance) image recognition classifiers to identify
handwritten digits using the popular MNIST data set.
In Chapter 6, the APIC method developed Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) topologies to recognise instances of previously unseen
handwritten digits from the MNIST data set. Comparable methods,
including the current state-of-the-art method for MNIST classification, used
complex models designed by human experts. These manually-designed
models used heuristic values for the feature extraction and classification
model architecture, resulting in complex, computationally-expensive
classifiers. The APIC method was shown to improve the efficiency
(performance) of classifiers for this task, by determining a more efficient
feature extraction process and Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) architecture
through evolutionary processes.
This case study demonstrated that APIC was both capable of
developing classifiers across a broad range of tasks across multiple domains,
and able to evolve more than Topology and Weight Evolving Neural
Network (TWEANN) classifiers, tested in Chapters 4 and 5. Using novel,
intuitive mutation functions (algorithm 3), candidate solutions of variable
complexity were evolved automatically. The accuracy achieved by the best
scoring CNN rivalled scores of comparable methods, using a more efficient
classifier. This was possible as APIC not only developed an optimised MLP
classifier (Section 3.3), but also searched for the best kernel matrices and
convolution design for the feature extraction component. This process was
performed using the APIC feature selection process (Section 3.1), controlled
by EAs. Kernel selection, according to Huang and Wang (2006), has a
profound impact on accuracy achieved by classifiers. Contrary to similar
methods, where human experts used heuristic values to develop complex
models, the APIC method focused on selecting the best kernel parameters
and features to describe each image, leading to more efficient
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representations, resulting in less-complex classifiers that performed well
compared to the more complex, manually-designed classifiers. The
state-of-the-art method for identifying digits in the MNIST data set used a
boosting strategy, incorporating the results of multiple complex classifiers
to make a classification determination. This boosting strategy, and the
development of a classifier ensemble could also benefit solutions provided by
APIC. The implementation of a boosting strategy for APIC-evolved
classifiers will be investigated in future works.
7.3 Future Work
The APIC general method has already demonstrated efficacy in a broad
range of tasks, across a variety of domains. In addition to IP traffic
classification (Chapter 4), NBAD (Chapter 5) and handwritten digit
recognition (Chapter 6), many other tasks exist that will benefit from
automated phenotype development using ML-based pipeline methods, such
as APIC. These classification tasks include those associated with education,
finance, medical and other technology fields.
The APIC method was designed as an ML pipeline method, specifically
for removing dependence on human experts, improving the application of
ML-based classification in a broad range of tasks. The method is modular,
where specific algorithms may be substituted with others as the task
dictates. For example, Bayesian Optimisation algorithms may be
substituted in favour of EAs, or Support Vector Machines (SVM) may be
substituted as the classifier model, instead of an MLP or TWEANN. The
possibilities for these substitutions are vast, where further research is
required to ascertain the benefits arising from these in various classification
tasks. Another area of research might be to automatically evaluate
algorithm substitutions, further reducing human-design input when
implementing APIC in each task.
As the availability of compute power continues to increase, so the search
space provided to APIC for each task can also be increased. This could be
simply adjusting the search space of each algorithm, or alternatively,
through a “complexification” (Stanley and Miikkulainen, 2002) process,
where simplistic networks are expanded until a better-performing, more
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complex network is discovered. The implication of such processes has yet to
be tested and is subsequently subject to future work.
Finally, the concept of “boosting”, where classifier ensembles are
assembled to make a classification, is an interesting direction for the future
of APIC. In this dissertation, the best performing classifier was used to
make a classification determination, however the final population of each
classifier production process (Section 3.3) contains a number of high-scoring
candidate solutions. By including more of these models when classifying
datum, additional aspects will be considered, leading to a classification
process that generalises well. A boosting strategy using candidate solutions
evolved by APIC has yet to be tested and will subsequently also be the
subject of future research.
7.4 Conclusion
The APIC method has shown promise in a broad range of classification
tasks, removing the dependency on human-design input in both related and
disparate domains. None of the similar methods considered in this
dissertation demonstrated the same degree of automation, nor were they
capable of extending efficacy beyond the task for which they were originally
designed. The APIC method was demonstrated to automatically perform
feature selection, pattern identification and classifier production (model
development) tasks, producing high-performing, accurate classifiers
protected from innovation. Although in this dissertation, APIC was used to
evolve ANN-based models, it is a general method that is suitable for
evolving almost any structured classifier. It is anticipated that through
future research, more automation - including the selection of algorithmic
components for each task and the development of boosting models - will




In this dissertation, the Automated Pattern Identification and Classification
(APIC) method for automatically evolving high-performance classifiers to
solve complex classification problems was presented and evaluated. This
chapter summarises the contributions of the dissertation, providing evidence
that the APIC method improves the efficiency, accuracy, completeness and
pervasiveness of Machine Learning (ML) in a broad range of classification
tasks.
8.1 Research Contributions
A number of artefacts were produced in this dissertation - the most
significant being a new method for automatically developing
high-performance, accurate classifiers for a broad range of applications in a
diverse set of scientific domains. The method promotes reducing the human
input required to develop classifiers for each task, by incorporating feature
selection, pattern identification and classifier production processes into a
single ML-pipeline method. The combination of each of these processes into
a single, general method is a novel contribution of this dissertation. The
ability of the method to evolve its own classifiers protects against
innovation, remaining effective by developing new classifiers automatically
as new patterns are first detected.
The ability to automatically develop accurate, portable classifiers is a
major contribution to the field of Internet Protocol (IP) traffic classification,
where most other classification systems were shown in Chapter 4 to be heavily
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dependent on human-design input. The APIC method allowed new classifiers
to be developed and deployed in near real-time, providing a classification
system that surpasses other comparable systems in completeness. The ability
to select an optimal feature subset, identify patterns in a mixed, noisy data
set and automatically produce portable, accurate classifiers for IP traffic
classification tasks are each contributions to the field of IP networking. The
application of Topology and Weight Evolving Neural Networks (TWEANN)
networks as IP traffic classifiers is another novel contribution of this research.
In Chapter 5, APIC’s efficacy as a Network-Based Anomaly Detection
(NBAD) system was tested, where the method showed great promise
detecting anomalous (attack) traffic in both static and dynamic (live) data
sets. For these tasks, APIC evolved custom TWEANN classifiers, whose
application in NBAD systems is also a unique contribution of this research.
A single method capable of both identifying underlying application
protocols in IP traffic and the detecting of anomalous (attack) traffic in IP
flows is an important contribution to the field of IP networking, promoting
increased control of today’s complex, evolving networks. Only the APIC
method was found capable of generalising between both of these tasks
without requiring substantial core changes or significant design input by
human experts.
Not only did the APIC method demonstrate efficacy by extending
beyond a single task in the IP networking domain, but it also demonstrated
the capability of addressing complex classification tasks in the diverse
domain of computer vision. In Chapter 6, the method evolved both the
feature extraction and classifier components of Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) classifiers, demonstrating that more efficient
(higher-performance) classifiers were achievable by increasing focus on the
features selected for these tasks. Using novel mutation processes (algorithm
3), the complexity of each CNN phenotype was adjusted automatically,
until the best scoring classifier combination was found. This is contrary to
comparative methods, where the structure of each phenotype was
configured heuristically using substantially more complex designs. Both the
custom mutation processes and evolutionary processes implemented by
APIC are novel contributions of this dissertation.
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The APIC method is an important contribution toward the automated
development of efficient, accurate classifiers for addressing a broad range
of classification tasks, as it makes no assumptions regarding the provided
inputs (feature set) or the final phenotype (solution). Instead, the method
automatically discovers the best feature set, identifies distinct patterns within
the data set and develops optimised models in unison to determine the best
configuration for each of these processes. APIC can, therefore, be generalised
to develop solutions for a broad range of current and future classification
tasks with little human-design input compared to current methods. The
APIC method is thus a general methodology for automatically developing
efficient and accurate classifiers for complex classification tasks in a variety
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